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COMMAND PERFORMANCE: THE TAX TREATMENT
OF EMPLOYER MANDATED EXPENSES
John W. Lee*
E MPLOYERS frequently not only expect but require performance
of duties by employees beyond a nine to five tour at the office or
plant. Such obligations may include the employee's living or eating on
the employer's business premises, relocating himself and his family as
a condition precedent to promotion or continued employment, obtain-
ing additional education, entertaining his employer's customers, and
traveling, including trips (frequently accompanied by his spouse pur-
suant to employer command, express or implied) to meetings and con-
ventions, either sponsored by the employer or otherwise.
During the last half century, the federal income tax treatment of such
activities has been the subject of numerous rulings and considerable
litigation. All of the rulings and most of the decisions have compart-
mentalized the above expenses, thereby failing to recognize their com-
mon strands or develop rules of universal application. As a result, the
common principles are, with a few significant recent exceptions, revealed
in such piecemeal fashion by the various lines of cases involving specific
types of deductions or exclusions that uncovering them is similar to
piecing together a Chinese puzzle. The task is further complicated by
the fact that the pieces are contained not only in cases involving exclu-
*Member of the Virginia Bar. B.A., University of North Carolina, 1965; LLB.,
University of Virginia, 1968; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown University, 1970; associated
with the firm of Hirschler and Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the guidance and advice of Edward S.
Hirschler, member of Hirschler and Fleischer, in the preparation of this article.
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sion from the employee's income of the employer's direct payment or
reimbursement of the commanded expense, but also in the employee's
deduction of expenses, both reimbursed and otherwise.
This article examines the development of the federal income tax
treatment of various types of employer compelled expenses or activities
with the goal of isolating common principles that might produce more
conceptual harmony, and hopefully, a little tax equity. It must be noted
at the outset, however, that the evolution of the case law within these
categories has not been without frequent irreconcilable splits in author-
ity, resulting in statutory attempts at clarification and reform in an
effort to obtain more uniform and just results. The common factors that
will recur in these cases are reducible to the common denominators of
(1) employer compulsion and attendant lack of employee control and
(2) business purpose or benefit to the employer. While the refinement
and delineation of these factors have developed unevenly in the various
categories of expenses, the most significant contrasts will be seen in their
different application to exclusions and deductions.
I. CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER: LIVING AND EATING EXPENSES
The "convenience of the employer" doctrine has a long history prior
to its partial codification in section 119 of the 1954 Code as an exclusion
from income. It first appeared in the initial years of the income tax
in administrative rulings proclaimed as early as 1914.' After several
such rulings were issued in which government employees and others
were not required to report as income the fair rental value of quarters
furnished them for the benefit and convenience of their employers,2 the
doctrine was promulgated in the regulations in 1920 as follows:
When living quarters such as camps are furnished to employees for
the convenience of the employer, the ratable value need not be added
to the cash compensation of the employee, but where a person receives
as compensation for services rendered a salary and in addition thereto
living quarters, the value to such person of the quarters furnished con-
stitutes income subject to tax (emphasis added).3
1T.D. 2079, 16 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 249 (1914); Note, Dissection of a Malignancy:
The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine, 44 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 1104 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as Note, Convenience of the Employer).
21d. O.D. 11, 1 CUM. BULL. 66 (1919); O.D. 265, 1 CuM. BULL. 71 (1919).
3 Treas. Reg. 45, art. 33, T.D. 2992, 2 CUM. BULL. 76 (1920).
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The doctrine as thus evolved was first judicially applied in Jones v.
United States.4 There an army officer had been required to live in gov-
ernment quarters in connection with the performance of his official
duties for the first part of the taxable year, and during the rest of the
year, after transfer to a new post without government quarters, received
a cash commutation in lieu of quarters. The Court of Claims held that
neither the value of the government quarters nor the cash commutation
constituted taxable compensation. The court relied primarily on three
factors: (1) the statute taxed such officers only on their "compensation
received as such" and the allowances in question were not compensatory
in nature but rather a reimbursement; (2) the officer was compelled by
the exigencies of his employment to occupy government quarters where
such were available-" [i] f the nature of the services requires the furnish-
ing of a house for their proper performance, and without it the service
may not properly be rendered, the house so furnished is part of the
maintenance of the general enterprise, an overhead expense so to speak,
and forms no part of the individual income of the laborer"; 5 and (3)
the taxpayer had no control over the quarters or allowance beyond "the
naked right of an uncertain period of occupancy" " where quarters were
involved and no election to take the strictly regulated cash commutation
where quarters were available.
Jones became the touchstone for exclusion in subsequent cases and
was relied upon in the first Tax Court decision sanctioning the doctrine,
Arthur Benaglia.7 In that case, the taxpayer was employed as the man-
ager of a resort hotel and was required to take his meals and lodging
there. The court ruled that the taxpayer's residence at the hotel was
neither compensation for his services nor was for his personal con-
venience, comfort or pleasure, but was furnished solely because he could
not otherwise perform the services required of him. Consequently, it
concluded that the value of the meals and lodging was not income to
the employee even thought it relieved him of expenses that he would
have otherwise borne.8
4 60 Ct. Cl. 552, 575, 577 (1925).
5 Id: at 575.
6 Id. at 577.
7 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
8 The advantage to him was merely an incident of the performance of his duty, but its
character for tax purposes was controlled by the dominant fact that the occupation
of the premises was imposed upon him for the convenience of the employer. Id. at 840.
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The Tax Court subsequently clarified this holding in Gunnar Van
Rosen:
[T]hough there was an element of gain to the employee, in that he
received subsistence and quarters which otherwise he would have had
to supply for himself, he had nothing he could take, appropriate, use
and expend according to his own dictates, but rather, the ends of the
employer's business dominated and controlled, just as in the furnishing
of a place to work and in the supplying of the tools and machinery with
which to work. The fact that certain personal wants and needs of the
employee were satisfied was plainly secondary and incidental to the
employment (emphasis added).9
Thus, it may be seen that the case law doctrine rested in the eyes of the
Tax Court (and other courts as well) on three factors: the employee's
lack of control and dominion, the employer's requirement, and the pri-
mary purpose of the expense-to benefit the employer or the employee.'0
It may be noted that where the secondary purpose was not merely inci-
dental and relatively insignificant, but rather the employer benefit and
employee benefit purposes were both substantial, an allocation would
be made excluding from income the value of the lodging only to the
extent attributable to the employer's benefit."
The Internal Revenue Service, on the other hand, took the position
in Mim. 647212 that the pre-1954 Code convenience of the employer
rule was "simply an administrative test to be applied only in cases in
which the compensatory character of such benefits is not otherwise
determinable." 's The Tax Court accepted the Service's position with-
out question, stating in Joseph L. Doran: 14
917 T.C. 834, 838 (1951); accord, Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768, 774-75
(3d Cir. 1954).
10See Michael A. Tougher, Jr., 51 T.C. 737, 745-46 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 441
F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). These factors are criticized in
Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, N.Y.U. llTH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1147, 1155-57
(1953) (hereinafter cited as Bittker).
11 Olin D. Ellis, 6 T. C. 138 (1946).
12 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 15. This ruling sparked controversy; compare Bittker, supra
note 10, 'with Gutkin & Beck, Some Problems in "Convenience of the Employer," 36
TAxEs 153 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Gutkin & Beck).
13 See Harold Brannon Magness, 26 T.C. 981, 983 (1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 93 (1958) (clearly the doctrine is an administrative engraft-
ing of an exclusion from gross income).
1421 T.C. 374 (1953); accord, Charles A. Brasher, 22 T.C. 637 (1954).
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It is undoubtedly true that the petitioner [i.e., taxpayer] lives at his
place of employment for his employer's convenience, but it does not
necessarily follow from this that the value of his living quarters is
not compensation. The weakness of the petitioner's argument is that
he considers "compensation" and "convenience of the employer" as
necessarily alternative propositions. This is not so. The convenience
of the employer rule is merely one test used to determine whether the
value of living quarters furnished to an employee is compensation.
In the absence of other criteria it has often been controlling. 15
The circuit courts and district courts were less receptive to the Com-
missioner's contention that the doctrine was merely an administrative
test applicable only when the compensatory nature of the benefit was
not otherwise determinable.' 6 For instance, the Second Circuit in Dia-
mond v. Sturr,17 citing pre-Doran Tax Court decisions,' pointed out
that the issue in such cases was not the issue of "compensation," but
whether the food and lodging was supplied for the employer's con-
venience. The court held that the convenience of the employer test
having persisted as the measuring rod of compensation in the interpre-
tations of the Treasury and the Tax Court throughout years of reenact-
ment of the Internal Revenue Code constituted the applicable standard
-apparently referring to the familiar rule that "Treasury regulations and
interpretations long continued without substantial change,.., are deemed
to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law." 19
Other decisions, such as Gordon v. United States,20 while not specifically
rejecting Mim. 6472, in the words of one commentator "evaded the
philosophy behind it." 21 There the district court held that there was
no inherent contradiction between the existence of an economic ad-
vantage and the co-existence of the more important convenience to the
employer, the implicit premise being that an economic benefit is non-
1' Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953).
16 Note, Convenience of the Employer, supra note 1, at 1117; see Gutin & Beck
supra note 12, at 158-59.
17 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955).
'8Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.TA. 838, 839 (1937); George Lamaze, 9 P-H B.T.A.
Mem. 196 (1940). Contra, Herman Martin, 44 B.TA. 185, 189 (1941). Martin was
followed in Doran.
i9 Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938); accord, George I. Stone, 32 T.C.
1021, 1024 (1959) (applying principle in context of section 119).
20 152 F. Supp. 427 (D.N.J. 1957).
2 1Note, Convenience of the Employer, supra note 1, at 1118.
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compensatory where furnished primarily for the benefit or convenience
of the employer.
The House version of section 119 in the 1954 Code would have re-
solved this conflict in favor of the Diamond approach by specifically
eliminating compensatory intent as a basis for not applying the con-
venience of the employer doctrine.- The Senate believed that the
House's use of the phrase "whether or not furnished as compensation"
for this purpose was confusing2 3 and substituted in its place "for the
convenience of the employer." 24 Significantly, the Senate report despite
this change in phraseology maintained that "there is excluded from the
gross income of an employee the value of meals and lodging furnished
to him for the convenience of his employer whether or not such meals
and lodging are furnished as compensation." 25
Under section 119 both the Service and the Tax Court initially at-
tempted to adhere to their 1939 Code positions, but they were soon
rebuffed by the Eighth Circuit in Boykin v. Commissioner.26 In revers-
ing the Tax Court and the Commissioner, Boykin held that Congress
intended to make the value of maintenance supplied in kind for the
convenience of the employer excludable from gross income regardless
of whether such maintenance might be regarded as part of the em-
ployee's compensation. Despite the fact that the Service has announced
that it will follow Boykin,27 the regulations continue to provide that
meals are considered furnished for the convenience of the employer only
if "furnished for a substantial noncompensatory business reason of the
employer. If an employer furnishes meals as a means of providing addi-
tional compensation to his employee (and not for a substantial non-
compensatory business reason of the employer), the meals so furnished
Will not be regarded as furnished for the convenience of the employ-
er." 28 In light of the legislative history of section 119 one commentator
has concluded that the proper interpretation of this language is that
"substantial noncompensatory business reason of the employer" should
have the same meaning as "primarily for the convenience of the em-
22 H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 119 (1954).
23 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
24 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 119.
25 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
26 260 F.2d 249, 254 (8th Cir. 1958).
27 Rev. Rul. 59-307, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 48.
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (a) (2) (1956).
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ployer." 2 It is submitted that Diamond v. Sturr correctly stated the
law with respect to the non-statutory exclusion and, consequently, bene-
fits furnished primarily for the employer's convenience constitute non-
compensatory benefits.
Whereas the pre-1954 Code convenience of the employer decisions
probed the compensation issue, the 1954 Code section 119 cases exam-
ined areas such as the relationship between the employer's command and
the performance of the employee's duties and between employer com-
pulsion and lack of employee control where the employee is a dominant
shareholder in his corporate employer.
A. Duties of Employee
Section 119 provides an exclusion from gross income of the value of
meals or lodging furnished to an employee "by his employer for the
convenience of the employer, but only if -... (2) in the case of lodg-
ing, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment." It is gen-
erally recognized that the condition of employment test is merely a
reformulation of the convenience of the employer test and the two are
basically similar.30 The Service interprets the condition of employment
test as meaning that the employee must be required to accept the lodging
in order to enable him to properly perform the duties of his employ-
ment.3 ' The Tax Court accepted this construction in Mary B. Hey-
ward.32 It provided several examples of reasons requiring on premises
housing for proper performance of duties: (1) remoteness of job site
and unavailability of other housing, (2) necessity of the employee being
on call for duty at all times, and (3) "possibly because the employer
demands it for reasons of his own." 3  The Heyward court reserved
opinion on the question whether section 119 was applicable if the em-
ployer insists that the employee live on premises without any apparent
connection between such occupancy and the performance of the em-
ployee's duties.34
29 Note, Convenience of the Emnployer, supra note 1, at 1122.
30 United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660 (Ct.
C1. 1964); accord, Herbert G. Hatt, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1293, 1303-04 (1969), aff'd,
72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. q 9259 (7th Cir. 1972).
31 Treis. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1956).
32 36 T.C. 739, 744 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 301 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962).
33 36 T.C. at 744.
34 Id.
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In Gordon S. Dole,35 however, the Tax Court came close to elim-
inating the demand of the employer as a criterion for establishing a
condition of employment:36
The standard prescribed by Congress is not subjective. It is objective.
The employer's state of mind is not controlling .... Many employers
may prefer that their employees live near the worksite so that they
will be more readily available for work. This is not a situation like
William L Olkjer and George 1. Stone where company housing near
the construction site was the only housing available in which the em-
ployees could live. By contrast, it was not necessary for these peti-
tioners to live in the company-owned houses to perform their duties
adequately. No company business was conducted in the homes. They
were used only as private residences of the petitioners. Granted that
petitioners needed to be in close proximity to the mill when emergen-
cies occurred, they could have lived in other available and suitable
houses located ... within a radius of 3 miles from the mill. a7
Dole was affirmed on appeal, however, on the basis of a concurring
opinion resting solely on the rationale that the lodging was not located
on the employer's business premises.38
The Tax Court in M. Carata2 9 subsequently followed Dole, reason-
ing that the term "required" meant required in order for an employee
to properly perform his duties of employment; therefore, the fact that
an employee was compelled by his employer to accept lodging on busi-
ness premises, standing alone, was not sufficient. The court found the
lodging furnished was not indispensable to the proper discharge of the
employee's duties. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, con-
struing the regulations under section 119 as providing alternative means
of satisfying the proper performance of duties, i.e., the condition of
employment prerequisite is feasibility of performance without furnished
lodging or a requirement that the employee be available at all times. "It
is not necessary to show that the duties would be impossible to perform
without the lodging being available. The regulation presumes that, if
35 43 T.C. 697 (1961), affrd per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965).
36 Note, Convenience of the Employer, supra note I, at 1125.
37 Gordon S. Dole, 43 T.C. 697, 706 (1961).
3 8 Dole v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 308, 309 (1st Cir. 1965). For an exhaustive treatment
of the concept of business premises see Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th
,Cir. 1966).
39 52 T.C. 960, 963 (1969), rev'd, 442 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1971).
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the employee must be available for duty at all times, the lodging is,
practically speaking, indispensable to the proper discharge of his
duties." 4 Yet, because the Ninth Circuit noted that the nature of the
taxpayer's job required that he be available for duty at all times, the
question remains unanswered whether condition of employment is met
where the employer requires that the employee live on the premises
and be available for duty, but there is no apparent connection between
such "on call" requirement and the performance of the employee's
duties. Nevertheless, the underlying rationale of the convenience of the
employer doctrine that the lodging, etc., must primarily benefit the
employer 41 would appear to require such a rationale connection. Thus,
there is an intimate interdependence between the concepts of employer
requirement and employer benefit.
B. Lack of Employee Control
A further significant and more precisely charted area of interde-
pendence is that of lack of employee control and employer requirement.
Usually the former would be a corollary of the latter: since it is the
employer who has required the move, lodging, or other "expenditure,"
the employee has no control over it. However, this is not always the
case. Nevertheless the Tax Court held in Herbert G. Hatt2 that the
fact the employee is also the president and majority shareholder of the
employer only necessitates careful scrutiny of the arrangement and does
not disqualify the employee from the benefits of section 119 even if he
could determine the "convenience" of his employer and the "conditions"
of his own employment. Similarly, under this provision the fact that the
employee is convenienced is not relevant;- the determinative issue is
whether the meals and lodging were provided for the convenience of
the employer. On the other hand, where the employee controls the
time, manner, and place of an expenditure, such as a cash allowance
provided on-duty highway patrolmen for meals, the Tax Court has held
under the pre-section 119 law that the allowance constituted compen-
40 Caratan v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1971).
41 See Note 9 supra and accompanying text.
42 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1293, 1304 (1969), aft'd, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. t 9258 (7th Cir.
1972); see T. NEss & E. VoGEL, TAxATIoN oF THE CLOSELY-HELD CORoRAnoN 8-57
(revised 1972) (hereinafter cited as Ness & Vogel).
43 William I. Olkjer, 32 T.C. 464, 469 (1959).
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sation.44 In a subsequent section 119 decision the Tax Court made ex-
plicit this interdependence between lack of employee control and con-
venience of the employer.45
Interestingly, the First Circuit, in a case involving reimbursement
to state policemen for on-duty meals in public restaurants adjacent to
highways assigned to them, reasoned that from the point of view of the
taxpayer, his employer's compulsory control over the place, duration,
value, and content of the meal might substantially reduce his freedom
and enjoyment of the meal and, hence, its value to him.46 The circuit
court noted that the Tax Court has considered these factors to be strong
evidence that employer's convenience was served, as distinguished from
a mere attempt to supply tax free income to the employee, 47 but de-
clined to deal with the convenience of the employer requirement of
section 119, finding the "meals" were not furnished on the employer's
business premises and that the "value of meals" did not encompass cash
payments.
In summary, while the Tax Court has on one occasion stated that
lack of employee control is strong evidence of "convenience of the
employer," i.e., implying that the former element is not always synony-
mous with employer requirement, the more established and widely
accepted view is that the factors of (1) employer requirement, (2) bene-
fit to the employer, and (3) lack of employee control (usually a con-
comitant of the employer's command) are sufficient for exclusion from
income, or at least satisfy the employer convenience and condition of
employment requirements of section 119. There is a further conflict
44 Harold Brannon Magness, 26 T.C. 981 (1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 931 (1958); see Walker, Employee Meals, Lodging and Moving
Expenses, N.Y.U. 25TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 529, 538 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Walker);
Ness & Vogel, supra note 42, at 8-55. See generally Note, Convenience of the Employer,
supra note 1, at 1133 n.223.
45 "When an employer furnishes a 'meal' in its normal sense, he can control the time,
place, duration, value and content of the meal to suit his convenience. These elements
of potential control, which are strong evidence that the employer's convenience is
involved, are lacking in a case such as this one, where the employee merely purchases
groceries." Michael A. Tougher, Jr., 51 T.C. 737, 745-46 (1969), aff'd per curirmn, 441
F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
46Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1969); cf., Allen J. McDonell,
36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 126, 129 (1967). See generally Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d
264, 267 (2d Cir. 1955); Bittker, supra note 10, at 1155 n.22.
47 Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 697 n.6 (1st Cir. 1969).
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under the statutory exclusion as to whether lodging must also be indis-
pensable to the performance of the employee's duties.
II. INTEREST OF THE EMPLOYER: MOVING EXPENSES
In Revenue Ruling 54-42948 the Service announced that allowances
or reimbursements made to an existing employee from his employer for
moving himself, his immediate family, household goods and personal
effects, i.e., "direct moving expenses," "in the case of a transfer in the
interest of his employer, from one official station to another for per-
manent duty, do not represent compensation..., and are not includible
in the gross income of the employee" 49 if the total amount is expended
for such moving expenses (emphasis added). John E. Cavanagh5° made
the similarity in terminology to the convenience of the employer doc-
trine explicit: "the transfer was not only for the convenience of his
then employer, but specifically directed and required by it." "' Like-
wise in its well reasoned opinion in Homer H. Starr2 the Tax Court in
elucidating the Service's phrase "interest of the employer," revealed the
complete identity in theory in the two areas of meals and lodging and
moving expenses.5 3
These factors were the same as those utilized in Gunnar Van Rosen,5 4
in explication of the pre-1954 convenience of the employer doctrine.5
Finally, Norvel Jeff McLellan56 acknowledged that but a single prin-
ciple was being applied by citing a pre-section 119 employer convenience
decision and ruling in the context of employee moving expenses.
Most cases have not acknowledged that the same principle was in-
48 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 53.
49d.
50 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
51 Id. at 303.
5246 T.C. 743 (1966), rev'd, 399 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1968). See generally Note,
Tax Treatment of the Transferred Employee's "Indirect" Moving Expenses. Com-
missioner v. Starr (1oth Cir. 1968), 48 ORE. L. REv. 299 (1969) (hereinafter cited as
Note, "Indirect" Moving Expenses).
M3 See generally Walker, supra note 44, at 549. "In a situation where the iransfer
of an existing employee is solely at the behest of the employer and where the cause
of the temporary expenditure is outside the control of the employer, the expenses are
incurred primarily for the benefit of the employer." Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743, 747
(1966).
54 17 T.C. 834, 838 (1951).
55 See p. 4 & note 9 supra.
5651 T.C. 462, 466 (1969).
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volved in the exclusion of meals and lodging under the convenience of
the employer doctrine and in the exclusion of reimbursements of moving
expenses incurred in the interest of the employer. Consequently, the
courts have placed different emphasis on the elements of the single con-
cept which is best described as the benefit of the employer doctrine.
While a major focus of the convenience of the employer cases has been
on the factor of lack of employee control,57 a major concern of the
exclusion of reimbursed moving expenses opinions has been whether the
employee expense was in the primary interest of the employer.58 An issue
of common importance has been the circumstances in which an economic
benefit, such as meals and lodging or reimbursement for moving expenses,
is not compensatory. 59 Just as the pre-section 119 cases had split irrec-
oncilably over this issue, so did the reimbursed moving cases. 60 More-
over, Congress also stepped in. In this instance, rather than prescribing
a statutory exclusion, Congress fashioned a special deduction for mov-
ing expenses (thereby bringing tax parity to the unreimbursed em-
ployee)61 and ultimately provided expressly for inclusion in income of
such reimbursements."2 While the ground rules are now firmly estab-
lished for post-1969 tax years, two cases in the earlier tortious case law
development that prompted this legislative reform are particularly in-
structive as to the parameters of the interest of the employer concept
and the question of compensation in the context of the broader under-
lying doctrine of benefit of the employer. These cases, Homer H. StarrG
and Edward N. Wilson, 4 epitomize the philosophical problems that have
plagued the entire area of employer compulsion of expenditures.
The taxpayer in Starr had moved solely at his employer's behest and
was unable to obtain a residence for himself and his family due to a
housing shortage. Consequently, he resided in a hotel at the new job site
for forty-three days while maintaining his family at his old residence
until they could move into a residence at his new duty post. The tax-
57 See notes 9 and 10 supra and accompanying text.
58 Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743, 746 (1966).
59See, e.g., Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1955) ("convenience of the
employer"); Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743 (1966), rev'd, 399 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1968).
60 Compare the Tax Court's opinion with the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Commissioner
v. Starr, 399 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1968).
61 INT. REv. Com, of 1954, § 217.
62 Id., § 82.
6346 T.C. 743 (1966), reed, 399 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1968) (exclusion).
6449 T.C. 406 (1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1969) (deduction).
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payer's employer reimbursed him for meals, lodging and incidental
expenses at the new place of employment prior to the arrival of his
family. The Tax Court acknowledged that the concept of gross income
was all inclusive, but it also recognized that "it is a well-established
principle that a reimbursement of costs incurred by an existing employee
primarily for the benefit of the employer is not compensatory in nature
and is excludable from the employee's gross income (emphasis added)." 65
Rejecting the Service's contention that indirect moving expenses could
not, under any circumstances, primarily benefit the employer, it pro-
ceeded to define the limits of the concept "interest or benefit of the
employer." In keeping with the intent of Congress as manifested in its
first attempt at reform in this area, a deduction under section 217 for
the direct moving expenses of old employees, the court met the chal-
lenge of Congress' having expressly left the exclusion for judicial
interpretation.
The court's starting point was that the criteria used to determine
whether a reimbursement is compensatory are in no way dependent upon
considerations relevant to the deductibilty of the expense by the em-
ployee. Proceeding to determine the scope of the concept of "the inter-
est of the employer" it answered the Government's principal conten-
tion 0 with a number of arguments, the strongest of which were: (1)
the "picture" of an employer underwriting the whims of its employees
at a new job site did not square with the economic realities of such
reimbursement insuring for the employer the ready availability of a
skilled, mobile labor force; 7 and (2) the fact the taxpayer was forced,
due to a housing shortage, to accept temporary quarters at the new job
site while maintaining his family at his old residence could hardly be
said to be the result of the taxpayer's "personal preference or taste." Its
conclusion was:
[W] here the transfer of an existing employee is solely at the behest of
the employer and where the cause of the temporary expenditure is
outside the control of the employee, the expenses are incurred primarily
for the benefit of the employer. In such a case, the concept of the
"interest of the employer" covers those costs which are actually
65Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743, 744-45 (1966).
6 "[I]ndirect expenses depend upon the employee's personal taste and the employer's
generosity, so that, even though incurred solely as a result of a transfer required by
the employer, the expenses cannot be regarded as primarily for the employer's benefit"
Id. at 746.
67See Note, "Indirect" Moving Expenses, supra note 52, at 303-04.
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incurred to effect the change in location, including those temporary
living costs directly related to and caused by the circumstances in
existence at the new post of duty.G8
Starr thus expressed more clearly than the "convenience of the em-
ployer" decisions the principle that compensatory economic benefits
and benefits that primarily benefit the employer are mutually exclusive
categories. 9 More significant was its indication that lack of employee
control where an expense is incurred pursuant to an employer's require-
ment need only extend to the cause of the expenditure; thus, lack of
control over all the elements of time, place, duration and value of the
expenditure is not necessary for the primary benefit of the expenditure
to inure to the employer. Accordingly, the very stringent lack of em-
ployee control requirements manifested in some of the Tax Court "con-
venience of the employer" decisions" are not necessarily mandatory as
to the contours of the broader underlying benefit of the employer
concept.
The Tax Court in Starr was careful to maintain a distinction between
old and new employees, possibly because an appeal would lie in the
Tenth Circuit which had decided United States v. Woodall,7 the first
6846 T.C. 747; accord, Willis B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801, 806-07 (1963) (Hoyt, J.,
concurring).
69 See text at notes 17-21, supra.
70 See text at notes 44 and 45, supra.
71255 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824 (1958). The taxpayers all
entered into an employment contract providing that the new employer would reim-
burse certain moving expenses, including cost of moving household effects, hotel
and meals en route, and automobile travel expenses, provided that the employees remain
in their new employment for at least six months. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that
the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955)
had construed the scope of income as encompassing "all gains except those specifically
exempted" and that, as stated by the Court in Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243,
247 (1956), "any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as com-
pensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected" is includible in gross
income. Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Woodall court concluded
that the reimbursements were includible in gross income.
One of the conditions which induced taxpayers to accept employment was
that their moving expenses to the place where they would be employed would
be paid by the employer. While it is true that there was no gain or profit from
the payments to the taxpayers, it cannot be denied that they received an economic
and beneficial gain. Had the expenses not been paid by the employer, the burden
would necessarily have been on the taxpayers. The payment 'was in the nature
of a cash bonus as an inducement to accept employment. As a matter of law,
these payments are no different than had Sandia [the employer] given the tax-
payers cash to pay outstanding obligations, or for the payment of living ex-
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moving expense decision which had been read as resting on such -a
dichotomy. Thus, discrimination against new employees Was confirmed
as to indirect moving expenses. Consequently, one writer accepted
Starr's economic reality reasoning and believed that it logically extended
Revenue Ruling 54-429, and therefore called for further legislative
reform to end this distinction in tax treatment.7 2 An earlier commentator,
evidencing concern for uniform treatment of similarly situated tax-
payers, had argued that the only escape short of legislation from such
discrimination was to reject any judicially fashioned exclusion.7" A
preferable alternative would have been to extend the compensation-
benefit to the employer analysis to reimbursed moving expenses, direct
and indirect, of new employees, an approach advocated in a concurring
opinion in Willis B. Ferebee,4 one of the early new employee direct
moving expenses decisions.
The Tenth Circuit, which had earlier decided Woodall, reversed
Starr on appeal.75 It could find no difference between an old employee
and a new employee. Unfortunately, in rejecting this discriminatory
penses for a specified period after their arrival in Albuquerque. The form of
payment, to constitute income, is immaterial. The statute explicitly declares that
gross income shall include compensation for personal services of whatever kind
and in whatever form it is paid. 255 F.2d 372 (emphasis added).
The Tax Court in John E. Cavanagh, 36 T.C. 300, 304 (1961) distinguished Woodall
on the grounds that the latter decision involved a "new" employee, and shortly there-
after in Willis B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801, 803 (1963) ruled that reimbursements of direct
moving expenses of a new employee were includible in income. Thus, at this point
reimbursements of direct moving expenses of existing employees were excludible, but
reimbusement of identical expenses of a new employee were includible. Furthermore,
it was the Service's position that unreimbursed moving expenses were not deductible
by old or new employees. See Hazelwood, Costs Incurred by an Individual Who
Moves in Connection 'with His Employment: A Tax Analysis, 20 TAx L. Rav. 365, 384
(1965) (hereinafter cited as Hazelwood). This discrimination against new employees
and unreimbursed employees led Congress in 1964 to provide under certain circum-
stances a deduction in new section 117 for direct moving expenses (the only category
whose reimbursements are recognized by the Service as excludible for existing em-
ployees) of all employees, including new and noreimbursed ones. S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964-3 Cumv. BuLL. 579. Congress stated, however,
that no inference was to be drawn that exclusions were necessarily limited to direct
expenses. "The question of whether the exclusion for existing employees extends beyond
these three categories is left for judicial interpretation." Id. at 71-72,-575-76.
7221 U. MlAmi L. REv. 705 (1967).
73Berger, Recent Developments Tighten Up Taxation of Employees' Reimbursed
Moving Expenses, 43 Taxes 519, 524 (1965).
7439 T.C. 801, 807 (1963) (Judge Hoyt).
75399 F.2d 675, 676 (10th Cir. 1968).
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distinction, it did not consider whether its cash bonus analysis in
Woodall was incorrect and whether it should yield to the employer ben-
efit analysis of Starr.76 Indeed, it refused to even discuss the principle
relied upon in the Tax Court, i.e., reimbursement of costs incurred by
an employee primarily for the benefit of his employer is not compen-
satory in nature. The Tenth Circuit's position that such reimbursements
constituted incentive bonuses, if correct, meant that the Service had
been too liberal in Revenue Ruling 54-429 in allowing reimbursement
for any moving expense to be excluded, since Woodall had involved
direct moving expenses of a new employee. The Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion in Starr, therefore, conflicted with appellate decisions which had
approved the ruling.77
76 The final judicial chapter in this imbroglio was written in two Tax Court reviewed
opinions-Norvel Jeff McLellan, 51 T.C. 463 (1968) and William A. Lull, 51 T.C. 841
(1969), aff'd, 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970). In McLellam, also appealable to the Tenth
Circuit, the majority in a singularly unenlightening opinion stated that the court had
reviewed its opinion and conclusions in Starr in light of the reversal by the circuit
court and concluded "that the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Starr is decisive
of this case." 51 T.C. at 465. It is, perhaps, significant that the majority opinion was
written by a judge who had dissented in Cavanagh. See note 71 supra. A concurring
opinion, joined by many of the judges, reasoned that "[slome economic benefits re-
ceived by employees, when furnished for the convenience of their employer, have
long been regarded as excludible from gross income." Id. at 466. It also reasoned that re-
imbursement for reasonable moving expenses should qualify for such exclusion. The con-
curring opinion further pointed out that if an employer furnishes a moving allowance for
the additional living expenses of living for a time in a hotel and eating in a restaurant at
a new job site, "it is not compensation for services rendered or to be rendered by the
employee; it is to prevent the employee from bearing the expenses of the transfer
requested by the employer. Like the reimbursement of an employee traveling on busi-
ness of the employer, the moving allowance relieves the employee of expenses under-
taken primarily on behalf of the employer." Id. However, it was recognized that
to so hold in a case appealable to the Tenth Circuit would be a futile act merely
forcing "the parties to the expense and trouble of securing a review and reversal of the
decision"' Id. at 467. The Lull majority merely slavishly followed McLellan, although
appeal lay in a different circuit. Strong dissents were lodged.
77See, e.g., Lull v. Commissioner, 434 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1970); England v.
United States, 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 936 (1966). Lull in par-
ticular appeared to adopt a "conduit" theory as to direct moving expenses. Although
reimbursements for direct moving expenses:
[M]ight properly be viewed as reimbursement for expenses of the employer
and, as such, do not constitute income to the employee . . ., payments for "in-
direct" expenses . . . can [not] be viewed as reimbursement for expenses which
should be attributed to the employer. The reimbursement is for expenses inci-
dental to the taxpayer's efforts to provide housing for himself and his family.
The expenses are for the kind of items that, for tax purposes, taxpayers usually
must provide for themselves from their salary . . . . "[Ilndirect" expenses . . .
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Since Edward N. Wilson 8 involved the deductibility of employer
mandated moving expenses, and the prior discussion of moving ex-
penses as well as of meals and lodging has considered only the question
of exclusions from gross income, it is necessary to first sketch the basic,
well-established rules regarding deductions.
There are three fundamental prerequisites for deduction of an expense
under section 162: it must be (1) incurred in carrying on a "trade or
business" (2) "ordinary and necessary" and (3) "paid or incurred within
the taxable year." 79 Only the first two are pertinent here. "Ordinary"
serves to distinguish between those that are in the nature of capital
expenditures, i.e., costs resulting in the acquisition or enhancement of
assets having useful lives extending beyond the close of the taxable year
and which accordingly must be amortized over the useful lives of the
assets.80 "Necessary" imposes only the minimal requirement that the
expense be "appropriate and helpful" for the development of the tax-
are attributable to the employee, and that reimbursement is simply added com-
pensation paid by the employer. Having been reimbursed for their own ex-
penses, taxpayers have experienced an economic gain. 434 F.2d at 617.
This rationale is made more clear in John E. Cavanagh, 36 T.C. 300 (1961), where the
Tax Court concluded that employer reimbursements of extra-ordinary food and lodging
expenses incurred by an employee at his employer's requirement:
[RIepresent repayment to the employee of an amount he has first paid for and on
behalf of his employer and do not constitute income to him. They are the em-
ployer's costs, not the employee's .... The prohibition against the deduction of
personal living expenses has reference only to such expenses as are ultimately
chargeable to the taxpayer. It has no applicability to such expenses properly
chargeable to another which the taxpayer pays and for which he is reimbursed.
36 T.C. at 304.
The court also held that the employer's convenience was primarily served by the tax-
payer's relocation. Although Cavanagh used language similar to that used by the con-
venience of the employer cases, its fundamental rationale was not that the taxpayer
received an economic benefit that was, however, not compensatory because it primarily
benefited the employer-the theory underlying the benefit of the employer doctrine-;
rather its not fully articulated rationale was that an expense incurred by a taxpayer
on behalf of another constitutes an advance to him and the other's subsequent reim-
bursement constitutes nontaxable repayment of a loan to the taxpayer. Cf. Arthur W.
Harrison, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1904, 1908 (1941). Since this rationale has been of
greater import in the area of entertainment expenses, it will be considered more fully
there. See text at notes 286 through 289 infra.
78 49 T.C. 406 (1968), reVd, 412 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1969).
79 4A J. MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE T.Ax.rioN § 25.07, p. 27 (1966) (hereinafter
cited as MEaRTNs). See generally Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Neces-
sary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1089, 1092-93, 1110-11 (1964) (hereinafter
cited as Wolfman).
80 Commissioner v. Teller, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
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payer's business. 81 Rarely will courts question the necessity of an ex-
pense by the taxpayer,8 2 with the peculiar exception of the Tax Court
when travel and entertainment expenditures are involved. 83
In the dichotomies that have engendered so much litigation under sec-
tion 162, "business" expenses are the counterpoise to personal, living,
or family expenses, which are not deductible except as expressly pro-
vided in the Code.84 Personal expenses are nowhere defined in the Code
or the regulations. Moreover, business expenses are defined in the reg-
ulations only in terms of a relationship: "the ordinary and necessary
expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to the taxpayer's
trade or business (emphasis added)." 85 Consequently, it should not be
surprising that most of the litigation in this area, particularly in the Su-
preme Court, has focused on the test to be applied in relating the expense
to the category of business or personal rather than on the meaning to be
ascribed to the category. That test as announced in United States v. Gil-
mores6 is the origin and the character of the expense. ST There the Court
held that the expense of defending a divorce suit was a personal expense
because the claim against the taxpayer, although it might affect his hold-
ings of income producing property, arose out of the personal relation-
ship of marriage.
An employer's requirement that an employee incur an expense would
seem to make it necessary as a matter of course.8 But as early as Welch
v. Helvering,s° the landmark "ordinary and necessary" decision, it was
recognized that "[m]any necessary payments are charges upon capi-
tal." "0 Thus, employer compulsion cannot convert a capital expendi-
ture into an ordinary expense. A more recent Supreme Court example
may be found in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n,91
81 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
82 J. Mertens, supra note 80, at § 25.09; Note, Determining Whether Convention
Trips are a Personal or Business Expense; 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 567, 568 (1962) (hereinafter
cited as Note, Convention Trips).
83 See text at note 246 infra.
84 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 262.
S5 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1958).
86 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
87 See generally Note, Deductibility of Legal Expenses: The Exclusivity of Gilmore,
40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 351 (1965).
88 See Note, Convention Trips, note 82 supra, at 570.
89 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
90 ld. at 113.
91403 US. 345 (1971).
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where the only issue was whether the payment of an "additional pre-
mium" to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation by the
taxpayer under compulsion of federal law "was an expense and an or-
dinary one within the meaning of § 162 (a) of the Code." 92
What is important and controlling, we feel is that the . . . payment
serves to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate
and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable consequence,
the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone an or-
dinary expense .... 03
We emphasize that just as compulsory accounting is not controlling
tax-,vise, so the statutory labels of "prepayment" and "additional pre-
mium". .. are not controlling. We also emphasize that the fact that
a payment is imposed compulsorily upon a taxpayer does not in and of
itself make that payment an ordinary and necessary expense (emphasis
added) .... 94
The crucial question remaining then is whether compulsion, and in
particular employer compulsion, makes an expense a business expense,
i.e., whether incurring an employer mandated expense in order to main-
tain one's existing position renders that expense a business expenditure
regardless of its relationship to the employee's duties, other than the
duty to heed his employer's command, and despite the fact that absent
the employer compulsion, the expenditure might have displayed aspects
of a personal expense. This fundamental question was addressed by the
Tax Court in Edward N. Wilson. 5 There the taxpayer, an existing
92 .d. at 354.
93 d. Although the Court was clearly speaking to the irrelevancy of compulsion to
the issue of capital vs. ordinary expenditure, see United States v. Mississippi Chem.
Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972), the Fourth Circuit in Virginia Natl. Bank v. United States,
450 F.2d 1155 (4th Cir. 1971), unfortunately misread Lincoln Savings & Loan as speaking
to the issue of whether compulsion is relevant to the question of whether an expenditure
is a business expense. See id., at 1159 (Winter, J., dissenting).
94 Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 359 (1971).
9549 T.C. 406 (1968), red, 412 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1969). See generally Hazelwood
supra note 72, at 369. The Tenth Circuit in Woodall had also held that the taxpayer
could not deduct his moving expenses under section 162. The court noted that the
taxpayer had testified that his reasons for accepting the new employment were personal.
It also looked to the "away from home" case law development under section 162 (a) (2),
which provides a deduction for "traveling expenses . .. while away from home* in
the pursuit of a trade or business," where it found the rule was that "[tihe job, not
the taxpayer's pattern of living, must require the travel," United States v., Woodall,
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employee, had not wished to relocate, but was informed that unless he
accepted the transfer he would jeopardize his future. Consequently, he
accepted the transfer under protest. The Tax Court pointed out that
its prior decision in Walter H. MendeP6 had been reversed, in part be-
cause of its erroneous determination that relocation expenses in the inter-
est of the employer were per se deductions for an employee, and in part
bcause there was no finding that the moving expenses were ordinary
and necessary expenses of the employee.97 The Tax Court, therefore,
specifically analyzed whether the expense so qualified. Its conclusion
was:
255 F.2d 370, 373 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 845 (1958), i.e., there must be a
direct connection between the travel expense and the carrying on of the trade or business
of the taxpayer or his employer. See Note, A House Is Not a Tax Home, 49 VA. L. REv.
125 (1963) (hereinafter cited as Note, Tax Home). The Tenth Circuit's conclusion was
that the moving expenses had no relationship to any service that was being performed for
the employer. Apparently, as an alternative holding, the Woodall Court held that the mov-
ing expenses fell into the category of expenses incurred to obtain employment, rather than
the category of expenses incurred in the course of employment. The Service permits a
deduction only for the latter. See Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932, 935 (1969); David
J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 324, 380 (1970); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15(f). This basis now
appears questionable. See note 172 infra. The court's conclusion was:
While it may appear to be equitable that expenses incurred in seeking and
obtaining employment, or in traveling to the place of employment, should be
treated as though they had been incurred in the performance of one's duty as an
employee, it has, nevertheless, been long recognized that deductions are matters
of legislative grace, allowable only when there is a clear provision for them,
and do not turn upon equitable considerations. 255 F.2d at 373.
9641 T.C. 32 (1963), rev'd, 351 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1965). See generally Hazelwood,
note 71 supra, at 369. In Mendel the majority reasoned from the basic premise that
employer reimbursements of personal expenses of an employee were includible in the
gross income to conclude that inherent in Revenue Ruling 54-429, and Cavanagb was
the assumption that reasonable amounts expended by a permanent employee in moving
his family and personal effects in a transfer from one permanent post of duty to
another were not personal expenses. 41 T.C. at 38. A dissent pointed out that the
majority opinion made no finding that the unreimbursed moving expense was an
ordinary and necessary business expense of the employee except for the above as-
sumption. However, the dissent did not believe Cavanagb required that assumption.
41 T.C. at 39. Mendel was reversed by the Fourth Circuit on appeal on precisely these
grounds: that (1) the majority opinion was founded upon an erroneous basis, the
rationale of Revenue Ruling 54-429 is that reimbursement for moving expenses does
not constitute gross income, not that expenses of relocation are per se deductions, and
(2) the review court could find no authority permitting a deduction for unreimbursed
moving expenses "where, as here, there is no finding that such moving expense is an
ordinary and necessary business expense of the taxpayer." 351 F.2d at 583.
97 Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. 406, 411 (1968).
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[I] n these days of the organization man, if a move is ordered by the
employer for the employer's convenience and the employee's future
earnings would be jeopardized by refusing to accept transfer, non-
reimbursed moving expenses are proximately related to the business of
the taxpayer-employee so that they constitute a business expense to
him.93
Although the court in Wilson was not favored with the express grant
of judicial leeway afforded in the exclusion area by the legislative history
of section 217, it noted that the committee reports accompanying the
enactment of that section directed its remarks to the fact that the then
existing "tax treatment" did not permit a deduction.0 ° Therefore, it
reasoned that congressional dissatisfaction lay with the failure of judicial
and administrative determinations to allow the deduction; there was no
implication "that Congress thought that the existing law might not be
broad enough at its roots to encompass allowance of the deduction" 101
before the court. The majority also noted that its view was foreshad-
owed by an earlier concurring opinion in Willis B. Ferebee,02 a new
employee reimbursed moving expenses decision, which suggested that
a relocation for the employer's convenience, as an alternative to being
dismissed, would lose the aspect of a personal expense by coming "under
the familiar rule exemplified by such situations as the cost of education
to retain an existing job as contrasted with obtaining a new one, or the
cost of room or meals where an employer and not the employee insists
upon the employee's location." 103
The majority, echoing the language of the benefit of the employer ex-
clusion decisions, concluded that it was the purpose, interest, and con-
venience of the employer and not of the employee that were served by
the transfer; the moving expense was for the taxpayer's business purposes
and reasons and not for personal ones. Thus, it seemed to mix a benefit of
98 /d. at 412.
109 See note 71 supra.
100 Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. 406, 412 (1968) citing H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong, 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. (Part 2) 183; S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess, 71, reprinted in 1964-1 Cum. BULL. (Part 2) 575. But see, Hazelwood,
supra note 71, at 370 (the Committee reports "imply no judicial leeway for deductions").
101 Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. 406, 412 (1968).
102 39 T.C. 801, 805 (1963).
103 Id. at 805. Similarly, a reimbursement of an expense which primarily benefits
the employer would be noncompensatory and, hence, excludible. Id. at 807 (Hoyt, J,
concurring; the writer of the majority opinion in Wilson).
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the employer deduction rationale with an analysis of the degree of
pressure brought by the employer upon the employee and his unwill-
ingness to move, i.e., a lack of employee control and employer require-
ment. A dissent focused on the inequities present in the latter approach
and advocated that a deduction be allowed for reasonable moving ex-
penses by any employee when the move is in the interest of his em-
ployer. 0 4 Presumably this rule would also extend to new employees. 10 5
One basis for the dissent against the involuntariness criterion was that
the employee had many choices, among them to refuse to move and to
accept the consequences or to move in the interest of the employer with
the hope of thereby advancing his own interests. 0 6 This sort of alterna-
tive is, however, contrary to the trend in other compulsion decisions
as discussed below.
The dissent was on more tenable ground in pointing out that the
employer did not require the employee to move his household effects,
furniture, and family.
[The taxpayer] could have sold his furniture as he did his house and
rented furnished living quarters at the new location or bought new
furniture. He could have maintained his personal home at his old
location .... The choice of the petitioner to move his furniture and
household effects was personal under the holding of a long line of cases
prior to our decision in Mendel and in my opinion it was on the basis
of this long line of cases that the Court of Appeals reversed our holding
in Mendel.10 7
In resolving the similar question of distinguishing personal from
business expenses in the context of deduction of "traveling expenses
..while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business" 10s
104 Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. 406, 417-18 (1968).
105 Cf. Willis B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801, 807 (1963) (concurring opinion) (no distinc-
tion between old and new employees).
106 Edward N. Wilson, 49 T.C. 406, 417 (1968).
107 Id.
1o8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 162(a) (1) (2). A traveling expense must be (I) reason-
able and necessary, (2) incurred while away from home, and (3) incurred in the
pursuit of business-"a direct connection between the expenditures and the carrying
on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer." Commissioner v.
Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946). The third test in particular appears closely related
to the necessary business expense requirement under the general section 162 (a) pro-
vision.
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(which has repeatedly been used as an analogy to moving expenses), 09
commentators have urged," 0 and recently the Second Circuit in Rosen-
span v. United States"' has fashioned, the test as whether the exi-
gencies of business compelled the traveling expenses or whether the
taxpayer's failure to move his home was for his personal convenience
and not compelled by business necessity," 1 12 rather than relying on the
doctrine that "home" is the taxpayer's place of employment." 3 Earlier
decisions had reasoned that the job, not the taxpayer's pattern of liv-
ing, had to require the travel."14 Indeed, this principle had been the key-
stone of the Tenth Circuit's denial in Woodall of a deduction for
moving expenses." 5 If a taxpayer maintained a home at a distance from
his business for personal reasons his employer's business was not served," 6
and as a general rule his travel expense and expenses of maintenance at
both his home and place of business were not deductible. The articulated
reason for this result by most courts and by the Government was that
where a permanent move was involved the taxpayer's "home" moved
to his new place of employment, the so-called "tax home," even though
his residence and family remained where they had been. 17 Thus, on-site
living expenses were not incurred "away-from-home" under this ap-
proach. The exception permitting a deduction for traveling expenses
109 See, e.g., United States v. Woodall, 255 F.2d 370, 373 (10th Cit. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 824 (1958); cf. Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743, 749 (1966), rev'd, 399 F.2d 675
(loth Cir. 1968).
110 Note, Tax Home, supra note 95, at 163; Haddleton, Traveling Expenses, "Away
From Home," 17 TAx L. REv. 261 (1963).
"l 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cit. 1971), cert. denied, 92 Sup. Ct. 54 (1971).
112 Id.
1 13 The Government has long advocated that the term "home" in the statute means
the taxpayer's business headquarters, Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 291 (1967);
Note, Tax Home, note 95 supra, at 127-a position adopted by many tribunals, England
v. United States, 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cit. 1965), cert. denied, 382 US. 936 (1966); Cockrell
v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1963); Coerver v. Commissioner, 297 F;2d
837 (3rd Cit. 1962); Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cit. 1948); York'v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Josette J. Friedman, 37 T.C. 539 (1961);
but not all, Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
54 (1971); Steinhort v. Commissioner 335 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964); Burns v. Gray,
287 F.2d 698 (6th Cit. 1961).
114 E.g., Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 1952).
115 United States v. Woodall, 255 F.2d 370, 373 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 824 (1958).
116 Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd per curian,
358 U.S. 59 (1958).
117 See authorities cited in note 113 supra.
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of temporary employment was regarded as just that, since the expenses
were thought not to be incurred for the benefit of the employer." 8
Therefore, an extension of the reasoning of this line of authority to post-
arrival indirect moving expenses to a "permanent" job site would yield
the conclusion that they were not incurred for the benefit of the em-
ployer, but they were the result of a personal choice. However, under
the Rosenspan rationale, the temporary assignment exception falls into
place conceptually. When an assignment is truly temporary it would
be unreasonable to expect the taxpayer to move his family and home,
"and the expenses are thus compelled by the 'exigencies of business'." "'
On the other hand, where the assignment is indeterminate and the tax-
payer decides to leave his home where it is:
[D] isallowance is appropriate not because he has acquired a "tax home"
in some lodging home or hotel at the worksite but because his failure
to move his home was for his personal convenience and not compelled
by business necessity. 120
While the Tax Court has traditionally applied the rule that home is
where the permanent job is,121 a recent decision manifests a receptivity
to the Rosenspan approach. In Dennis D. Goodman," a memorandum
opinion,12s the court pointed out that the temporary employment excep-
tion was treated by some courts (tax-home jurisdictions) as a gloss on
home in the phrase "away from home," while others such as Rosenspan
have connected it with the relationship of the expenditure to the pursuit
of business. The court viewed the ultimate question as:
118 Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd per curiam,
358 U.S. 59 (1958).
119Rosenspan v. United States, 439 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92
Sup. Ct. 54 (1971).
120 Id.
121 See note 113 supra.
12240 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1437, 1439-40 (1971).
123 The Chief Judge of the Tax Court determines whether an opinion will be a
"regular" decision, printed in the Tax Court reports, or a memorandum decision, pub-
lished only by the Tax Services. See Gluck, How Cohan Works: Allowance of
Business Expense Deductions When No Exact Records Are Kept, 6 RuTGEas L. Rxv.
375, 379 n.21 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Gluck). Theoretically the criteria upon
which the determination to release a decision in memorandum form is made are that
the case involves only a question of fact or the legal question has been decided previously
by the Tax Court, hence, there is no need for further precedent (a memorandum
opinion being considered as having no precedential value). In fact, however, memoran-
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[W]hether it would be reasonable in the circumstances of the par-
ticular case to expect the taxpayer to move his family to the new work
location and establish his permanent residence in that area. If so, the
job assignment is not temporary and either the place of employment
becomes his tax home or the costs of living at the place of employment
are not incurred in the pursuit of business. In either event, the costs
of his meals, lodging, and related items are not deductible under sec-
tion 162(a) (2).24
In its concluding summary on the other hand, analysis was made only
in terms of the pursuit of business approach. The court found that there
was no business reason for incurring duplicate business expenses; the
taxpayer did so solely for personal reasons.125
dum decisions are on occasion cited by the Tax Court. Moreover, the conclusion is
inescapable from research of unsettled areas of tax law that on rare occasions memoran-
dum opinions are used to sweep a troublesome question or a minority view, perhaps
more worthy of court review, under the rug. While this practice may be justified on
the basis that bad facts may distort or retard the case-by-case development of a prin-
ciple of law, the difficulty is that a memorandum opinion implies that the case is
completely reconcilable with prior precedent, and proceeding on this assumption tax
practitioners and commentators may attempt to reconcile decisions that represent two
polar views of an issue, the memorandum opinion having been released as such as an
alternative to court review. Compare Bogene, Inc., 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 810 (1968),
'witb Alan B. Larldn, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968). See Bass,
Medical Payment Plans Can Discriminate in Favor of Stockbolder-Employees, 29 J.
TAxATiob 142 (1968) for an attempt to reconcile the two cases. Of even more prece-
dential value than regular opinions are court reviewed Tax Court decisions-the over-
whelming majority of moving expense cases were court reviewed. Proposed findings of
fact and his opinion are submitted by the Tax Court judge who heard the case to the
Chief Judge who determines whether the decision should be reviewed by the "full'
Tax Court. INr. REv. CODE of 1954 § 7460(b). See Tax Division, Department of Justice,
Study of the Trial Court System for Federal Civil Tax Disputes, reprinted in 22 TAX
LAwYErt 95, 102 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Tax Division, Study). Although the Tax
Court has sixteen judges (plus retired judges who hear cases), INT. REv. CoDE of 1954,
§ 7444(a), a majority of those present constitutes a quorum and may decide a court
reviewed opinion. However, the opinion does not necessarily reveal the number. of
judges present (court reviewed decisions are traditionally discussed on Fridays at the
Tax Court in Washington, D. C., throughout the year, but on any given Friday during
all of the year, except the summer months, individual judges will be out of town hearing
cases) and a majority may represent the views of as few as five judges or as many as
seventeen-a retired judge (id. § 7447) will sit and vote in the conference if he origin-
ally submitted the case to the Chief Judge. The author of the majority opinion will
be the judge who heard the case unless his views did not prevail in conference, in
which case the writing of. the opinion may be assigned to another judge. Tax Division,
Study, supra, at 103.
12440 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1437, 1440 (1971).
125 Id. at 1441.
19721
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Rosenspan suggested, however, that the "personal choice" principle
had sometimes been pressed too far.12 6 England v. United States, an
indirect moving expense decision following Woodall,127 was cited as
"another case in which the 'personal choice' principle scarcely provides
a satisfactory basis of decision .... ," 128 Homer H. Starr seems directly
on point. There the Tax Court held that the Government's contention
"that indirect moving expenses cannot, under any circumstances, be
said ... to inure primarily to the benefit of the employer, ignores the
economic realities of the situation." -' The taxpayer's acceptance of
temporary quarters for himself at his new duty post, while maintaining
his family at his old residence, was caused by a housing shortage and
was not a result of his personal preference. Temporary living costs
directly related to and caused by circumstances in existence at the new
post of duty so as to be outside the employee's control and which arise
from a transfer at the behest of the employer constitute expenses in the
interest of the employer and are incurred primarily for his benefit. 30
Thus, reading Starr and Rosenspan together, a failure of the taxpayer to
immediately move his family and residence, i.e., his home, when the
assignment is permanent, yet the failure is necessitated by the condi-
tions at the new duty post, is not for his personal convenience, but is
compelled by business necessity and is incurred in the pursuit of busi-
ness.' Accordingly, the dissent in Wilson was in error in its "personal
choice" analysis.
126 Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 911 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92
Sup. Ct. 54 (1971).
127 See notes 71 and 95, supra.
12SRosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 911 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92
Sup. Ct. 54 (1971).
129 Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743, 746 (1966).
130 ld. at 746-47.
131 While a different panel of the Second Circuit than the Rosenspan panel has more
recently stated that the temporary employment rule constituted an exception to the
requirement that an away from home expenditure manifests a direct connection with
the carrying on a trade or business (see note 108, supra, for a discussion of this require-
ment), Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1971); the judges in Rosenspan do not
appear to have viewed the rule as an exception to the pursuit of business requirement,
but rather viewed such expenses incident to temporary employment as not being per-
sonal because it would be unreasonable to expect the employee to move; hence, the
expenses are compelled by the "exigencies of business:' Moreover, Rosenspan declined
to decide whether the exigencies of business refer to employer's business or of the em-
ployee's as well (however, other compulsion areas suggest that an expense which benefits
the employer, i.e. meets the exigencies of that business, is automatically an expense of
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The Tax Court in Vaal R. Dodd,a a memorandum opinion, followed
Wilson where it found that it was reasonable for the taxpayer to believe
that he would be laid off if he did not accept a transfer. In Wilson the
taxpayer had been explicitly told he would jeopardize his future with
his employer if he did not move.
Both Dodd and Wilson were appealed. Ironically, and unfortunately,
Dodd with the less extensively developed opinion was decided first.
However, the appellate court was presented with the pro se taxpayer's
contentions, derived from Wilson, that the unreimbursed moving ex-
pense should be the deductible the same as educational expenses of an
employee to hold his job, or treated the same as meals and lodging ex-
cluded from income because required as a condition of employment.
Judge Dyer of the Fifth Circuit dismissed these arguments on the
unconvincing and irrelevant ground that "[It]he instances that the tax-
payer seeks to analogize to this case are specifically made deductible
or exempt by the Code and Treasury Regulations." 3 While it is a
hoary tax doctrine that deductions are matters of legislative grace, al-
lowable only where made deductible by statute, 184 the generic category
of business expenses is made deductible by statute;"3 5 moreover, employer
compelled educational expenses were deductible under court decisions
for almost a decade before specific reference was made to them in the
regulations.13 6 The whole thrust of Wilson, missed by the appellate
court in Dodd, was that employer compulsion makes such moving ex-
penses business expenses, imposed by the employer as a condition of
employment, or of retention of employment. The Fifth Circuit's rever-
sal of the Tax Court in Dodd may be best viewed as an example of
the twin evils of (1) important tax cases involving minor amounts of
money being tried and appealed without tax counsel and (2) the ab-
sence of a National Tax Court of Appeals.8'
the employee's business as well, see text at note 347 infra) but stated that where the
expense need only be necessary to the taxpayer's business-the general rule under sec-
tion 162, see United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969)-"the 'personal choice'
principle scarcely provides a satisfactory basis of decision." Rosenspan v. United States,
438 F.2d 905, 911 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 Sup. Ct. 54 (1971).
132 37 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 134 (1963), res'd, 410 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1969).
'33 Commissioner v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1969).
134 Mertens, note 79 supra, at § 25.03.
135 INr. Rav. CoDE of 1954 § 162 (a).
136See Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5
(1958); Wolfman, note 79 supra, at 1102.
'37 See generally Note, The Old Tax Court Blues: The Need for Uniformity in
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In recapitulation, the interest-of-the-employer moving expense cases,
although now rendered extinct -by congressional reform, add signifi-
cantly to an understanding of the underlying benefit of the employer
doctrine. As a preliminary matter, recognition by the Tax Court of
the common principles involved in exclusion of employer reimbursement
of moving expenses and of the value of employer required meals and
lodging forms the basis for discussion of the underlying commonality
of employer compelled activities. While the same elements of employer
compulsion and lack of employee control and benefit to the employer
were involved in both exclusion areas, the focus of the control element
in the context of reimbursed moving expenses was on the cause of the
expenditure and not on the timing, location, quality, and quantity of
the expenditure as in the section 119 cases. Furthermore, a comparison
of Starr and TTilson reveals that in the context of exclusions from in-
come, benefit to the employer is the more important factor, while in
the context of deductions, employer compulsion is more significant. The
cause of this difference is that on the exclusion side the basic inquiry is
whether the employer primarily intends to benefit itself or its em-
ployee; if the latter the economic benefit is compensatory. The role
played by the factor of lack of employee control is principally that of
Tax Litigation, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 970, 979 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Note, The
Old Tax Court Blues) and authorities cited therein. As could have been predicted
from the lack of analytical reasoning and blind adherence to precedent manifested by
the appellate opinions treating excludibility of reimbursements for indirect moving
expenses, Wilson was also summarily reversed without consideration of the employer
compulsion arguments relied upon below. Wilson v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 314 (6th
Cir. 1969) (order). Furthermore, the Tax Court's response to these reversals was also
true to the form established on the exclusion side of the problem: in Lloyd G. Jones,
54 T.C. 734, 741 (1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1971), the majority stated that
the court had issued three opinibns in recent years holding such expenses deductible
but was .reversed.in each; "[o]n-further consideration, we are persuaded by the Courts
of Appeals in these cases and will no longer follow our decisions therein." Again a
number of judges concurred solely on the grounds that the case would be appealed to
the Fifth Circuit which had recently decided Dodd adversely to the Tax Court on
this issue. Id. at 742. The Tax Court had earlier taken the position in Authur L.
Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 720 (1957) that as a court of national jurisdiction it was not
bound by the precedent of a court of appeals to which an appeal would lay. Tax
Division, Study, supra note 123, at 103. This position generated a great deal of
criticism particularly by appellate courts, id. at 103 n.39. McLellan, note 76 supra, and
Jones may be viewed as foreshadowing the abandonment of Lawrence that matured
in Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), aff'd on other grounds, 445 Fad 985
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). See generally Note, The Old Tax Court
Blues, supra, at 979. "
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supplying -a conceptual basis for the exclusion, i.e., lack of dominion
over an economic benefit. 138  On the. deduction .side, the expenditure
must be related.to the employee's trade or business. An employer man-
dated expense, which if not undertaken by the employee may jeopar-
dize his job, certainly is directly related to preserving that job, his trade
or business. Employer benefit or convenience may also: be squeezed
into that mold: Jt is the-business of the employee to further the interests
of his employer, thus a purpose to further the employer's iterest is a
business purpose as to the employee. 3 9 In short, these may be viewed
as alternatives, with employer compulsion being relied upon primarily
when present.
III. REQUIREMENT OF THE EMPLOYER: EDUCATioNAL EXPENSES
The early development of deductibility of educational expenses was
strongly shaped by an example contained in Juistice Cardozo's opinion
in Welch v. Helvering,140 a non-educational expense case holding that
payments made by a commission salesman to creditors of his bankru Ipt
corporation were not 'deductible because made to establish his relations
wNitli customers. There the Court stated that "[r] eputation and learning
are akin to capital assets, like the good will of an old partnership. For
many, they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to success.
,The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not
ail ordinary expense-of the operation of a business." 141 The Service and
many Tax Court decisions, nevertheless, came to treat educational ex-
•penses as personal rather than capital. 14 For instance, in Nora Payne
Hillr3 the Tax Court, relying upon the definition of the term "or-
138 Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1971).
139 The presence of control or dominion was originally a basis for inclusion in non-
bompensatory income cases; absence of control has since been used as a basis for
exclusion. Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 40 U.S.L.W. 4289, 4292 (March 21; 1972);
United States -v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 123 (5th Cir. 1968). However, there may well
be a difference between lack of control where there is no receipt of income or
economic benefit and lack of control where there is such receipt. Indeed, in the
doctrine of constructive receipt control serves as an alternative to actual receipt as
a basis for taxation. See -generally Lee, Shareholder Withdrawal-Loan or Dividend:
Repayments, Estoppel, and Other Ancomalies, 12 WM. & MARYe L. REv. 512, 533 -n.127
(1971) (hereinafter cited as Lee, Shareholder Withdrawal).
140 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
141 Id. at 115-16.
142 Wolfman, note. 79 supra, at 1096-97 and authorities cited therein.
143 13 T.C. 291 (1949), reed, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.'1950).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
dinary" as "common" or "frequendy occurring," would not assume
that public school teachers ordinarily attend summer school to maintain
their teaching certificates when alternatives such as passing an examina-
tion on selected books are available. Consequently, it found the summer
school expense not ordinary, but personal.
The Fourth Circuit in the landmark decision of Hill v. Commission-
er 144 reversed the Tax Court. It thought unreasonable any requirement
of establishing statistically the number of teachers who chose summer
school. If the particular course taken by the taxpayer was a response
that a reasonable person would normally take under the circumstances,
the expense qualified as ordinary. The Court of Appeals concluded that
the taxpayer went to summer school to "maintain her present position,
not to attain a new position; to preserve, not to expand or increase; to
carry on, not to commence." 14 This choice of language implied that
the cost of education undertaken to secure promotion or a new position
was not deductible. 146 But, on the facts before it, the Fourth Circuit
found that the attendance was undertaken essentially to enable the tax-
payer to continue her career in her existing position. Thus, the review
court concluded that the taxpayer incurred the expenses in carrying
on a trade or business, and that they were ordinary and necessary, and
were not personal in nature.
The Service picked up the hint in Hill and ruled in I.T. 404417 that
summer school expenses incurred by a teacher to maintain her position
were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, but ex-
penses incurred to obtain a teaching position, or to qualify for permanent
status, a higher position or salary were personal expenses. More sig-
nificantly, the Service read Hill narrowly: unless a teacher could prove
that an educational expense had been incurred under "employer com-
pulsion," it was not necessary but was incurred for enhancement (pro-
fessional or cultural) and was disallowable as "personal." 148
The course taken up to this point by the Service with respect to em-
ployer compulsion and otherwise "personal" expenses is the mirror
image of its favored stance in the area of deductibility of moving ex-
penses. In the educational expense context it argued that employer com-
'44 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
145 Id. at 909.
146 Wolfman, note 79 supra, at 1098.
147 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 163; Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 699 (1962).
148 Wolfman, note 79 supra, at 1101.
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pulsion alone could suffice;149 but in the context of moving expenses,
that the taxpayer must show a connection between his duties of em-
ployment and his moving expenses and, implicitly, that any employer
requirement for the move was not relevant.150 In both instances, if the
expenses were not deductible, they were considered personal in the eyes
of the Service.
The originally proposed 1954 Code regulations with respect to deduc-
tibility of educational expenses would have allowed an employee a
deduction for educational expenses only if his employer required him to
undertake the study.15' However, the final regulations issued in 1958
provided an alternative basis for the deduction: educational expenses
were deductible if undertaken primarily for the purpose of (1) maintain-
ing or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his employment or
(2) the traditional meeting of the express requirements of the taxpayer's
employment, or the requirements of applicable law, imposed as a con-
clition to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status, or employ-
ment.152 This change was intended to remove the distinction previously
drawn between self-employed persons and employees.tm In effect, this
modification recognized "the principle that the term 'necessary' as used
in section 162 is broad enough to cover expenditures voluntarily made
which are 'appropriate and helpful.' " 154
The principal criterion under the maintenance or improvement of
skills tests was the customariness of established members in the tax-
payer's trade or business undertaking such education. 55 Under the
requirement of the employer test, such requirement had to be imposed
149The employer requirement aspect was not present in Coughlin v. Commissioner,
203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cit. 1953), where the Second Circuit viewed a self-employed
taxpayer's attendance at a tax institute as closely akin to Hill and allowed the expense
because the education and knowledge so gained was "well adopted to fulfill his pro-
fessional duty to keep sharp the tools he actually used in his going trade or business,"
id.; they were appropriate and helpful to an established trade or business.
150 See text at note 95 supra.
151 Proposed Treas. Reg. S 1.162-5 (d), 21 Fed. Reg. 5093 (1956);
152Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958). These regulations have been construed as offering
alternative bases for deduction of educational expenses: employer requirement or im-
provement or maintenance of existing skills. Ralph A. Fattore, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1243 (1963).
153See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. 110 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 CuM.
Burr. 922, 1031.
154 Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 699 (1962); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 CuM. BULL.
69,70.
155 Wolfman, note 79 supra, at 1103.
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primarily for a bona fide business purpose of the taxpayer's employer
and not primarily for the taxpayer's benefit.156
The 1958 regulations also provided that educational expenses incurred
primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position, a substantial ad-
vancement in position, or of fulfilling the taxpayer's general educational
aspirations or other personal purposes were not deductible.5 7 Education
that met the express requirements for a new position or a substantial
advancement strongly evidenced that such education was undertaken
primarily to obtain the new position or advancement, unless it was re-
quired as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his existing
employment. These regulations also provided that, in any event, the
costs of education required to meet the minimum requirement for quali-
fication in a trade or business were not deductible." 8 The Tax Court in
Cosimo A. Carlucci59 read in this proviso recognition that such mini-
mum requirements education was in the nature of a capital asset and that
its cost was accordingly personal.
Not surprisingly, most cases under the employer requirement portion
of these regulations dealt with whether the education was required as
a condition for retention of existing employment, or represented the
minimum requirement of the employer.' 60 However, the greater num-
ber of decisions that arose under the new maintenance or improvement
of skills provision of the regulations were the expenditures for improve-
ment of skills or self-improvement.' 6'
In 1967, these regulations were liberalized to provide more objective
criteria for determining whether expenditures for education were prop-
erly deductible as business expenses than were contained in the 1958
regulations which emphasized the taxpayer's subjective intent.162 Thus,
the new regulations provided that educational expenses were deductible
if the education:
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958).
1571d. § 1.162-5(b) (1958).
15ld.
159 37 T.C. 695, 700 (1962).
160 See, e.g., United States v. Michaelson, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963); Laurie S:
Robertson, 37 T.C. 1115 (1962); see generally Annot., 3 A.L.R. 3d 829, 837-39 (1965):
161 See, e.g., C. Fink Fischer, 50 T.C. 164 (1968); Richard P. Joyce, 38 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1443 (1969); Daniel J. Coughlin, III, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 487 (1969). 1
162 See Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.,2d 292, 293 (7th Cir. 1968). See generally Gag-
gans & Leftwich, What Is The Present Climate for Educational Expense Deductions, 31
J. TAXATION 236 (1969).
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(1) Maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his
employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meets the express requirements of the individual's employer,
or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a
condition to the retention by the individual of an established employ-
ment relationship status, or rate of compensation. 163
The 1967 version of the regulations abandoned the "new position"
test, and instead provided that educational expenditures made in order
to meet minimum educational requirements or made as part of a pro-
gram of study which would lead to qualifying the taxpayer in a new
trade or business'64-a change in an employee's duties involving the
same general type of work would not constitute a new trade or business.
Such expenditures in the eyes of the Service:
[A]re personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of
personal and capital expenditures and, therefore, are not deductible
as ordinary and necessary business expenses even though the educa-
tion may maintain or improve skills required by the individual in his
employment or other trade or business or may meet the express require-
ments of the individual's employer or of applicable law or regula-
tions.1e5
Thus, the amended regulations do not take a position on whether mini-
mum requirement and new business educational expenditures are capital
or personal. Similarly, earlier decisions had often declined to identify
whether their basis for disallowing certain educational expenses was that
they were capital or personal because "the result would be identical." 166
However, characterization of such expense is significant in the broader
context of whether expenditures with otherwise personal aspects are
made deductible by emplbyer compulsion. Indeed, Judge Opper in his
concurring opinion in Willis B. Ferebee,6 7 a new employee moving
expenses case, pointed to educational expenses incurred to retain an
existing job, as contrasted with obtaining a new one, as an illustration
of the principle that an expense loses its personal aspect if undertaken
for the convenience of the employer as an alternative to being dismissed.
16 3 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a) (1967).
164 Id. § 1.162-5(b) (3) (1967).
165 Id. § 1.162-5(b) (1) (1967).
166 Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956, 958 (1950); cf. United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S.
53, 57 (1968) (legal fees).
167 39 T.C. 801, 805 (1963).
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It is established beyond question that compulsion cannot convert a
capital expenditure into an ordinary business expense.""8 If minimum
requirements or new trade or business educational expenses are disal-
lowable on the theory that they are personal rather than capital, despite
an express employer requirement, then such compulsion, at least in this
instance, would not cause an expense to lose its personal aspect. The
answer is provided by the Tax Court in Arthur M. Jungreis.
One of the requirements for the allowance of a deduction under sec-
tion 162(a) is that the expense must be paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. Thus, a taxpayer must
be engaged in a trade or business at the time he pays or incurs an ex-
pense which is deductible under section 162(a). This is the clear im-
port of section 1.162-5(a) (2) of the 1967 regulations which speaks of
"the express requirements of the individual's employer * I * imposed
as a condition to the retention by the individual of an established
employment relationship, status or rate of compensation." (Emphasis
supplied.)
... Each appointment or reappointment as a teaching assistant was
a separate and distinct employment contract. No number of appoint-
ments or reappointments as a teaching assistant created any presump-
tion of a right to reappointment. Consequently, all of the educational
expenses incurred by petitioner were conditions precedent which were
required in order to "obtain" a new employment contract rather than
conditions subsequent required to "retain" an established employment
relationship. The educational expenses incurred by him were clearly
for the purpose of "commencing" and "increasing," rather than for
"carrying on" or "preserving," and therefore do not constitute allow-
able deductions under section 162(a) of the Code, section 1.162-5 (a) (2)
of the 1967 regulations, or the principles enunciated in Hill v. Com-
missioner... 181 F.2d 906 (C. A. 4, 1950). 1 9
In short, the basis for disallowance of a new trade or business or mini-
mum requirement expenses is that the taxpayer is not yet engaged in an
existing trade or business with which a nexus can be shown to permit
a deduction. The theory is that despite a taxpayer's firm decision to
enter into a business and the making of expenditures over a considerable
period of time in preparation for entering such business, he still has
not engaged in carrying on such business for the purposes of section
168 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
16955 T.C. 581, 588 (1970).
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162 (a) "until such time as the business has begun to function as a going
concern and performed those activities for which it was organized." 170
Regardless of the validity of such a theory, it is clear that the court's
basis for the disallowance of new trade or business educational expendi-
tures is not that they are personal, but that they were not incurred in an
existing business. Under this approach the taxpayer who ultimately does
enter into the business would apparently be able to capitalize these
expenditures, but if he does not go that far they cannot be capitalized,
nor are they business or personal expenses. Tax equity is not overly
abundant in the existing case law in this area.' 71
Disallowance of educational expenditures for entering a new trade or
business is entirely consistent with this conceptual framework; disallow-
ance of such expenditures for a new position (the test under the 1958
regulations) in the taxpayer's existing trade or business is not. Indeed,
the Tax Court has recently held that the expenses of seeking a new posi-
tion in the same trade or business are currently deductible, 72 although
by way of contrast expenses in preparation of engaging in a new field
170 Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.) vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). The doctrine has been criticized by com-'
tientators. See, e.g, Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They Deductible by a Corporation
for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 48 TAXES 488 (1970); Mandell, Deductibility of Pre-
Operating Expenses: Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures, N.Y.U. 25TH INsr. oN FED.
TAx. 1235 (1967). The conclusion that since such expenditures increase the earning
capacity of the business, they must be capitalized, Mid-State Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 696,
714 (1954), conflicts with the deductibility of similar expenditures to expand an exist-
ing business, York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958), and with the deduc-
tibility of advertising expenditures which benefit future years, E. H. Sheldon & Co. v.
Cormissioner, 214 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1954). The other rationale (espoused in Rich-
7nond Television) that a pre-opening venture is not engaging in a trade or business con-
flicts with the Service's position elsewhere, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1 (a) (1) (1956), as
-wall as earlier decisions, e.g., 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1932).
.171 B rrrr, FEDERAL IcoME EsrATE ,Am Gir TAxATIoN 262-63 (1964).
172 See David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 377-78 (1970). See generally Tucker, An In-
dividuaPs Employment Seeking Expenses & Analyzing The New Judicial Climate, 31
J. TAXATION 352 (June 1971). The Tenth Circuit in Woodall denied the new em-
ployee's direct moving expenses in part on the grounds that a distinction was to be
drawn between expenses incurred to obtain employment and those incurred in the
course of employment. Primuth in effect rejected this distinction, 54 T.C. at 381
(Tannenwald, J.,' concurring), and, indeed, the author of the Primuth majority opinion
has drawn an explicit parallel between an employment fee to obtain a job and "the
expense incurred to reach the location of the new employment," Jon F. Hartung, 55
T.C. 1, 6 (1970), on appeal to the Ninth Circuit (Sterretr, J., dissenting). However,
since a major theme of Primuth was that the taxpayer was engaged in the business
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of endeavor must be capitalized.173 Thus, it is significant that the Treas-
ury Department abandoned the "new position" stance in the 1967
regulations.
The minimum requirements rule is more difficult to fit within this
framework. For a taxpayer may be engaged in the business of being
an employee and the minimum requirements education would appear
an employer prerequisite to keep that existing employment. While
meeting the minimum requirements frequently qualifies the taxpayer
for a new position, permanent as contrasted with provisional employ-
ment (the premise of Jungreis is that only a permanent position consti-
tutes a trade or business),174 this usually would not even entail a change
in duties, so that at most a change of positions within the same trade or
business appears to be involved. Thus, in many instances the minimum
requirements rule is not sound conceptually.
The other relevant change in the 1967 regulations of significance in
the broader context of the effect of employer compulsion on deductibility
of employee expenditures concerns the employer business purpose pre-
requisite. 17 The 1958 regulations provided that an employee was con-
sidered to have made his expenditures to meet an express requirement
of his employer only if such requirement was imposed primarily for a
bona fide business purpose of the employer and not primarily for the
employee's benefit. 17  This test sounds quite similar to the primary ben-
efit to the employer concept encountered in the exclusion from an
employee's income of the value of employer expenditures only inciden-
tally benefiting the employee. The 1967 regulations, however, state that
a taxpayer is considered to have undertaken education to meet his
employer's express requirements "only if such requirements are imposed
for a bona fide business purpose of the individual's employer." 177 The
latter test is more consonant with the proper function of the business
purpose test in this area. Unlike the context of exclusions from income
where employer benefit has independent significance (and indeed may
of his occupation-corporate executive-only one of the two taxpayers in Woodall
could have come within the Primuth rationale. The other in the consolidated case
was a new graduate from engineering school.
173 David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 382 (1970) (Tannenwald, J, concurring).
174 Arthur A. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581, 588 (1970). But cf., James B. Carey, 56 T.C.
477, 487 (1971) (on appeal to the Fourth Circuit) (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
175See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (3) (1967).
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
177 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c) (2) (1967).
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well be the principal basis for exclusion), the business purpose test in
the context of deductions from income serves merely as a safeguard to
insure that the employer compulsion or requirement is bona fide and
not a subterfuge to allow deduction of an expense that would be personal
absent the employer compulsion. Thus, the relative significance of
employer compulsion and employer benefit is constant in the areas of
deductibility of educational expenses and moving expenses.
In addition to highlighting the different roles played by the factors
of employer requirement and benefit of the employer where exclusion
and deduction of employer mandated expenses are involved, the educa-
tional expenses development establishes that the employer compulsion
and rational connection with the employee's other duties are alternative
tests and satisfaction of one does not necessarily meet the other's require-
ments. This aspect points up the fundamental error in Woodall. There
the court found that the moving expenses "had no relation to any serv-
ice which was being performed for the employer," 178 but ignored the
theory underlying the employer requirement rule that it is necessary in
an employee's business of earning his salary to abide by his employer's
requirements; and if costs are incurred in doing so, they are necessary
business expense, deductible if ordinary, i.e., not capital. 179
Although not expressly discussed in the cases, or regulations, it is clear
that the fact that the employee may possess and exercise control over
the subject matter of the courses taken, quality of the educational ex-
perience (i.e., institution attended), and duration of the educational ex-
penses does not preclude his deducting them if required by the employer
as long as they are not minimum educational requirements and do not
qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business. In addition, the tax-
payer may elect between alternative requirements, such as summer
school or a course of reading as in Hill, without losing the deduction.
Thus, the rules here are more consistent with the moving expense cases
where the crucial factor was also lack of control over the cause of the
expenditure than with the convenience of the employer requirements.8 0'
178 United States v. Woodall, 255 F.2d 370, 373 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U..
824 (1958).
179 This principle is, of course, not peculiar to educational or moving expenses; it
reappears below in the entertainment expense and traveling expense areas, see text at
notes 279 and 432 infra. This doctrine also underlies the rule with respect to employee
excess compensation and other types of reimbursement agreements. See Lee, Share-
holder Withdrawal, note 139 supra, at 540 n.168.
180 See text at notes 57 and 58 supra.
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Perhaps even more significant than these additional pieces of flesh on
the skeleton of employer compulsion is the illustration of conceptual
tunnel vision at work. From Hill until the 1958 regulations, and there-
after in some instances,'"' the administrative view and the view of the
Tax Court was that deductibility of educational expenses was dependent
upon employer compulsion. In essence this meant that educational ex-
penses which were voluntarily incurred were not deductible. This ap-
proach is in no way dictated by the statutory test of "ordinary and nec-
essary," construed by the cases as meaning appropriate and helpful. As
pointed out in a dissent in Harold H. Davis8 2 (which was, in effect,
accepted by the Service since it relinquished its victory in Davis both
by stipulating on appeal to vacate and remand the case for entry of a
decision of no deficiency' 3 and by issuing Revenue Ruling 63-275): "
[T] he test is not whether the expenditure is "required," but rather
whether it is "appropriate" or "helpful" and proximately related to
the taxpayer's trade or business. Of course, where the taxpayer is
compelled by his employer to incur certain expenses, that fact itself
may be highly pertinent in allowing the deduction. But the absence
of such compulsion certainly does not, of itself, require the opposite
result. The question still remains whether the expenditure is reasonably
related to the taxpayer's trade or business.185
The 1958 regulations clearly sought to incorporate this general test by
its allowance of deductions for improvement or maintenance of skills
used in an existing business, which are, of course, appropriate or helpful
to that business. Indeed, it is unlikely that any expense which met the
latter test would not also meet the former. However, for the better
part of a decade from Hill to the 1958 regulations and sporadically there-
after, the Service and the Tax Court attempted to apply the unique rule
of allowing educational and related expenses only where employer com-
pulsion was present.""'
181 Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175, 178 (1962), vacated and remanded (by stipulation),
1964 P-H 56, 345 (9th Cir.).
182 !d. at 186 (Raum, J., dissenting).
183 Wolfman, supra note 79 at 1091.
184 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 85.
185 38 T.C. 175, 186 (Raum, J., dissenting).
186 The Service has taken a similar position with respect to home office expenses,
ruling that such expenses are deductible only if required by the employer as a condition
of employment. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 432. Not unexpectedly the
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IV. PRIMARY BENEFIT TO THE EMPLOYER: ENTERTAINMENT EXPENSES
An economic gain bestowed as compensation upon an employee con-
stitutes income; the gain may be indirect as where a benefit is received
without a corresponding dimunution in wealth.' 8' For example, if an
employee (typically a corporate executive) entertains his employer's
customers through hosting a cruise on his employer's yacht, the value of
the cruise to the employee may be includible in the executive's gross
income as taxable compensation or if he is also a shareholder (a common
event in close corporations) possibly as a constructive dividend."1 8 Since
a dividend is not deductible by a corporation,"8 9 a frequent issue in cases
involving employer expense-paid entertainment undertaken by share-
holder-employees has been whether the portion of the expenditures
allocable to such employees is deductible by the employer. Indeed, in
many of the cases in this area, particularly the earlier ones, the question
of income to the employee appears incidental to the issue of deducti-
bility of the expense by the corporate employer."" Consequently, the
strict attitude towards corporate deduction of entertainment expenses
where dominant shareholders are involved has significantly and directly
influenced the question of exclusion of the value of the indirect gain
by the sharehholder-employee undertaking the entertainment, whether
under employer command or not. Thus, in Louis Greenspon'9' where
a corporate executive allocated to controlled corporations a substantial
portion of the expenses of establishing and maintaining a home with elab-
orate grounds in which business guests were entertained, the court re-
quired "very clear" evidence to show that any particular percentage of
expenditures for entertainment at the shareholder's home were purely
commercial and, hence, deductible by the corporations. Indeed, it ex-
pressed concern that a corporation was taking deductions for expenses
judicial response has been to apply the traditional "appropriate and helpful" test. Newi
v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally Staller, The Second Of-
fice at Home, 58 AJBA.J. 526 (1972).
187 United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1968).
188 See, e.g., Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650 (1962). See generally Comment, Dis-
guised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.LA. L. Rxv. 207 (1956).
189 Swed Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 480 (5th Cit. 1963). See generally
Lee, Shareholder Withdrawal, supra note 139, at 512.
190 See, e.g., Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650, 663 (1962); Louis Greenspan, 23 T.C.
138 (1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956); Robert R. Walker, Inc., 34 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 154, 169-70 (1965), aft'd, 362 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1966).
19123 T.C. 138, 150-51 (1954), aftd, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
with respect to the private home of its dominant shareholder and chief
executive officer. "In such circumstances, the proof should be very
clear and very certain that the expenses charged to the corporation were
legitimate business expenses of the corporation. Otherwise, the oppor-
tunity for abuse would be very great." 192 This standard of burden of
proof bears a striking resemblance to the strong proof required of the
Internal Revenue Service in civil tax fraud cases, i.e., "clear and con-
vincing" 193 evidence-which is greater than the "clear preponderance"
standard usually applied.19 4 The court found no such clear and certain
proof; rather the farm was believed to be primarily the shareholder's
home and any use of it to entertain business guests was only incidental.
Having devoted extensive analysis to disallowance of the corporate de-
ductions, the court perfunctorially agreed with the Service that the farm
expenses charged to the corporation constituted income to the share-
holder.
It now appears to be well settled, particularly in cases where a dom-
inant stockholder withdraws or disburses corporate funds for his per-
sonal use, without intention of repayment, that the amounts withdrawn
are the equivalent of corporate distributions, the informality of the
transaction notwithstanding. 95
The same rule extends to corporate-owned facilities made available to
a stockholder for his personal benefit.196
The taxability of the fair value of such expenditures is bottomed on
economic benefit-a corporate distribution to a shareholder serving no
legitimate corporate purpose that results in economic benefit to the share-
holder constitutes a constructive dividend to the benefited shareholder. 97
At the other extreme, the rule appears equally well-established that the
cost of a corporate expense does not constitute income to the share-
holder if it qualifies as an ordinary and necessary expense of the cor-
poration, although the shareholder obtained -personal enjoyment from
1921 d. at 151.
'93See, e.g., Allen F. Labay, 55 T.C. 6, 13 (1970), aff'd, 450 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1971);
Henry S. Kerbaugh, 29 B.T.A. 1014, aff'd, 74 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1935). See generally
Note,'The Burden of Proof Required of a Parent Claiming Child Exemption, 29 WASH.
& LEE L. Rav. 29, 39 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Note, The'Burden of Proof).
194 See Note, The Burden of Proof, note 193 supra, at 39 nn.56 and 60.
195'Louis Greenspan, 23 T.C. 138, 151 (1954).
196See Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650, 663 (1962) and authorities cited therein.
197 Commissioner v. Riss, 374 F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1967).
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the expenditure. 198 Indeed, this rule was even applied to a big game
hunt in Africa conducted by a corporate executive who admittedly
enjoyed hunting. 99
While careful consideration has been traditionally given to the cir-
cumstances in which the value of such expenditures paid by a corporate
employer were taxable to the shareholder-employee, until recendy less
explicit analysis was given to the circumstances permitting an exclusion
from income. Possibly courts felt that the taxable income to the enter-
taining employee was the natural consequence of disallowance of the
deduction taken by the corporation or more likely the unarticulated
rationale was that identical factors governed inclusion in the employee's
income and deduction by the corporation (not by the employee-the
erroneous assumption encountered in the moving expense area) so that
discussion of the corporate deduction sufficed. In any event, with the
advent of section 274, which disallows under certain circumstances de-
ductions for entertainment expenditures otherwise deductible by the
payor under sections 162 or 212, courts have focused more closely on
the circumstances in which an employee is not subject to taxation on the
value of such costs. Thus, John L. Ashby, °° primarily a section 274
case, was the first decision to supply the answer implicit in the earlier
case law: 201 to the extent that a corporate expenditure incidentally ben-
efiting an employee is made for a corporate business purpose its value
is not includible in the employee's income; the converse had, of course,
been established by prior opinions, i.e., to the extent the cost is paid or
incurred for the benefit of the individual its value constitutes income to
him.202 In Ashby a corporation was denied deductions for costs with
respect to entertainment "facilities" (a yacht and two clubs) because
it could not show that more than fifty percent of the use of the facili-
ties was for business use so that the facilities would qualify as being used
"primarily for the furtherance of the taxpayer's trade or business," a
198United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 123 (5th Cir. 1968); see John L. Ashby,
50 T.C. 409, 418 (1968).
199 Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C. 463 (1955) (effective advertising at low cost
for a dairy).
.200 50T.C. 409, 418 (1968).
201 It would appear logical that the same rules should govern exclusions as govern
inclusions, see United States v. Gotcher, 401 F2d 118, 123 (5th Cit. 1968), and the
Supreme Court has just recognized this. See note 139 supra.
202 See note 197 supra.
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prerequisite to deductibility under section 274(a) (1) (B) .203 The Com-
missioner argued that the shareholder should be charged with dividend
income to the full extent of the disallowed deductions. The Tax Court,
however, pointed to the legislative history of section 274,204 which
made "it clear that since the only purpose of sec. 274 is to disallow
deductions, it does not affect the question of the includability or ex-
cludability of an item in income of any individual, and that the usual
rules are applicable in this respect." 205 Although the court believed that
the yacht was not used primarily, i.e., fifty percent or more, for a cor-
porate business use, it was satisfied from the evidence that as much as
20/68 of the boat's use was for corporate business purposes "and accord-
ingly... [was] of the opinion that only 48/68 of the depreciation and
costs of repairs and maintenance of the boat and the same percentage of
the boat interest constituted amounts paid or incurred for the benefit
of the individual (emphasis added) .... ," 206 and, hence, was dividend
income to him.
This line of cases evidences the parallelism between the corporate
executive decisions and the benefit of the employer doctrine-both turn
in large measure on whether the primary benefit of the expenditure
inures to the employer or the employee. The other elements of the
latter doctrine (lack of employee control or choice and the closely
related factor of employer requirement) have played a less significant,
or at least less explicit role in these opinions. Indeed, in the overwhelm-
ing majority of the reported decisions the employee was the dominant
shareholder of his corporate employer so that if employee control were
the determinative factor those decisions could have been resolved on
that point.2 07 In fact, that was not the case. Thus, it would be easy to
conclude that employee control or employer requirement is not a relevant
factor in the corporate-executive line of authorities. There are two
203 The item must also be directly related to the active conduct of his trade or
business. INT. RE V. CoDm of 1954, § 274(a) (1) (B). The regulations and legislative
history do not define the perimeters of active conduct of a trade or business in this
context. For the scope of the concept in other provisions see Lee, "Active Conduct"
Distinguished from "Conduct" of Rental Real Estate Business, 25 TAx LAWYER 317
(1972).
204 S. RFa'. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL.
733.
205 John L. Ashby, 50 T.C. 409, 418 n.5 (1968).
206 Id. at 418.
207 See, e.g., Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650, 663 (1962).
[Vol. 7:1
EMPLOYER MANDATED EXPENSES
caveats to such a conclusion. The first is that the benefit of the employer
doctrine, at least in its statutory form in section 119, is applicable where
the employee controls the employer. 8 Thus, it may be argued that
employee control is still an element, but the separate identities of the
corporate employer and employee-shareholder are respected. The other
possibility, also present under section 119, is that in situations of abuse
a shareholder will be taxed despite the fact that the primary benefit of
the cost inures to the corporation if the shareholder actually does exer-
cise control over the expenditure.2° Similarly, one of the corporate
executive cases has indicated in dictum that it might consider actual
shareholder control in situations of abuse. In that decision, United Ana-
line Co. v. Commissioner,210 the shareholder in fact had received:
[T]angible, and hence taxable, benefits over and beyond the incidental
ones which may be conferred by attendance at a predominantly busi-
ness function. It might be that the court used too large a measure if
... it suggested that his enjoyment of the yacht when strictly business
guests were entertained was such a taxable benefit. This we need not
decide, although we might see a basis for such a finding when the
choice of an expensive recreational facility for business purposes was
fully in the hands of the stockholder who was to use it. But certainly
where this facility was enjoyed on entirely separate occasions which
were not predominantly, and in some cases not at all, business moti-
vated, the fair value of such use is what has been loosely called a con-
structive receipt.211
A further indication of the significance of control in this area may
be seen in Nicholls, North, Buse Co.212 There the Tax Court drew
upon the doctrine of assignment of income (the doctrine focuses on the
power to control the disposition of income) 213 to include in the income
of the dominant shareholder the value of his sons' personal use of a cor-
porate facility. The court emphasized that it was the taxpayer's decision
that the corporation acquire the facility (the ever familiar yacht) and his
208 See text at note 42, supra.
209 See text at notes 44 through 46, supra.
210 316 F.2d 701, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1963).
211 ld. The Analine court drew support from the section 274 foreign travel regula-
tions' control concept discussed below at note 346.
212 56 T.C. 1225, 1239-40 (1971).
213 See Lee, Section 482 and the Integrated Business Enterprise, 57 VA. L. REv. 1376,
1409 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Lee, section 482).
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"decision to allow the use of the boat by his sons as they desired and
without direct control over either the circumstances of use or the main-
tenance of appropriate supportive documentation ... ." 214 The court
was not persuaded that the taxpayer's purpose in agreeing to the ac-
quisition of a large pleasure craft was solely to benefit the corporation.
Furthermore, the fact that the principal user of the boat for personal
purposes was a mature adult and a shareholder in his own right (al-
though assuredly a lower tax-bracket shareholder) was irrelevant because
the taxpayer was in complete control of the events. It may be noted,
however, that the taxpayer was not taxed on his (or his sons') enjoyment
of the use of the boat on occasions of entertainment of business guests.
Despite the United Analine suggestion that shareholder control might
trigger taxation in certain circumstances even though the entertainment
was predominantly business, case law is more likely to follow precedent
in which shareholder-employees are not taxed to the extent the cor-
porate expenditure serves a corporate business purpose, with no consider-
ation being given to such shareholder's control over the expenditure.215
The United Analine language-taxability of benefits where use is not
predominantly business-serves also as a rather clear example of the
primary purpose criterion as applied to deductions and inferentially to
income. A deduction for maintenance and depreciation is permitted,
for example, where acquisition of property is primarily associated with
business motivated purposes and the personal use is distinctly secondary
and incidental.218 Conversely, if such acquisition and maintenance is
primarily motivated by personal considerations the deductions are dis-
allowed.2 17 However, the Tax Court in International Artists, Ltd.218
pointed out (in the context of deductibility of expenditures) that the
primary purpose criterion is applicable only where the secondary pur-
pose is merely incidental and relatively insignificant. "Where substan-
tial business and personal motives exist, however, allocation becomes
214 Nicholls, North, Buse Co., 56 T.C. 1225, 1239-40 (1971).
215 International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94, 104 (1970), cited United Analine as sup-
porting the proposition that a deduction for maintenance of property is disallowed
where primarily associated with profit-motivated purposes and personal use is secondary.
The court also pointed out that corporate expenditures benefiting a shareholder were
the equivalent of personal expenditures by an individual and the same rules applied.
216 See, e.g., Delores Bussabarger, 52 T.C. 819 (1969).
217 See, e.g., W. D. Gale, Inc. v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1961).
218 55 T.C. 94, 105 (1970).
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necessary." 21  For deductions by the corporate employer the court
believed that a 50 percent allocation properly reflected the business and
personal use of the property. Then turning to the question of the
amount of the dividend income to the shareholder-employee, the Tax
Court applied the same 50 percent allocation factor to the fair rental
value to determine the amount of income taxable to the employee. Thus,
it seems clear that despite the almost universal use of the term "primary
purpose" in the corporate executive decisions, the taxpayer and the
courts are not faced with an all-or-nothing choice. Income to the em-
ployee can be allocated according to the relative benefit to the employer
and the employee. This approach is by no means unprecedented, the
value of meals and lodging having been partially excluded from the
employee's income under the pre-1954 convenience of the employer
doctrine on just that basis. 220
Development of deductibility and, hence, indirectly of excludability
of entertainment expenses has been strongly influenced by the avail-
ability of the Cohan1221 rule of approximation prior to 1963.222 That rule
arose in the following circumstances. The Board of Tax Appeals in
George M. Cohani had denied the taxpayer any deduction for the
large sums which it believed that he had spent in traveling and entertain-
ing for two reasons: (1) the amounts claimed were bare estimates un-
supported by vouchers or bookkeeping entries of any kind, and (2)
the court did not know what part of the expenditures were for personal
expenses. Judge Hand of the Second Circuit held that estimates were
allowable.
Absolute certainty in such matters is usually impossible and is not neces-
sary; the Board should make as close an approximation as it can, bearing
219 d.
220 Olin D. Ellis, 6 T.C. 138 (1946).
221Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930).
222 The substantiation rules of section 274 were intended by Congress to overrule the
Cohan rule in the area of entertainment expenses, S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
35 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 707, 741; Albert N. Dibs, 39 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 983, 985 (1970); see generally Comment, Substantiation of Business Related En-
tertaimnent Expense, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 345 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Comment,
Substantiation). However, Cohan still lives where section 274 is inapplicable. See
Teichner v. Commissioner, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9183, p. 83, 745 n.11 (2d Cir. 1971); Lillian
Pascarelli, 55 T.C. 1082, 1096 (1971). A catalogue of such areas is available in Kramer,
Esthiated Income and Expense in the Tax Law, 32 TAxEs 906 (1954).
223 11 B.T.A. 743 (1929).
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heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own
making. But to allow nothing at all appears to us inconsistent with say-
ing that something was spent. True, we do not know how many trips
Cohan made, nor how large his entertainments were; yet there was
obviously some basis for computation, if necessary by drawing upon
the Board's personal estimates of the minimum of such expenses. The
amount may be trivial and unsatisfactory, but there was basis for some
allowance, and it was wrong to refuse any, even though it were the
travelling expenses of a single trip. It is not fatal that the result will
inevitably be speculative; many important decisions must be such.224
Commentators pointed out that as a practical matter taxpayers through
excessive deductions were able to shift the burden of proof (which
normally rests with the taxpayer)2 25 to the Service, since it knew that
under the Cohan rule a reasonable approximation would be made by the
courts in the absence of records, and thus it would have to allow some-
thing; the question was how much.226 Consequently, taxpayers were
tempted to claim excessive deductions for bargaining purposes."7 Due
to such potential abuse many court decisions sought to limit the Cohan
rule. For example, some opinions were subject to the interpretation
that once the Service had applied Cohan a court would uphold such
minimum allowance rather than applying its own approximation.22' s It
is submitted that the better view is that a court will not substitute its
judgment for the Commissioner's Cohan approximation in the absence of
proof that the latter was arbitrary or unreasonable. 22
224 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally Gluck,
supra note 123.
225 Tax Ct. R. P. 32.
226 See Eichel, The Missouri Rule-Substantiation Requirements for Travel and En-
tertainment Expenditures under Section 274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19Y4,
18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 613, 616 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Eichel); 44 Noam DAME
LAWYER 1006, 1007 (1969).
227 See Emmanuel & Lipoff, Travel and Entertaimnent: The New World of Section
274, 18 TAx L. REv. 487, 517 (1963) (hereinafter cited as Emmanuel and Lipoff).
228See, e.g., Neils Schultz, 44 B.T.A. 146, 151 (1941); S. J. Campbell, 30 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 902, 922 (1961). See generally CAPLiN, Tim TRAVEL AND ENTERTArNMENT
EXPENSE PROBLEM, 39 TAXES 947, 960 (1961) (approval of Campbell and Scbultz; Service
determinations developed in the field will be upheld); Gluck, suzpra note 123, at 383, n39
(critical of Schultz rule); Note, Business Expense Deduction-The Cohan Rule, 36
TAXES 177 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Note, Cohan Rule).
229 See Silverman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 849, 853 (8th Ci. 1958). Significantly,
this is a burden of proof similar to that under section 482 and greater than the clear
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The principle of Cohan... dictates that the Court estimate from the
evidence what portion of the claimed deduction should be allowed.
This, however, is not necessary when respondent has previously em-
ployed the Cohan principle in asserting his deficiency. In such a case
the question really is whether respondent's application is, considering
the evidence, fair and adequate. 230
In effect, the Commissioner could place the burden of proof back upon
the taxpayer by allowing a portion of the claimed deductions.'-" How-
ever, where the courts were convinced that the Service's approximation
was erroneous, they made their own estimation.
32
Another gloss which some early decisions attempted to place upon
Cohan was that in the absence of segregation, for example, of traveling
expenses between a taxpayer's official and personal trips there was no
basis for an approximation.23 This gloss was particularly unfortunate
since one of the bases for the Tax Court's original disallowance of the
claimed deductions in Cohan was that it did not know what portion of
the claimed expenditures were personal. Indeed, more recent decisions
are legion that have permitted a partial deduction despite a failure to
so segregate.234 Furthermore, many cases that could find no basis for
allocation of claimed deductions between personal and business expendi-
tures also stated that the taxpayer failed to prove that he was entitled to
any deduction at l.23-5 A more sophisticated varient of the segrega-
tion principle is the Sutter rule.230 Where a taxpayer in entertaining
makes outlays for himself or his family that are personal expenses, he
must show "by clear and detailed evidence as to each instance that the
preponderance of evidence placed upon the taxpayer in most Tax Court cases. See
Charles Rocco, 57 T.C. No. 85 (1972).
230 Victor R. Havas, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1597, 1601 (1970), appeal docketed, No.
-, 9th Cir., June 6, 1971.
231 See Note, Cohan Rule, supra note 228, at 178.
232 See Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513, 519 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 242 F.2d 558 (7th
Cir. 1957); Morris Nemo, 24 T.C. 583, 594 (1955); Michael Potson, 22 T.C. 912, 928-29
(1954), aff'd sub. nom., Bodoglou v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1956).
233 See George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840, 844 (1936); Joseph F. Logel, 24 B.TA.
798 (1931), cf. Cohan v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763, 765 (2d Cir. 1943).
234 See, e.g., Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20, 38 (1965); Herman Drews, 25 T.C. 1354,
1355 (1956). But see Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1, 13 (1965). See generally
Gluck, supra note 123, at 387 and authorities cited therein.
235 Walter I. Greer 28 T.C. 994, 996 (1957); cf. Sperling's Estate v. Commissioner,
341 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1965).
236 Richard A. Sutter, 21 T.C. 170, 173 (1953).
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expenditure in question was different from or in excess of that which
would have been made for the taxpayer's personal expenses" ;237 other-
wise even under Cohan no amount is deductible. The Cohan doctrine
may, nevertheless, be applicable to carve out business expenses from the
total expenditures where, as a practical matter, the taxpayer cannot sep-
arate them by proof from personal living expenses. 8
Still another limitation, although arguably limited to refund cases
where the taxpayer is required to show the correct amount of tax to
prevail,' 9 is that a court may, rather than must, make an estimate.240
But perhaps the restriction of the Cohan principle that reveals most ju-
dicial resistance to approximation is the view (not universally held) 241
that the record must afford a basis for making a reasonable estimate. 242
Moreover, it is clear that a taxpayer must first prove that the expenditure
was an ordinary and necessary business expenditure before Cohan can
be applied to determine the amount.243 Thus, a judge who was reluctant
237 Id., accord, LaForge v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 370, 372 n.2 (2d Cit. 1970). The
Service has announced in Revenue Ruling 63-144, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 129, 135, that it
will apply the Sutter doctrine only in "abuse" cases. See Herman Marvin, 40 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1042, 1045 n.3 (1971).
238 James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1962).
2 39 Eustice, Tax Problems Arising fron Transactions Between Affiliated or Controlled
Corporations, 23 TAX L. REV. 451, 495 n.115 (1968).
240 Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). See generally Lee,
Section 482, note 213 supra, at 1400.
241 Polletti v. Commissioner 330 F.2d 818, 820-21 (8th Cir. 1964) (remanded for
application of Cohan rule where Tax Court had held that some of expenditures were
deductible, but record failed to provide a basis for determining a specific amount);
see Jason L. Honigman, 55 T.C. 1067, 1081 (1971); V.H.T. Bien, 20 T.C. 49, 56 (1953);
Andrew P. Solt, 19 T.C. 183, 188 (1952); cf. James E. Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner,
234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956), reVing, 24 T.C. 597 (1955).
242 Plisco v. United States, 306 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
948 (1963) (refund suit); Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932, 937 (1969) (dictum); A. Finkl
& Sons, 38 T.C. 886, 903-05 (1962). See generally Lee, Section 482, note 213 supra, at
1399-1400.
243 Oates v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1963). Indeed, many cases
which conclude that there was no basis in facts before them for a reasonable Cohan
allocation, do so on the grounds that the taxpayer has presented no reliable evidence to
show he is entitled to an adjustment. See Walter I. Geer, 28 T.C. 994, 996 (1957); accord,
Paul Masters, 25 T.C. 1093, 1099 (1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 335 (3rd Cir. 1957); Alfred W.
Barber, 19 T.C. 600, 604 (1952). Cf. United Analine Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d
701, 704 (1st Cir. 1963); accord, Walker v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir.
1966). See generally Kramer, Estimated Income and Expense in the Tax Law, 32
TAXEs 906, 907 (1954). However, where a court holds that some expenditures were
made, but refuses to apply Cohan because there was no evidence as to extent, dates,
amounts, or specific expenditures, Herbert Schellenbarg, 31 T.C. 1269, 1278 (1959),
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to estimate entertainment expenses could easily do so by refusing to find
that the claimed expenses were business related.2 4 , Indeed, the explicit
judicial response to potential abuse in the entertainment expense area
has been that the taxpayer seeking the benefit of such deductions must
meet a greater than normal burden of proof: very clear and very certain
evidence that the expenses were in fact incurred and that they bore a
proximate relationship to the conduct of his trade or business.245 In addi-
tion, the Tax Court imposed a special burden of showing that the enter-
tainment expenses were necessary.
In determining that which is "necessary" to a taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness, the taxpayer is ordinarily the best judge on the matter, and we
would hesitate to substitute our own discretion for his with regard to
whether an expenditure is "appropriate and helpful," in those cases in
which he has decided to make the expenditure solely to serve the
purposes of his business. But where, as in this case, the expenditures
may well have been made to further ends which are primarily personal,
this ordinary constraint does not prevail; petitioner must show affirma-
tively that his expenses were "necessary" to the conduct of his pro-
fessions.240
At times in fact the Tax Court appears to have approached a require-
ment that such entertainment constitutes a direct part of a business dis-
cussion or negotiation of specific business matters. 247 The feeling of the
court has been that the "deduction is one that is peculiarly susceptible
"1 248of abuse ....
Despite the special rules regarding burden of proof and degree of
business necessity generated by judicial concern about potential abuse
of entertainment expenses, this area has produced significant develop-
ment of the employer requirement concept in its bearing on deduction
of employer mandated expenses.
modified, 283 F.2d 871 (6th Cit. 1960) (result would be based solely on inference and
guesswork), it is in conflict with Cohan as construed by the Eighth Circuit in Polletti
v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818, 820-21 (8th Cit. 1964).
244See, e.g., Reginald G. Hearn, 36 T.C. 672, 674 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 431 (9th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 US. 909 (1963); Eugene H. Walet, Jr., 31 T.C. 461, 471
(1958), aff'd, 272 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1959); cf. Alfred W. Barber, 19 T.C. 600, 604 (1952)
2 4 5 See text at notes 192 through 194 supra.
246 Robert Lee Henry, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961) (citations omitted).
247 See, e.g., Louis Boebm, 35 B.T.A. 1106 (1937); S. J. Campbell, 30 P-H Tax- Ct.
Mem. 902, 928 (1961).
248 Id.
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The Service's position here, unlike its early stance on educational
expenses, is that an employer requirement is not a prerequisite to em-
ployee deduction of entertainment expenses incurred on behalf of the
employer. Instead, it ruled in Revenue Ruling 57-502249 that:
[A] corporate officer who claims deductions for traveling and enter-
tainment expenses incurred on behalf of a corporation must bear the
burden of proof that he is entitled to such deduction. Reimbursement
for such expenses to the corporation officer or a resolution requiring
the assumption of such expenses by him 'would tend to indicate that
they are a necessary expense of his office. Although the presence of
such evidence does not conclusively determine that the expenses are
deductible, neither does the absence of such evidence of itself neces-
sarily result in the disallowance of deductions, provided it can be es-
tablished otherwise that the expenses are a necessary expense of the
office (emphasis added).250
Subsequent decisions such as Brown v. Commissioner251 echo the posi-
tion taken by this ruling, e.g., a clear employer policy requiring the
employee to make the expenditure would be helpful in establishing the
right to the deduction. However, others following the landmark Schmid-
lapp v. Commissioner252 hold without qualification that where the tax-
payer proved that as part of his duties his employer required him to incur
expenses on its behalf, without expectation of reimbursement, the ex-
penditures were deductible by the taxpayer.253 In Schmidlapp where the
taxpayer, a vice president of a large bank, was expected as part of his
implied duties to entertain at his own expense business guests of his
employer, Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit ruled that "[i]t
is no answer to say that they were for the bank's benefit; so were all
the taxpayer's services; if it did in fact give him to understand that he
was to extend a factitious hospitality in its interest, the cost of it was a
necessary expense of his office." 254 The premise of the opinion clearly
249 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 118.
250 Id. at 119. In Rev. Rul. 72-192, INT. Rav. BuL. 1972-17, 9, the Service reiterated
its view that employer compulsion is not conclusive of business necessity, only strong
evidence thereof. More important in its eyes is whether the activity is utilized as a
means of carrying out the substantive duties of the employee's job.
251 446 F.2d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally MERTENs, note 79 supra, at 5 25.12.
252 96 F.2d 680, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1938).
253 See, e.g., John 0. Lockwood, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Memo. 686, 687 (1970); Albert L.
Sanderson, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 87, 88 (1957).
254 Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1938).
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was that expenses essential to the continuance of the taxpayer's employ-
ment are deductible-the judicial rationale supporting deduction of
employer required educational expenses. 255
Many entertainment expense decisions involved a common factual
pattern: an employee reimbursed by his employer for certain entertain-
ment expenses claimed that his employer also required him to incur
other expenses for which he was not reimbursed. The most widely
known of these cases, Noland v. Commissioner,2 6 began with the as-
sumptions that (1) every person working for compensation is engaged
in the business of earning his pay so that expenses essential to the con-
tinuance of that employment are deductible and (2) the business of a
corporation is not that of its officers, employees or stockholders, hence,
if either the corporation or the stockholder-executive pays the other's
obligations, his expense is not deductible.257 The taxpayer did not ques-
tion these rules but sought to prove that the corporation required him
to incur the expenses, including among others the costs of the annual
Christmas party which theretofore had been borne by the company.
The Fourth Circuit followed the Tax Court in holding that "the proof
was not so certain or definite as to compel a finding that these expen-
ditures 'were required by the Company or the conclusion that they were
deductible business expenses of the taxpayer (emphasis added)." 258 The
review court went on to note that the expenses (club and association
dues primarily) of the executive in discharging his civic and community
responsibilities were personal. In this context, the court made a fre-
quently quoted statement.
It is greatly to be doubted that expenses, which are clearly personal
in nature, could be converted into business expenses of the individual
by a formalistic requirement of his employer that they be incurred.
Personal, living and family expenses are nondeductible by the express
provisions of § 24(a) (1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 24(a) (1). No magic form of
words occurs to us by which an employer can convert them into some-
255 See text at note 167, supra. As one commentator has pointed out, the fact that
an expenditure primarily benefits the employer does not lessen its deductibility, instead
the employer compulsion makes it deductible. Note, Deductibility of Expenses Incurred
for the Benefit of Another, 66 HAav. L. REV. 1508, 1509 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Note,
Expenses for Another).
250 269 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
257 Id. at 111.
258 Id. at 112.
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thing else, and relieve his employees of a portion of the tax burden
uniformly borne by all other individuals.
To distinguish between such expenditures and those having a closer
relation to business is not easy. Answers turn upon particular factual
situations, and distinctions are usually a matter of degree. If the ex-
pense has been billed to an employer and has passed a critical scrutiny
of corporate officers concerned with the elimination of needless ex-
pense, it becomes prima facie an allowable business expense of the
corporation. When the corporation, reimbursing its officers and em-
ployees for direct expense incurred in furthering its business, does not
reimburse an officer for particular expenses, that expense prima facie is
personal, either because it was voluntarily assumed or because it did
not arise directly out of the exigencies of the business of the cor-
poration.259
However, simply because a corporation refuses to absorb an expense,
it is not rendered automatically outside the traditional scope of cor-
porate expense. 260
Another judicial response to the pattern of expenses benefiting the
employer with only some of the expenses being reimbursed has been to
treat the unreimbursed portion as not necessary. Thus, in Horace E.
Podem1s,26'1 the Tax Court ruled that where an employee could have
been reimbursed by his employer for certain expenses "had he taken
the trouble to claim reimbursement by filing the necessary vouchers," 262
the expenses were not ordinary and necessary. 263
The tenor of Podems is that the employee's expenditures for which
he failed to claim reimbursement were business expenses, but were not
necessary by virtue of such failure. It came, however, to be read as
259 Id. at 113. One writer has commented that to say in such cases that the employee
is attempting to convert his employer's deductions into his own seems a little unreal;
he is bearing an expense that he thinks advisable in order to keep his job and protect
his salary. Fischman, Income Tax Aspects of Third Party Payments of Taxpayer
Obligations, N.Y.U. 19ri INST. o N FED. TAx 31, 39 (1961) (hereinafter cited as
Fischman).
260 Brown v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1971).
26124 T.C. 21 (1955).
262 Id. at 22.
2 63"Obviously, it was not necessary for Horace to remain unreimbursed for the
expenses of his automobile to the extent that he could have been reimbursed had he
taken the trouble to file a voucher and be reimbursed by his employer. These amounts
were not ordinary and necessary expenses of Horace's business." Id. at 22-23 (emphasis
added); accord, Brown v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 926, 929 n.5 (8th Ci. 1971).
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holding that an employee who is entitled to reimbursement from his
employer but does not claim it is not entitled to a deduction, because
such deduction properly belongs to the employer and not to the em-
ployee, and by failing to seek reimbursement the taxpayer cannot con-
vert business expenses of his employer into his own business expenses.2 64
This view that expenses reimbursable by another are not the .taxpayer's
expenses conflicts with the holding in Revenue Ruling 57-502 that em-
ployer reimbursement tends to indicate that an employee's expense on
its behalf constitutes a necessary business expense of his position. More-
over, the Court of Claims in RCA Communications, Inc. v. United
States2 65 ruled that where a taxpayer's expense is otherwise ordinary and
necessary the fact that he is entitled to reimbursement does not preclude
a deduction (the subsequent reimbursement is, however, includible in
income). Furthermore, the Tax Court has carved out an exception to
Podemw where the right to reimbursement is contingent. In such cir-
cumstances an otherwise ordinary and necessary business expense is
deductible under the annual accounting principle. 266
The income tax treatment to the employee of the employer reim-
bursement is equally murky. Some early decisions seem to have assumed
that if the expenses were deductible by the employee, their reimburse-
ment by the employer was not to be included in the employee's gross
income.267 Thus, the Tax Court held that reimbursements did not con-
204 See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 253 (9th Cir.
1963); Roy L. Harding, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 868, 872 (1970); Coplon v. Commissioner,
277 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1960); Norman E. Kennelly, 56 T.C. 936, 943 (1971), aff'd per
curian, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9348 (April, 1972); William C. Stolk, 40 T.C. 345, 356
(1963).
265 277 F.2d 164, 167 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
266 See, e.g.,.Electric Tachometer Corp., 37 T.C. 158, 161-62 (1961); Alleghany Corp.,
28 T.C. 298, 304-05 (1957). The Court of Claims in RCA Communications contrasted
Pittsburgh Indus. Eng'r. Co., 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1038, 1042-43 (1950) with earlier
Tax Court cases as an example of a more recent trend allowing a deduction as
ordinary and necessary business expenses for amounts expended by a taxpayer for
which he was subsequently partially reimbursed. However, Pittsburgh Indus. Eng'r. Co.
on its facts appears to be a contingent right to reimbursement decision although the
Tax Court did not expressly rely on that fact, but instead on the annual accounting
principle (the basis for Allegbany Corp., which, in turn, was the precedent relied on
in Electric Taoometer).
267See J. S. Sullivan, 5 B.T.A. 996, 999 (1927); Jay N. Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499, 503
(1926). See generally Note, Income Tax Consequences of the Relocation of Employees,
51 CoLum. L. Rxv. 118, 123 n.32 (1951) (hereinafter cited as Note, Relocation Em-
ployees); MERTFas, supra note 79, at 20-21.
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stitute income where equal to a fair estimate of deductible expenses (in-
deed, reimbursement by an employer was thought by one court to sup-
port its conclusion that the reimbursement was the equivalent of a fair
estimate of such expenses)26 8 or constituted income only to the extent
that the expenses reimbursed were not business related.2  Where the
expenses were clearly not deductible other decisions viewed the issue
as whether the amounts represented additional compensation rather than
reimbursement for traveling expenses incurred in the interest of the
taxpayer's employer.2 70 Not surprisingly the latter cases came to be
interpreted as holding that a taxpayer must include in income reimburse-
ments received from his employer2 1 (and then take deductions for
amounts actually expended for the employer's business or for the busi-
ness purposes designated by the employer). The Seventh Circuit in
Heidt v. Commissioner 72 made a determined effort to resolve the con-
flicts in this area by distinguishing between expenses incurred by an
employee as a principal rather than as a corporate agent.
Examples falling under the "principal" category are those where the
employee is expected to make certain expenditures in order to earn
his salary, without reimbursement from his employer. Such expendi-
tures would be deductible by the employee and not by the employer.
And, in cases where the employee is not required by his employer to
make the expenditures as a condition to earning his salary and is not
reimbursed for making them, such expenditures may be deductible
where they have a direct bearing on the amount of his compensation
and are made in good faith.
In the instant case we have a situation where the automobile expense
incurred by taxpayer was for the benefit of the employer and taxpayer
was clearly entitled to reimbursement. The employer is entitled to the
deduction, and the employee who receives reimbursement is entitled
to offset and deduct his expenditures from his receipts. Under such
circumstances the employee ordinarily realizes no income and incurs
no individual expense as a result of the transaction. See, Treasury
268 See Robert L. Gray, 10 T.C. 590, 596-97 (1948).
269 James T. Thrower, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1707, 1715-16 (1962), aff'd, 330 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1964).
270 See, e.g., Eugene H. Rietzke, 40 T.C. 443, 453 (1963); Estate of Earl W. Hamlin,
19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 431, 435 (1950).
271 See, e.g., Silverman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 849, 853 (6th Cir. 1958) (citing
Hamlin's Estate).
272 274 F.2d 25, 27-28 (7th Cir. 1959).
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Regulations 118, Sections 39.23(a)-1 and 39.23(a)-2, promulgated
under the 1939 Code.
We have concluded that the case as presented is one where the tax-
payer voluntarily gave up reimbursement that he was entitled to receive
and could have received if he had claimed it. He is thus attempting
to convert the employer's right to a deduction into a right of his own.
This he cannot do (emphasis added)273
The Heidt principal agent categorization is, of course, compatible with
Podems but not with Schmidlapp unless the latter is limited to nonreim-
bursable expenses. The fundamental defects, however, in the Heidt ap-
proach are (1) that the principal-agent categories in essence merely dis-
tinguish between unreimbursed and reimbursed expenses without offering
reasoned ground for so doing (an agency theory was rejected in RCA
Communications), and (2) the theory of the exclusion, the employer is
entitled to the deduction and the reimbursed employee is entitled to offset
and deduct his expenditures from his receipts, thereby realizing no income
and incurring no deductible expense, is internally inconsistent as well
as being both novel and without support in the tax treatment of exclusions
elsewhere. There are, however, conceptual models available that solve
the problems of employer mandated expenses incurred by an employee
on behalf of his employer and of reimbursed expenses.
There is an exception to the general rule followed in Noland that a
taxpayer's payment of expenses on behalf of another are not deductible.
That exception arises when the taxpayer's motive for making the ex-
penditure is to protect or promote his own business. 4 In such circum-
stances, the expenses are deductible by the taxpayer "even though the
transaction giving rise to the expenditures originated with another per-
son and would have been deductible by that person if payment had been
made by him." 271 The tests established by the leading case developing
the exception, James L. Lohrke,27" are (1) the purpose or motive of the
taxpayer in paying the obligations of another, and (2) whether the
expenditure is appropriate for the furtherance or promotion of the tax-
273 d.
274See, e.g., Young & Rubican, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233, 1242-43 (Ct. CI.
1969) and authorities cited therein; Ernest C. Rink, 51 T.C. 746, 751 n.3 (1969).
275 James L. Lohrke, 48 T.C. 679, 685 (1967).
276 48 T.C. 679 (1967).
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payer's business. 277 Decisions following Schmidlapp such as Albert L.
Sanderson,278 where the taxpayer's superiors "suggested" that he join
clubs for the better performance of his duties and further made it clear
that he was expected to personally bear the expenses or his chances for
advancement would be jeopardized, are certainly compatible with the
Lohrke rationale. Thus, it is clear that the theory underlying Schmid-
lapp is that expenses incurred by an employee on behalf of his employer,
so that in effect they are the employer's expenses, are nevertheless de-
ductible by the employee if incurred pursuant to employer command
since in such circumstances the expenses are also appropriate to the pro-
motion or at least retention of the taxpayer's business-his employment. 9
Indeed, the Tax Court in Marvin A. Heidt 280 expressly recognized as
an exception to the rule that one taxpayer may not take deductions
properly belonging to another, that "where a corporate officer incurs
an expense on behalf of the corporation, he is entitled to a deduction
therefor if he can sustain his burden of establishing that such expenses
are a necessary expense of his office." 281 Significantly, in applying this
principle, the Tax Court in Heidt also adopted a "personal choice"
analysis.28 Robert G. Fairburn,283 in elaborating on the appellate Heidt
277 Id. at 688.
278 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 87, 88 (1957).
279 An alternative rationale also connected with Lohrke would be that employee
expenditures benefiting the employer constitute a business expenditure of the employee
because it is his business to further the interests of his employer, see text at note 347
infra, and, hence, are appropriate for the furtherance or promotion of the taxpayer's
business within the meaning of Lohrke.
2 80 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 131, 133, affd, 274 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1959).
281 Id.
282 "There is no real evidence that company transportation could not have been
available to Heidt had he chosen to use it, and we conclude that his use of his own
automobile was based primarily on considerations of personal choice and convenience
and certainly not upon any necessity of office. This being the case, his decision not
to claim reimbursement for automobile expenses, while perhaps sincerely motivated,
cannot convert what would properly be Bendix's expenses into ordinary and necessary
business expenses of his own." Id. See Robert G. Fairburn, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 462
(1969).
28aId. at 469. While Samuel F. Patterson, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1052-57 (1971), a
recent Tax Court memorandum decision, did state that even had the taxpayer been
directed or requested by his employer to incur certain expenses (which was not :the
case), it was "not clear whether the expenses were related to his own trade or business
or to that of his employer," it is in the Noland line of cases and did not realize that
the Schmidlapp-Lobrke principle constitutes an exception to the rule that a taxpayer
may not deduct the expenses of another, i.e., employer compulsion renders the expense
appropriate for the continuance of the taxpayer's employment.
[VOL 7:1
EMPLOYER MANDATED EXPENSES
"incurred as a principal" concept, provided an alternative to the Schmid-
lapp employer compulsion basis for deduction: expenditures that have a
direct bearing on the employee's salary, i.e., appropriate and helpful ex-
penditures. In summary the Schmidlapp-Lohrke concept solves the
problem of employee deduction of expenses incurred on behalf of his
employer. Indeed, one commentator has pointed out: "[iif an expendi-
ture is a business expense, deductibility should not be affected by reim-
bursement policy or whether it is viewed as the expense of the employer
or of employee." 284
The resolution of the reimbursement problem lies in a decision relied
upon by the Podems court, Glendinning, McLeish & Co. v. Commis-
sioner.2 5 There the Second Circuit held that payments made by a tax-
payer which were reimbursed were not expenses at all; where the tax-
payer had a right to reimbursement but did not enforce this right the
payments were the equivalent of loans or advances to the other party
and not deductible. The obvious rationale is that for a taxpayer to incur
an expense he must make an out-of-pocket expenditure; "the deduction
which the applicable section of the income tax law permits, contem-
plates an expense only out of the funds and property of the person claim-
ing the deduction." 2 86 While Glendinning did not speak to whether the
reimbursement was includible in income, following its conclusion that
the payment of another's expenses constitutes a loan by the taxpayer
to that person, the reimbursement would constitute the repayment of
the employer's debt which is not taxable to the employee-creditor. In-
deed, precisely this rationale was adopted by the Tax Court in Arthur
W. Harrison2 87 to exclude from income reimbursement of expenses in-
curred by an employee on behalf of his employer. Similarly, Henry F.
284 Emmnanuel & Lipoff, note 227 supra, at 525; Note, Expenses for Another, note 255
supra, at 1515. See also Fischman, note 259 supra.
285 61 F.2d 950, 952 (2d Cit. 1932); accord, Baker v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 813,
815-16 (2d Cir. 1936).
-286 New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir.
1934); see Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1932).
28710 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1404, 1408 (1941). One commentator has reasonied that the
principle that reimbursement of expenses properly belonging to. the employer .re nofn-
taxable repayments of. loans or advances made by the employee, when he originally
paid the expenses is the corollary of the rule precluding deduction of expenditures
made with the expectation of reimbursement. Lyon, Federal Income Taxation, 1957
ANNUAL SURVEY OF A.MEMCAN LAW 123, 126 (R. Collings, Jr. 1957).
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Cochrane88 held that since the amounts expended by the taxpayer on
another's behalf constituted advancements "it necessarily follows that
when they were repaid... they did not constitute income ... ." 289
In the event that the reimbursement were included in income,
the taxpayer would have an out-of-pocket expenditure and hence ex-
pense. If the facts supported the application of the Schmidlapp-Lohrke
exception to prohibition of deductions for expenses benefiting another,
then the reimbursed employee would be entitled to a deduction. Thus,
it would appear that the Glendinning-Harrison rationale is compatible
with Schmidlapp. The only fly in the ointment is the amount of the
expense. Should it be the full amount of the expenditure benefiting the
employer or only the amount equal to the taxes created by the inclusion
of the reimbursement in income-the true out-of-pocket expenses? Carl
G. Jordan2 90 held that where the taxpayer took into gross income em-
ployer reimbursements for traveling expenses incurred while away from
home, "deductions to the extent of reimbursement should be allowed." 291
Accordingly, the answer appears to be the former.
Commentators have argued that a policy of reimbursement should
be given little, if any, weight in the question of deductibility on the basis
that what the employer considers ordinary and necessary for its business
should not control what is ordinary and necessary to its employee's
business. 2  This position ignores that reimbursement is a corroborative
factor evidencing the business purpose of the employer compulsion-
an uncontrolled employer would tend not to make reimbursements unless
the expenditures benefited it.23 This practicality underlies the admin-
288 23 B.T.A. 202, 208 (1931); accord, Adolph B. Canelo, III, 53 T.C. 217, 224 (1969),
aff'd, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971).
289 23 B.T.A. 208. Cf. Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 10.
290 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 652, 653 (1958).
291 Id.
292 Recent Case, Wife's Traveling Expenses Deductible When Her Presence Serves
Her Husband's Business Purpose, 22 VAND. L. REv., 1432, 1437-38 (1969) (hereinafter cited
as Recent Case, Wife's Traveling Expenses).
293 This is clearly the premise to the statement in Noland that "If the expense
has been billed to an employer and has passed a critical scrutiny of corporate officers
concerned with the elimination of needless expense, it becomes prima facie an allowable
expense of the corporation," 269 F.2d 108, 113. See Walter M. Sheldon, 30 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 256, 259 (1961), aff'd, 299 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962). But see James T. Thrower,
31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1707, 1716 (1962), aff'd, 330 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1964) (no
authority exists for unique argument that approval by employer of reimbursement
yields "presumption of regularity"; however, there was considerable evidence that
vouchers were "rubber-stamped" without question).
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istrative approach taken in the trade or business expense regulations294
and in the substantiation regulations"15 under which an employee is not
required to report on his tax return reimbursements for travel and other
expenses that he incurred "solely for the benefit of his employer" if he
was required to make an adequate accounting to his employer. The
problem of the uncontrolled employer is covered by special rules appli-
cable to reimbursements to employees who are holders of 10 per cent or
more of the stock of their employer, whether directly or by attribu-
tion.29 6
Reimbursement of expenses primarily benefiting the employer would
not make such expenses deductible (assuming the reimbursement is in-
cluded in income) by the employee if they were not also required by
the employer or independently directly connected with the taxpayer's
business since such expenses would not qualify under the Scbmidlapp-
Lohrke exception to the rule of nondeductibility of another's expenses
or obligations. In view of this, the reading of Revenue Ruling 57-502 as
establishing an exception to the rule that expenses relating to the business
of the taxpayer's employer rather than to his own are not deductible
if the employee is (1) reimbursed by his employer, or (2) required to
make the expenditures,297 is too broad. The reason for the Service's
apparent liberality is that it regards all reimbursements as income (al-
though it administratively has chosen not to require certain reimburse-
ments to be reported on the tax return)" s and, thus, no doubt feels
compelled to provide a deduction to an employee for his reimbursed
expenditures primarily benefiting his employer. The case law, on the
other hand, provides an exclusion from income for employer -reimburse-
ments of expenses primarily benefiting it, but no deduction for an ex-
pense benefiting another unless the expense is required by the employer
or is otherwise directly related to his business.
The development of deductibility of entertainment expenses is in some
respects parallel to deductibility of educational expenses in that in both
employer compulsion and proximate connection with the taxpayer's
294Treas. Reg. S 1.162-17(b) (1) (1958).
295 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(e) (2) (1962).
296 Id. § 5(e) (5).
297 J. Huffaker & R. Falb, Travel & Entertainment Expenses-Recording and Re-
porting, A-15 (TAX MM A mENT PORTFOUO * 180, 1968) (hereinafter cited as Huffaker
& Falb).
298 Id. at p. A-12; Euffaker, New T & E Regs. Raise Basic Questions Concerning Gross
Income, 18 J. TAxATror 90 :(1963) (hereinafter cited as Huffaker).
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other duties are alternative grounds for deduction. The analogue here
of the employer business purpose found in the educational expense area
(to establish the bona fides of the employer compulsion) has been
employer reimbursement. However, it is not the prerequisite to deduc-
tibility that the Service had first made of employer business purpose in
the educational expense area. There are other dissimilarities also. The
Service did not initially attempt to limit deductibility to employer man-
dated entertainment expenses. On the other hand, neither has the
Commissioner conceded that an employer requirement that an employee
incur entertainment expenses is conclusive as to their deductibility by
the employee as he did with respect to all educational expenses, except
new trade or business and minimum requirements expenditures.
Perhaps the most striking difference in the evolution of the two areas
has been the explicit development of special rules to combat articulated
potential abuse in the entertainment area, whereas the aberrant limitation
by the Service and the Tax Court of deductibility to "involuntary"
educational expenses was without consideration of the basis for appli-
cation of a different rule and in most places was utilized without overt
recognition of departure from the ordinary. Similarly, the more strict
approach that was taken by Congress in the travel and entertainment
area in section 274, which had its seeds at least in the judicial attempts
to contain the potential for abuse, is to be contrasted with the legislative
creation and then liberalization of the new deduction for moving ex-
penses that was enacted and then amended to correct the appellate con-
ceptual astygmatism.
The most significant contribution of the entertainment expense de-
velopment to a better understanding of exclusion and deduction of
employer mandated expenses in general is its difference in emphasis
on the elements of benefit to the employer and employer compulsion
(or lack of employee control) with respect to exclusion and deduction
from income. As to exclusion of the value of employer expense-paid
entertainment, the focus has been on benefit to the employer. Employer
requirement has been of little if any significance here. On the other
hand, in the context of exclusion of meals and lodging, lack of employee
control (the concomitant to employer requirement) has been central
to the concept of convenience of the employer. The Tax Court deci-
sions with respect to exclusion of reimbursements of moving expenses
present a more balanced approach, resting primarily on benefit to the
[Vol. 7:1
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employer but with significant emphasis also on lack of employee con-
trol and on employer requirement.
As to employee deduction of entertainment expenses that benefit the
employer (so that they would be considered expenses of the employer),
benefit to the employer cuts against a deduction by the employee; it
is the employer requirement that makes the expenses deductible (or a
showing that the expenditures had a direct bearing on the amount of
the employer's salary). Employer compulsion has also been the
central element, as contrasted with employer benefit, in the deduction
of educational expenses and moving expenses.
V. PULLING TOGETHER THE THREADS: TRAVELING, CONVENTION,
AND WIVES' EXPENSES
Convention and travel expense cases, as well as the wives' traveling
expenses decisions, have been decided in most instances by the Tax
Court. The historical development in both. areas has centered on deduc-
tibility. Although several of the very early Tax Court (then Board "of
Tax Appeals)2 decisions held that where traveling expenses to cQn-
ventions were deductible the employee received no income upon his
reimbursement by his employer, 00 the court soon took theposition,
without recognition of the earlier contrary authority, that as a matter
of course employer reimbursement constituted gross income. The sole
issue was the deductibility of the costs.Y01
A. Conventions
The convention decisions began auspiciously. The first, Marion
D. Shutter,30 2 involved attendance by a clergyman at a church conven-
tion of which he was an ex-officio member as well as a member of sev-
eral committees. The Tax Court held that such attendance was essential
to his standing and position in the church and, therefore, constituted
an ordinary and necessary expense. Having sanctioned church con-
vention expenses, the court extended the umbrella of deductibility to
299 See generally Note, The Old Tax Court Blues, supra note 137, at 976 n.2.
"300 See note 269 supra."
301 See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 11 B.T.A. 818, 820 (1928); accord, Alexander
Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927).
302 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925).
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other professional men, such as professors, 3 3 doctors,30 4 attorneys,"0 '
certified public accountants,' °6 and commercial artists.*°0 Favorable
treatment was also given to corporate executives and employees.0
Furthermore, employers were permitted deductions for traveling ex-
penses of employees to refresher courses3°9 or regional sale marts.3 10
Unfortunately, these cases did not develop criteria to determine
whether a convention trip was primarily of a business or a personal
nature.311 An exception is found in Alexander P. Reed.312 There, a
direct and proximate relationship existed between the purpose of the
convention, as reflected by its agenda, and the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness. The Tax Court noted that there was no actual or potential business
benefit, economic or otherwise, which resulted or might proximately
result from attendance at the conference. Thus, the court seemingly
would permit deduction of convention expenses if business contacts
made by reason of the convention or prestige arising from it directly
generated income although the subject matter of the program was not
itself germane to the taxpayer's business. The Treasury regulations speak
to both approaches (resulting business benefit and content),31a and in
published rulings 14 the Service has held that the method of comparing
the purpose of the convention, as manifested in its agenda, with the
taxpayer's business is but one method of establishing the business pur-
pose of the taxpayer's travel and such direct subject matter relationship
is not a prerequisite for deductibility. Permitting a deduction if either
303 Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927).
304 Cecil M. Jack, 13 B.T.A. 726 (1927); accord, Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242
(1931); Roy Upham, 16 B.T.A. 950 (1929); J. Bently Squier, 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928).
305Wade H. Ellis, 15 B.T.A. 1075 (1929), af'd, 50 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
306 Charles 0. Gunther, Jr, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1954).
307 Jay N. Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926).
30SRita M. Callinan, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 175 (1953); L. F. Ratterman, 17 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 390 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 204 (1949).
309 Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 17 T.C. 1097 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 219 F2d
862 (9th Cir. 1955).
310 A. Finkenberg's Sons, Inc., 17 T.C. 973 (1951).
311 See Treas. Reg. S 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958). The all-or-nothing test of the regulations
is criticized in Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination
Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1099 (1966), and
is inconsistent with the general approach in deduction of expenses; see International
Artists, Ltd, 55 T.C. 94, 105 (1970).
312 35 T.C. 199, 202 (1960).
313 Treas. Reg. 5 1.162-2(d) (1958).
314 Rev. Rul. 63-266, 1963-2 CuM. BuLL. 88.
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a special test (agenda content) or the general proximate connection with
trade or business or effect on income is met does not conflict with the
similar approach taken in the educational and entertainment expense
areas.
In virtually all of the reported convention expense decisions prior to
1960 a deduction was permitted. However, the beginning of that decade
witnessed widespread administrative, legislative, and judicial concern
about abuse in the travel and entertainment area (T & E expenses), in-
cluding treatment to be accorded to certain types of conventions and
expenses allocable to wives.318 This concern culminated in the Revenue
Act of 1962, which imposed substantial new substantiation requirements
on otherwise deductible T & E expenditures.3 10 It was in this context317
that the Fifth Circuit decided Patterson v. Thomas.
31 8
In Thomas the taxpayer, an insurance salesman, by selling a requisite
amount of insurance, received from his company an expense paid trip
for himself and his wife to an annual company convention held at a
popular vacation spot. In determining whether the taxpayer's trip was
primarily of a personal nature or for business purposes the majority
opinion considered the following four factors: (1) the amount of time
devoted to business activities compared with the time spent for social
activities; (2) the relationship between the sponsor of convention and
the participants; (3) the location of the convention; (4) and the atti-
tude of the employer. The majority, in concluding that the primary
purpose of the trip was pleasure, stressed the facts that the convention
was held at a resort area (two days travel time from the employer's
home office) and that "at the most, five hours out of the three and one-
half days were spent in only two formal business meetings." 319 The
company official in charge had written to the hotel manager stating that
while two business meetings would be held during the four day con-
vention, business would be secondary; the main object was to give the
employees a good time. One judge dissented, 20 principally on the
315See BrrrKx, FEDERAL INcomE EsTATE AND Gir TAXATioN 230-36 (1964); Caplin,
The Travel and Entertainment Expense Problem, 39 TAXES 947 (1961); Emmanuel
and Lipoff, supra note 227.
316 INT. Rnv. CoDz of 1954, § 274.
317See Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 837 (1961)
(Brown, J, dissenting).
318 Id.; 47 VA. L. Rzv. 1097 (1961).
319 Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 1961).
820 Id. at 114.
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ground that the taxpayer and his wife were in reality required by the
husband's employer to attend the convention, although the "command
appearance" was in the form of an invitation. The dissent would have
permitted a deduction due to this employer compulsion.
In Rudolph v. United States,321 decided several months later by the
Fifth Circuit on essentially the same facts, the majority reached the
same result as in Thomas, with the same judge dissenting. Rudolph,
however, was appealed to the Supreme Court. Certiorari was granted,
but was dismissed as improvidently granted on the basis that the trial
court's decision turned on the taxpayer's dominant motive and purpose
in taking the trip and the company's in offering it.322 The district court
had found that the company's primary purpose was to afford a pleasure
trip in the nature of a bonus and it was primarily a vacation to the em-
ployee and his wife. 23 In a separate opinion Justice Douglas, joined by
Justice Black, dissented to the dismissal. 4 He maintained that "l[i] ncome
has the connotation of something other than the mere payment of ex-
penses." 32' The implication was that the taxpayer was no better off
financially after the trip than before it. Nor did the dissenters believe
that the trip constituted disguised compensation because isolated and
irregular arrangements with no earmarks of "sham" bore no rational
connection with compensation for services rendered, and, in fact, no
services were rendered. Rather, the exigencies of the taxpayer's employ-
ment gave rise to the convention, one which served a good business pur-
pose of the employer. Justice Douglas also made the point that not all
awards or fringe benefits constituted income to the recipient. Just as
specific statutory exclusions from gross income are provided for certain
awards, such as gifts, 326 life insurance proceeds,3 2 disability benefits,328
rental value of parsonages,329 scholarship grants,33° and mustering-out
321 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed as hnprosddently granted, 370 Us.
269 (1962). See generally Price, Traveling 'with Your Wife May be Taxing, 28 FED.
Ba J. 75 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Price).
322 370 U.S. at 270.
329 189 F. Supp. 2, 4-5 (D. Ala. 1960).
324 370 U.S. at 278 (dissent).
325 Id. at 279.
326 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 102.
327 Id. § 101.
328 ld. § 105.
329 Id. § 107.
330 Id. § 117.
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payments,331 employees may receive from their employers many fringe
benefits which do not constitute taxable income. Examples given were
"courtesy" discounts and medical services which the Treasury regula-
tions provide "are not considered as wages subject to withholding if...
of relatively small value and are... furnished by the employer merely
as a means of promoting the health, good will, contentment, or efficiency
of his employees." 332
Justices Douglas and Black would have in any event reversed the
Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the expenses of the husband were
deductible in accordance with the host of other convention cases that
had allowed the deduction. The expenses of the wife were thought
deductible as well because of the "equitable concept" that a wife con-
tributes to the business productivity of her husband. Probably an em-
ployer compulsion argument was not explicitly raised because the trial
court had found no compulsion.?
Justice Harlan, also speaking in a separate opinion,334 would have
decided Rudolph on its merits, accepting the district court's findings
that the employer intended the trip as a bonus with the consequence
that its value constituted income to the employee and that the employee
considered the trip a pleasure trip in the nature of a vacation and, there-
fore, a non-deductible personal expense. He noted that the district court
did not find any element of compulsion. Subsequent courts, including
the Fifth Circuit, have read Rudolph and Thomas as holding that the
conventions were awards based on sales performance. 35 Moreover, it
has been emphasized that these cases bear little relevance to the question
of tax treatment of a wife's traveling expenses on a business trip since
the husband's trip was not primarily for business.336
Douglas' dissent in Rudolph contains the elements developed in the
later exclusion cases, but in embryonic form-perhaps the cause of the
abortive granting and then dismissal of certiorari-and is supportable
only by refashioning its arguments to one degree or another. For ex-
331 Id. § 113.
S32 Treas. Reg. § 31.401 (a) (b) (10) (1957).
333 Rudolph v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2 (D. Ala. 1960).
334 370 U.S. 270.
335See, e.g., Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030, 1033 n.10 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 789 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gutcher,
401 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1968); Bell Electric Co., 45 T.C. 158, 167 (1965); Allen J.
McDonell, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 126, 128 (1967)
336 United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 789 (9th Cir. 1969).
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ample, the dissent's first contention that income connotes something
other than payment of expenses is defensible if such expenses primarily
benefit the employer, but not if they primarily benefit the employee. 7
Indeed, one commenator would place this argument by the Rudolph
dissenters in the line of cases holding that employee expenditures pri-
marily benefiting the employer are deductible only by the employer,
but their reimbursement is excludible by the employee. 38 The fit is,
however, a bit uneven since Douglas and Black would have permitted
the employee and his wife to deduct the expenses if the reimbursement
was income to them.
Similarly, the Rudolph dissent's emphasis on the isolated and irregular
aspect of the convention expense as indicative of the benefit being non-
compensatory does not reappear in later cases or analogous areas. How-
ever, the belief that the value of the convention was noncompensatory,
owing to the business benefit received by the employer and the fact
that the exigencies of the taxpayer's employment gave rise to his at-
tendance at the convention, parallels the tack taken in such pre-1954
Code convenience of the employer cases as Diamond v. Sturr. These
3s7 See text at notes 10 and 58 supra. There is, however, some authority that "re-
imbursements in general do not involve any realization of gain to the taxpayer and
therefore do not constitute income under Section 61." Allington, Moving Expenses and
Reimbursements, 56 A.B.A.J. 495, 496 (1970) (citing Conner v. United States, 303
F. Supp. 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1969)). The Conner court reasoned that there must be gain
before there is income and that reimbursements by insurance for additional living
expenses caused by the destruction of the insured's home did not constitute a gain.
"If there was any income in the ordinary and real sense of the word realized by
anyone relating to these payments, it was the owner of the house that plaintiffs (the
taxpayers) rented. With respect to the reimbursement by the insurance company . . ,
plaintiffs were no more than a conduit through which these funds passed." Conner
v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (S.D. Texas 1969), aff'd on this issue, 439
F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra, Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968);
Arnold v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); McGuire v. United States,
70-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 1 9384 (N.D. Calif. 1970); Neil F. McCabe, 54 T.C. 1748, 1748-49
(1970) (since taxpayers have no basis in reimbursement receipts they received a taxable
gain); Edmund W. Cornelius, 56 T.C. 976, 981-82 (1971); Rev. Rul. 59-360, 1959-2 CUM.
BULL. 75 (equivalent to use and occupancy insurance, the proceeds which constitute
gross income). INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 123 provides that such reimbursement received
on or after January 1, 1969, are excludible from income. The Conner court also
overlooked that a taxpayer may be taxed on an indirect economic gain, as where a
benefit is received without a corresponding diminution in wealth. United States v.
Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1958); see Irving Sachs, 32 T.C. 815, 820 (1959),
aff'd, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960).
338 Huffaker & Falb, supra note 297, at A-10.
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elements are also seen in the Tax Court's treatment of reimbursed moving
expenses. Finally, the reliance on the withholding regulations' treat-
ment of certain fringe benefits as not being "wages subject to withhold-
ing" becomes relevant only in the light of the articulation in later
withholding decisions of theories similar to the benefit of the employer
concept to exclude the cost of attendance at a convention from the
classification of wages33 -wages and income not necessarily being co-
extensive.
339Having supposedly won the war against insurance agents and their company
conventions (although, in fact, the holdings and facts in Thomas and Rudolph would
not support such a claim), the Commissioner apparently found it difficult to collect
the spoils, i.e., audit every agent attending such conventions, and resolved to have
the employer insurance companies do it for him by treating the value of such con-
ventions to the agents as wages subject to withholding. The Court of Claims in
Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1967) heard the first such
case. The Government, relying heavily upon Thomas and Rudolph, asserted that the
convention trips amounted to awards or prizes in the form of free pleasure trips or
vacations to the winner and as such constituted additional wages for withholding tax
purposes. The employer (who had paid the withholding taxes under protest and was
suing for their refund) maintained that convention expenditures were not awards-
which are subject to withholding, Rev. Rul. 55-232, 1955-1 Cum. BUtL. 115-but were
ordinary and necessary expenses in the conduct of its business and, hence, not re-
muneration "for services performed by an employee for his employer" within the
meaning of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3401(a). The Court of Claims agreed: (1) the
expenditures from the employer's point of view were incurred to advance its own
wholly legitimate and bona fide business purposes, (2) work sessions exceeded planned
social activity time, and (3) the agents were required to attend, which compelled the
conclusion that the trip primarily served the employer's purposes. The expenses at-
tributable to the agents' wives (who were also required to attend and be present at
planned activities) also benefited the employer. Id. at 931. This overall approach
is quite similar to that of the dissents in Patterson and Rudolph. Price, supra
note 321, at 78 n.19. Significantly, while one basis for distinguishing those two cases
was that there was no necessary correlation between what constitutes "wages" and
what constitutes income, 373 F.2d 932, another basis was that "insofar as there can be
considered to be overlapping considerations or a relationship between the question of
what constitutes 'wages or remuneration! . . . and what constitutes 'gross income' ...,
or what is deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses ... " Id. at 933, the
court noted "significant factual differences." Peoples Life was followed by Acacia
Mut. Life Ins. Co, 272 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1967); however, since it found that the
agents' wives did not attend scheduled meetings and could attend only if their hus-
bands sold an additional quota of insurance, the trip as to them was considered an
award. The home office wives and all husbands, home office and field agents, fared
as well as the employees and their wives in Peoples Life. Not only was the Court of
-Claims close to the Rudolph dissenters' approach, but its tack closely parallels the
benefit of the employer exclusion doctrine, and, indeed, the Court of Claims has
recently ruled that reimbursements of moving expenses of new employees, Humble
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Unfortunately, neither the Harlan nor Douglas opinions reached sev-
eral significant issues concerning deductibility of traveling expenses. The
first was the test to be applied when a trip is taken for both business and
pleasure. The Commissioner conceded that in a "perfect world" the
conceptually ideal solution would be to allocate the cost between busi-
ness and pleasure. However, he urged that the section 162 regulation's
all-or-nothing primary purpose test for traveling expenses was the only
feasible solution to the difficulties of ascertaining the relative worth
of the business and pleasure portions. The Court's Duberstein test of
"dominant motive," applied to the issue whether a payment constituted
a gift or compensation, was suggested as an analogue.3 40
Nevertheless, the Cohan rule has long been used to measure the value
of business and nonbusiness benefits for deduction purposes and such
approximation is used with other business expenses.3 41 Alternative models
are also in the section 274 regulations that disallow certain foreign travel
expenses. As to foreign travel of more than a week, each day is treated
as a "business day" or a "nonbusiness day" 342 to arrive at a fraction to
be applied to total travel expenses. A percentage of the expenses equal
to the ratio of nonbusiness days to all travel days is disallowed.3 43  A
day is deemed a business day, even though the majority of the day is
spent on nonbusiness activities, if the taxpayer's presence was required
Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1971), and of indirect
moving expenses, Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1971),
do not constitute wages for withholding tax purposes because not intended to com-
pensate the employee for services and were incurred by the employer in the course
of its ordinary business to prevent its moving employees from suffering a loss. Shnilar
conclusions have been reached with respect to per diem payments at remote jobsites,
Stubbs, Overbeck & Ass'n. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), and reim-
bursements for meals by employees on the road in their sales territories, Royster Co.
v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9374 (E.D. Va. 1972). Paradoxically, however,
meals furnished for the convenience of the employer have been considered "wages"
for the purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act, S. S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1967). See
generally Comment, Tax Treatment of Compensation in Kind, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 628,
633-39 (1949). The Service has recently abandoned the argument that wages for with-
holding and gross income are in pari materia. Royster Co. v. United States, supra. In
this writer's opinion the approaches with respect to gross income and wages are es-
sentially the same, but the income cases requiring inclusion were in most instances in
error.
340 Brief for Commissioner.
3 41 See notes 221 through 243 supra and accompanying text.
342 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (1963).
343 Id. § 1.274-4(f) (1) (1963).
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(e.g., by his employer) at a particular place for a specific and bona fide
business purpose.34 Furthermore, travel is deemed entirely allocable
to business activity if the taxpayer did not have 'substantial control over
the trip.345 In turn, a taxpayer who is reimbursed by his employer or
on an expense allowance is deemed not to have such control unless he
is a managing executive or a ten percent or more stockholder of his
employer. 4 16 Thus, the Treasury itself has adopted more lenient rules
where the employee has no control over employer mandated travel
expenses.
The Government's most significant concession in Rudolph was with
respect to the interrelationship of benefit to the employer and proximate
relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business.
On the question of whose motivation is controlling-the employer's
or the employee's-there is again no substantial disagreement between
the parties. Initially, as petitioner agrees, the question is necessarily
why did the person claiming the deduction (the employee) incur the
expense. Since, however, it is the "business" of an employee to further
the interests of his employer, we agree with petitioner that a purpose
to advance his employer's interests is a business purpose as to the em-
ployee. Thus, since the reason an employer requests an expenditure
will normally be to advance his (the employer's) interest, it is nor-
mally sufficient that an expense is incurred at the behest of the em-
ployer. The necessary limitation, of course, is that if the employer's
purpose is to advance not his own interests but the employee's-i.e.,
to confer a benefit upon the employee-the employee's participation
in the endeavor of conferring a benefit upon himself can hardly be a
business purpose as to him. If, as petitioner puts it, the employer's
"business" purposes are to be "attributed" to the employee, so must
his purpose to benefit the employee.3 47
Since Rudolph presented only the seeds for exclusion of employer
mandated travel expenses, it was left to subsequent travel cases, albeit
not involving conventions, to fully develop the concept. An examlle.
is Allen 1. McDonell,3 4s a Tax Court decision involving a -saes incentive,
award for teriitorial salesmen, ivith winners and their wives receiv-
3441d. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (ii) (1963).
345 1d. § 1.274-4(f) (5) (i) (1963)..
3461d.
347 Note 340 supra.
348 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 126 (1967).. ,.
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ing an expense-paid trip to Hawaii. The taxpayer was a home office
salesman selected with three other home office salesmen by lottery to
host the winners. At the time of the drawing, home office salesmen were
told that "those selected and their wives were expected to go, although
they would have been excused for good reasons." 84 9 They and their
wives were instructed to consider the trip as a work assignment and not
as a vacation. Their assignment was to shadow the contest winners and
to see that they enjoyed themselves. They were also to protect and,
if possible, enhance the employer's image. Since the contest winners
went as couples the company felt that the presence of the wives of the
home office participants was also essential: "it would be impossible for
stag salesmen to host a trip for customers." -50 The taxpayer and his
wife performed their assigned duties which consumed substantially all
of the trip time. The Tax Court distinguished the situation of the tax-
payers from that of the contest winners for whom the trip was a reward
as well as an incentive.
Unlike the contest winners, petitioners were expected to go as an es-
sential part of . . . [the husband's] employment. The right to go
carried with it the duty to go. The trip was not a vacation for the
petitioners. It was realistically a command performance to work.
What was a social benefit to the contest winners was a work obliga-
tion to these petitioners. More importantly, petitioners herein were
expected to devote susbtantially all of their time on the trip to the
performance of duties on behalf of DECO [the husband's employer]
in order to achieve, albeit subtly, DECO's well-defined business objec-
tives. In this respect the situation is unlike that in Patterson v. Thomas
... where the Court found that, although the taxpayer had an obli-
gation to attend the convention, his work responsibility was minimal
(emphasis added) .351
The fact that, unlike in Thomas, the taxpayers' right to go on the trip
was not determined by any standard of work performance, was empha-
sized. Indeed, the McDonell court noted that there was not the slight-
est suggestion the trip was conceived of as disguised remuneration.
Rather, the employer had sound business reasons for the taxpayer and
his wife to go." 2
349d. at 127.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 128.
852 "[Sluch business reasons, when coupled with the equally compelling business cir-
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Although the Tax Court explicitly acknowledged the presence of
employer compulsion-"command performance"-this was in the eyes
of the court a secondary factor to the substantial work responsibilities
of both the taxpayers and possibly to the employer business purpose as
well. While the Tax Court articulated employee work responsibilities
and employer business purpose as separate factors, they are both facets
of the concept of benefit to the employer. Where an employee performs
precisely the activity the employer expects him to, and such activity
serves a corporate business purpose, then the employer benefits from
such activity.353 For instance, where the State Department requires a
foreign service employee to return periodically to the United States
and reorient himself to the American way of life by travel and com-
munication, his performance of activities, like vacation traveling, con-
stitutes the devotion of substantially all of his time on the trip to the
performance of duties on behalf of his employer. From this the em-
ployer receives direct benefit. 5 4 Similarly, where the employer expects
the employee's wife to accompany him on business trips and entertain
clients of the employer, her "services, albeit social in nature, are exactly
the type business activity in which the employer expects her to en-
gage." 35r The fact that the employer's business purpose can thus be
served by activities other than specific "work" duties ultimately defeats
the McDonell court's obvious strivings to draft its opinion as narrowly
as possible and confine its import to the fact that the taxpayers were
assigned specific chaperoning duties, the "command performance to
work," which both consumed substantially all their time and served
sound business reasons of the husband's employer. Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Gotcher35"6 read McDonnell precisely for the
broad principle that "one does not receive taxable income when he is
serving a legitimate business purpose of the party paying the expenses."
cumstances involving these petitioners' participation, made the trip no different from any
other business trip requiring their services-including ... [the taxpayer's wife] whose
duties were substantial and could not have been performed by stag men." Id. at 129.
The Tax Court did not consider the taxpayers' alternative argument that the trip had
no fair market value to them. Cf. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir.
1969).
353 See, e.g., Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States 373 F.2d 924, 929 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
354Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1971).
355 Recent Case, Wife's Traveling Expenses, note 292 supra, at 1436 n.28.
356 401 F.2d 118, 123 (5th Cir. 1968). .
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Thus, McDonnell, too, involved the factors of employer compulsion and
benefit to the employer, with greater emphasis on the latter.
Paradoxically, the Fifth Circuit, which had earlier ruled against the
taxpayers in Thomas and Rudolph, decided the leading exclusion of the
value of travel expenses case, United States v. Gotcher.357 That deci-
sion involved an expense-paid trip to Germany provided to a prospective
investor in a VW dealership and his wife, paid in part by his employer
(a local VW dealership) but in major part by the Volkswagon Com-
pany. A substantial portion of the husband's time was spent touring
VW factories and German dealerships. After the trip, the taxpayer
bought a twenty-five percent interest in his employer's company that
had been offered to him before the tour. The Volkswagon company
had instituted such tours for potential dealers to overcome the initial
unfavorable public image of its products and of Germany. The trial
and appellate courts agreed that V-W's primary purpose for the trip was
to induce the taxpayer to purchase an interest in a VW dealership.
The district court had reasoned that an economic or financial benefit
does notconstitute income unless conferred as compensation. The Fifth
Circuit, as had the Supreme Court over a decade earlier, 58 rejected this
position as too narrow. However, it also rejected the Service's conten-
tion that exclusions from gross income were narrowly limited to the
specific statutory exclusions provided in sections 101 through 123. This
view also had been rejected by courts, 59 commentators,36° and, im-
plicitly, Congress. 6' The Gotcher court generalized from the exclusion
provisions, in particular section 119 which excludes from an employee's
gross income the value of meals and lodging furnished him for the "con-
venience of the employer," that "the value of any trip that is paid by
the employer or by a businessman primarily for his own benefit should
be excluded from gross income of the payee .... ,, 362 While the con-
cept of economic gain is key to gross income, the "concept has two
distinct requirements: [t]here must be an economic gain, and this gain
3571d.
358See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US. 426 (1955).
359 See, e.g., Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 369 (1962) (concurring and dissenting
opinions).
360 See, e.g., Huffaker, note 298 supra.
361 See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM.
BULL. 733; S. REP. No. 830, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 CuM.
BULL. Part 2, 57.
362 United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1968).
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must primarily benefit the taxpayer personally."3 3 Thus, meals and
lodging incidentally benefiting an employee are excludible if they pri-
marily benefit or convenience the employee.
' The Fifth Circuit also pointed out that where an employee has no
choice but to go, and has no control over the schedule or money spent,
the Supreme Court definition of income as accessions of wealth over
which the.taxpayer has complete control is not met. The court stated
that complete control and dominion have played a fundamental role
in determining the incidence of taxation in landmark decisions involving
noncompensatory economic gains. McDonell was also thought to sug-
gest that one important factor in analyzing the tax consequences of an
expense-paid trip is "whether the traveler had any choice but to go." 30 4
Although not articulated in Gotcher, such lack of control also consti-
tutes one of the conceptual underpinnings of the "convenience of em-
ployer" doctrine 0 5
The third segment of the court's rationale was based on cases involv-
ing corporate executives who traveled or entertained clients at their
company's expense. From those decisions the rule evolved that an eco-
nomic benefit is taxable to an employee only if the payment serves no
legitimate business purpose of the employer.
The corporate-executive decisions indicate that some economic gains,
though not specifically excluded from section 61, may nevertheless
escape taxation. They may be excluded even though the entertainment
and travel unquestionably give enjoyment to the taxpayer and produce
indirect economic gains. When this indirect economic gain is sub-
ordinate to an overall business purpose, the recipient is not taxed.360
The test to be applied, said the Gotcher court, is the employer's primary
purpose for the expense. The circuit court concluded that the tax-
payer's "presence served a legitimate corporate purpose and that no
appreciable amount of time was spent for his personal benefit and en-
joyment." 307 His personal benefit was clearly subordinate to the con-
crete benefits to VW.
363 ld. at 121.
3 8d. at 123. See note 139 supra and text at notes 370-71 infra for discussion of the
control concept.
365 See text at notes 9 and 10 supra.
366 United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
3G71d. at 123.
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As to the wife's trip, on the other hand, Gotcher reversed the lower
court on the grounds that she did not make the trip to see local dealers
or to attend discussions about the VW organization.os Thus, her trip
was, in the eyes of the review court, primarily a vacation to her. The
majority opinion held, therefore, that the primary benefit of the expense
paid trip for the wife went to the husband since he was relieved of her
expenses, and he should, therefore, include the expenses attributable to
her travel in his gross income. A concurring opinion noted that under
the Gotcher rationale the taxpayers in Rudolph, which also arose in
the Fifth Circuit, would have prevailed also. Although bothered by
"[a] ttributing income to the little wife," 369 the concurring judge ac-
quiesced, confident that on the proper record the wife would prevail.
The four common factors of significance to the opinion writers in
Gotcher, McDonell and the Douglas dissent in Rudolph, (1) payment
of expenses as income, (2) employer compulsion and lack of employee
control, (3) intent as compensation, and (4) primary benefit to the
employer, are reducible to two. They are a primary benefit to the em-
ployer and the two facets of employer convenience, viz., employer
compulsion and lack of employee control.
Viewed from this perspective, the craftsmanship of the Gotcher opin-
ion is striking. The first basis for the exclusion of an expense paid trip
to Germany for an employee and potential VW dealer was the general-
ization, derived from section 119, that the value of an employee's trip
paid for by an employer primarily for its own benefit should be ex-
cluded from the employee's income. Another basis, however, for this
same "convenience of the employer" doctrine, partially codified in that
section, is the janus-like factor of employer requirement and lack of
employee control. This factor was also considered since the lack of
employee choice or control arising from the business necessity of ac-
cepting the VW "offer" of hospitality was the second thrust of the Fifth
Circuit's opinion. The third and final support for exclusion consisted of
a return to the factor of employer benefit, derived from the corporate
executive decisions. Gotcber reasoned that an economic benefit is tax-
able to an employee only if it serves no legitimate business purpose of
the employer, i.e., does not benefit the employer. Thus, Gotcher, as well
as the convenience of employer decisions and the indirect moving ex-
368 Id. at 124.
369 Id. (Brown, J., concurring).
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pense cases, predicated exclusion on both employer requirement (with
concomitant lack of employee control) and benefit to the employer.
Only the corporate executive decisions rested solely on benefit to the
employer, and even there employee control may be significant in in-
stances of abuse.
Paradoxically, the two basic elements in Gotcher necessary for exclu-
sion each support a separate theory justifying that result. Employer
compulsion is inextricably tied with dominion and control over income.
Similarly, employer benefit rests on the theory that an employee is
to be taxed neither on an incidental benefit from an employer's direct
payment of its own expenses, nor on reimbursement; an employee is a
mere conduit for payment of his employer's expenses. Significantly,
the Supreme Court has recently confirmed in another context that the
underlying assumption in cases dealing with the concept of income has
always been "that in order to be taxed for income, a taxpayer must
have complete dominion over it." 370 A dissent sought to limit the
reasoning of the classic control or assignment of income decisions to
language used to support taxation of income,"7 and would not have
extended that language to support nontaxation of income; i.e., to the
dissent, control was relevant only to includability, not to excludability.
Whether both lack of employee control and employer benefit are
always necessary has never expressly been considered by the courts,
but except for the corporate executive decisions the cases seem to as-
sume that the answer is affirmative. In addition to this fundamental ques-
tion, there exists a number of other uncharted areas. Perhaps the most
important involve the necessary interrelationship between the employer
mandate and the employee's other duties and between employer com-
pulsion and lack of employee control where the employee is a dominant
shareholder of his corporate employer. Applying the lessons drawn
from the development under section 119, it may be expected that the
boundaries of the necessary connections between employer requirement
and everyday employee duties will lie in the element of benefit to the
employer. If the employer demands employee participation for reasons
of its own without any apparent connection between such activity and
the performance of the employee's other duties, then it is highly unlikely
that there is any objective benefit to the employer. But if there is, ex-
370 Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 40 U.SL.W. 4289 (March 21, 1972).
371 Id. at 4298 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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clusion should be permitted. 2 Concerning control by a shareholder-
employee in the context of closely-held corporations, the lesson to be
gleaned from the various lines of authorities relied upon by Gotcher,
and, in particulari the "convenience of the employer" case law, is that
the resolution of this problem also lies in objective benefit to the em-
ployer. Employee control over his employer calls for careful scrutiny
of the benefit to the employer, but not automatic inclusion. In addition
to the careful scrutiny of employer benefit, reasonableness of the expense
may also become crucial where the employee has potential control. In
summary, of the two elements relied upon in Gotcher and the doctrines
and cases cited therein, the benefit to the employer appears the more
crucial element to exclusion.
Gotcher is the leading opinion to exclude the value of mandated
expense-paid travel that does not primarily benefit the taxpayer. Yet
perhaps its greatest significance lies in the recognition of the fact that
the common elements of primary benefit to the employer and lack of
employee control which recur in many tax law areas permitting exclu-
sions from gross income, statutory and otherwise, constitute general
principles underlying these areas. Thus, the Fifth Circuit read Mc-
Donell, a Tax Court travel expense ruling, the convenience of the
employer decisions, and the corporate-executive cases as intimately
related in theory. While the Gotcher court did not include the Tax
Court moving expense decisions in this group of related trends, the latter
tribunal had previously recognized the identity in theory between such
cases and the convenience of the employer authorities.373 Thus, it is
clear that the exclusion doctrines of convenience of the employer (meals
and lodging), interest of the employer (moving expenses), and primary
benefit to the employer (entertainment and travel expenses) are but
variations on a single theme.
372 On the other hand, it should be noted that in other contexts a distinction has
been suggested between employee activities such as educational activities which directly
benefit the employer by directly improving the employee's ability to perform his
assigned tasks more effectively, and those activities that only indirectly benefit the
employer such as employee health or vacation plans which are not directly related
to the employee's job function but only indirectly aid his ability to perform by keeping
him healthy and, hopefully, happy. Dimmig v. Workmen's Comp'n App. Bd., 40 U.S.L.W.
2686 (Calif. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1972) (injuries incurred in scope of activities directly
benefiting the employer are compensable under Workmen's Compensation Act).
373 See text at note 57 supra.
[Vol. 7:1I
EMPLOYER MANDATED EXPENSES
B. Wives' Traveling Expenses
In contrast to the early development in the convention expense area,
the first wife's traveling expense cases, which actually did not involve
business trips by wives, appear to have established an adverse precedent
in the Tax Court that was then applied without critical analysis to more
business oriented travel by wives. For example, one early line of deci-
sions dealt with the costs of a taxpayer moving his family to a new
location when he had changed his place of business.3 74 Such expenses
are not deductible, at least where relocation is not required by the em-
ployer,371 absent special statutory authority. Another line involved the
travel of a wife or nurse with an ailing taxpayer on a business trip in
order to care for him.371 Here, too, the expense is not a business expense
under the origin of expense test,8 77 but rather a medical expense.3 1
Although the true nature of both lines of cases was on occasion recog-
nized, they more frequently were uncritically cited for the following
propositions:
[A] mounts expended by a taxpayer for the purpose of having his wife
accompany him on a business trip where the wife's presence did not
serve a bona fide business purpose represent nondeductible personal
expenses .... If such personal expenses as the wife's traveling expenses
are paid by the employer direcdy or under reimbursment, they are
not deductible by the husband-employee as business expenses or travel-
ing expenses while away from home in the pursuit of business, not-
withstanding such payment by the employer.10
A further element which appears to have played a significant part in
the hard-line course taken by the Tax Court is that many of the wife
travel cases have also involved entertainment. Not unexpectedly, the
special burden of proof, showing of necessity, and relationship to busi-
374Baxter D. McClain, 2 B.T.A. 726 (1925); accord, George B. Lester, 19 B.T.A.
549, 558 (1930); Walter Schmidt, 11 B.T.A. 1199 (1928).
375 See text at notes 95 through 131 supra.
876 George W. Megeath, 5 B.TA. 1274 (1927); accord, Wn. E. Reisner, 34 T.C.
1122, 1131 (1960). Contra, Allenberg Cotton Co. v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Gas.
9131 (W.D. Tenn. 1960).
377 See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
378 Leo R. Cohn, 38 T.C. 387, 390 (1962).
379Alex Silverman, 28 T.C. 1061, 1064 (1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958);
accord, S. J. Campbell, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 902 (1961); Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr.,
26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 916,921 (1957).
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ness discussions or negotiations evolved by that tribunal with respect
to deduction of entertainment expenses38 0 appear to have engendered
special deduction rules with respect to deduction of wives' travel ex-
penses as well. 311
With this background it is not surprising that the deficiency cases
lead another court to conclude that "the attempt to cast, for tax pur-
poses, a 'business' coloration upon a wife's traveling expenses is . . .
generally frowned upon .... For example, in Frederic C. Moser,3s
the wife of a traveling insurance salesman assisted her husband in en-
tertaining clients, gave assistance in the preparation for solicitation of
particular clients, and assisted in the preparation of elaborate, individ-
ualized "briefs" submitted to prospective clients. The court held:
[The taxpayer's] wife was of some assistance . . . in the conduct of
his insurance business while on the trips in question. However, there
is no convincing evidence that this assistance, to any substantial degree,
was greater that a wife, with a reasonable interest in her husband's
business affairs, would normally provide. With respect to the enter-
tainment of clients, she did no more than her wifely duty would re-
quire (emphasis added) .... 3s4
On a different occasion the Tax Court concluded that the wife's services
in entertaining her husband's customers "were no more than any inter-
ested wife would render under the circumstances." 385 Indeed, this
theme of "wifely duty" forms a common thread running through many
of the Tax Court wife's travel expenses decisions, extending even to
decisions not involving travel and entertainment.38 6
Another common strand in these cases is the conclusion that, although
a wife's assistance in her husband's work on business trips and help in
entertaining customers or clients was helpful, such services were not
necessary.3 8 7 It should be noted that the Tax Court's stance on this point
380 See text at notes 245 through 247 supra.
381 See, e.g., S. J. Campbell, 30 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 902 (1961).
382 Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924, 930 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
383 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 106, 108 (1959).
3841d.; accord, Preston B. Rieley, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 496, 497 (1964). Contra,
Allenberg Cotton Co. v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9131 (W.D. Tenn. 1960).
385 B. F. Crabbe, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 189, 193 (1956); accord, S. J. Campbell, 30
P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 902, 922 (1961).
386 See, e.g., Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 916, 921 (1957).
387 "The deductibility of the expenses of a wife in attending her husband's business
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conflicts with the general weight of authority. As the leading federal
income tax treatise writer points out, "[an expense will ordinarily be
considered 'necessary' if the expenditure is appropriate and helpful in
developing and maintaining the taxpayer's business. Obviously, under
such a view, the necessity involved is not absolute or inexorable." 388
This extraordinary "necessary" rule parallels the special necessity the
Tax Court (although not appellate courts) initially required in the edu-
cational expense area, but has since abandoned, 3 9 and that the Tax
Court requires in the entertainment expense area.390
Though not expressly stated in its opinions, the Tax Court's disal-
lowance of deductions for a wife's traveling expenses where she per-
formed only her wifely duties, coupled with the unique circumstances
involved in few Tax Court decisions granting deduction of a wife's
travel expenses, indicate to some commentators that the court requires
that a "wife must exercise a special talent or skill or service. Voice
coaching, linguistic ability, and secretarial services have been held to
be of this nature." "o Similarly, though also based on a handful of
cases, commentators have emphasized the theme of the wife having a
direct interest in the income producing activities 92 so that deductions
for her travel could be viewed as deductions for her efforts at produc-
ing a share of the family income, rather than as her spouse's deduction
for his wife's assistance in producing his income. The Douglas dissent
in Rudolph would have extended this concept to all travel expenses of
wives accompanying their husbands on business trips by analogy to the
civil law philosophy embodied in the community property concept,
which attributes half of a husband's earnings to the wife due to her con-
tribution to her husband's business productivity. 93 There are, however,
too few Tax Court cases in this area resolved in the taxpayer's favor for
meeting or convention requires a finding that she performed services necessary to the
husband's trade or business, and not merely helpful thereto." L. L. Moorman, 26 T.C.
666, 679 (1956); accord, William H. Leonhart, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 493, 524-25, aff'd,
414 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1969); William H. Johnson, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 964, 971
(1966).
88 Mertens, supra note 80, at § 25.09, pp. 38-39 n.727.
889 See text at notes 181 through 185 supra.
390 See text at note 246 supra.
391 Price, note 321 supra, at 85; Rich, A Wife's Tax Value: Tax Aspects of a Wife's
Attending Conventions, Sales Meetings, Etc., N.Y.U. 22D INSr. ON FED. TAX. 895, 900-01
(1964) (hereinafter cited as Rich).
892 Price, note 321 supra, at 86; Rich, note 391 supra.
893 Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 285 (1962) (dissent).
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these two recurring patterns to be categorized as absolute rules rather
than mere trends. Nor should they be. The wifely duty concept is too
narrow; the direct interest idea too broad. Rather, the decisive ques-
tion should be how substantial the spouse's assistance on the trip is,394
at least where an employer requirement is not present.
It might be thought that since the potentiality for abuse believed by
some to be present in the area of foreign travel and entertainment was
substantially eliminated in 1964 by the section 274 substantiation rules
and the detailed and demanding regulations thereafter promulgated
under that provision, the Tax Court deduction rules for wives' trav-
eling and entertainment expenses (which were clearly influenced by
fear of such abuse) would be relaxed so as to be in accord with the
usual standards for deductions. 9 This has not been the case. For ex-
ample, in Elmer K. Zitzewitz,396 the Tax Court noted that the substan-
tiation requirements imposed by section 274 "are in addition to the
requirements imposed by section 162, and the petitioner still has the
burden of proving initially that his expenditures were ordinary and nec-
essary expenses, proximately related to his trade or business." 39' In
ascertaining whether the section 162 standards were met, the court relied
upon the familiar, but anomalous, rule enunciated in Moorman: "[t]he
deductibility of expenditures for a wife on a business trip requires a
finding that her services were necessary and not just helpful." '"
Thus, the traditional Tax Court attitude towards deductibility of
wives' traveling expenses was as illiberal as its attitude towards deduc-
tion of convention expenses was liberal. This illiberality is placed in
even sharper contrast by the fact that the landmark "command per-
formance" decision permitting a deduction for a wife's travel expenses,
United States v. Disney,39 9 involved both entertainment and "wifely"
activities. There the chief executive officer of Walt Disney Produc-
tions made several foreign and domestic business trips in furtherance
of his employer's world-wide entertainment operations. In conformity
with the company policy, indeed a virtual employer insistence, that
executives take their wives with them on extended business trips be-
394See generally Sax, A Wife's Traveling Expenses, 37 TAXmS 595 (1959).
395 See Rich, note 391 supra, at 904.
396 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 80, 83 (1969).
397 Id.
398 Id. See L. L. Moorman, 26 T.C. 666, 679 (1956).
399 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969); Recent Case, Wife's Traveling Expenses, supra note
292.
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cause the company believed that their presence would enhance the com-
pany's "family-oriented" image, the taxpayer took his wife on these
trips. The Ninth Circuit held that had the taxpayer;
[O]ccupied a less powerful executive position with the company, the
necessity of taking his wife on the trips would have been dictated by
employer insistence amounting almost to a condition of employment.
Another executive of the company, performing the same duties on
such trips, would at least have been warranted in concluding that dis-
regard of this firm company policy might jeopardize advancement in
the company.40°
Consistent with this policy the company reimbursed the taxpayer, just
as it had paid the expenses of the other executives' wives incurred in
accompanying their spouses on business trips.
The Disney court acknowledged that most of the wife's activities-
she did not attend daytime business meetings and spent most of her day
in her hotel room or shopping, and attending to her husband's laundry,
taking telephone calls at their hotel room and performing other activi-
ties of a "wifely" character-in helping her husband fulfill some of his
business purposes in making the trip were of a kind in which she would
normally engage while they were both at home.40 1 The test for a bona
fide business purpose for a wife's travel does not turn on the characteri-
zation of her activities as social or business, but whether under the
circumstances the wife's presence and activities perform a business
function.02
The appellate court's starting point was that the expenses must be
ordinary and necessary in connection with the taxpayer's business and
not ordinary and necessary in connection with his employer's business. 403
400United States v; Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1969). Significantly the
"conditions of employment" terminology is used under section 119 as virtually a
synonym for convenience of the employer. See text at note 30, supra.
401 '"But the added factor here is that the husband has, because of company policy,
been put to the additional expense of paying his wife's travel expenses so that she could
assist him in this way on the road. It is this distinction which accounts for the fact
that, under the circumstances of this case, her travel expenses are deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses, whereas her living expenses at home are not." Id. at 788.
402Recent Case, Wife's, Traveling Expenses, note 292 supra, at 1438.
403 United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1969). However, the Service
hag conceded that ari employee expense which benefits the employer (i.e., a necessary
employer expense) also furthers the employee's trade or business. See text at "note 347
supra.
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The tests to be met are whether the dominant purpose of the wife's trip
was to serve her spouse's business purpose in making the trip and wheth-
er she spent a substantial amount of her time in assisting her husband
in fulfilling that purpose.404 The husband's business purpose in taking
the trips was, in essence, to promote the family-entertainment public
image of the company, to enhance the morale of company representa-
tives, and to "cultivate close and cordial relationships between his com-
pany and the exhibitors and other company executives with whom the
company dealt throughout the world." 405 To perform the latter duties,
the trial court found that it was necessary for the taxpayer to have his
wife with him at various luncheons, dinners, receptions, film screenings,
press conferences and good will visits.
The appellate court believed that this necessity was established not
only by the taxpayer's determination, but also by the company require-
ment, almost a condition of employment for lower-echelon executives,
that executives' wives accompany them on such trips. This policy was
reinforced by the company's practice of defraying the expenses of such
travel through reimbursements. In the Ninth Circuit's opinion con-
formity with this company policy adequately established that these trips
had a bona fide business purpose tested by the husband's business purpose
in making the trip. The Disney court was careful to state that an em-
ployer requirement and reimbursement policy does not always render the
employee's expenses deductible.40 6
The Ninth Circuit returned to the effect of employer compulsion on
deductibility of traveling expenses in Stratton v. Commissioner.4 7 There
the taxpayer-employee was a foreign service officer for the State De-
partment assigned to a permanent duty station in Karachi, Pakistan. The
State Department had issued regulations making it compulsory that such
employees return to the United States on "home leave" as soon as pos-
sible after completion of three years of foreign service. In the fall of
1962, the employee and his family were authorized to travel at govern-
ment expense to the United States so that he could consult with the
4o4 Id. at 788.
405 Id. at 787.
406 "The fact that an employer may prefer to have an executive take his wife along
is not controlling if ber presence does not serve the taxpayer-employee's business
purpose in making the trip. The fact that an employer defrays the travel expenses of
the wife is not controlling, for this may, and frequently does, represent only a bonus
for past business achievements by the employee." Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
4o7 448 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1971).
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State Department in Washington, D. C. and then go on "home leave."
During this time the taxpayer and his family traveled throughout
the United States. The taxpayer claimed deductions for the unreim-
bursed expenses he incurred for transportation, meals, and lodging for
himself and his family during the period he was on "home leave."
The issue before the appellate court was whether the taxpayer's "home
leave" was primarily personal in nature (to give the taxpayer a vaca-
tion) or was primarily related to the taxpayer's trade or business.408
The Commissioner argued that: (1) the "home leave" was primarily
a personal trip; (2) on such leave the taxpayer performed no official
acts and was accountable to no one; (3) "home leave" was credited
to the employee's leave account according to length of time abroad
rather than to time needed for reorientation; (4) since the Department
did not provide a per diem or reimbursement it did not view "home
leave" as a business trip; and (5) the taxpayer's government travel au-
thorization implied that "home leave" was at the taxpayer's request or
convenience.4°9 The taxpayer maintained that he was ordered to take
"home leave" as a mandatory duty assignment carried out on behalf of
his employer.410
The court acknowledged that "home leave" was akin to vacation;
indeed, it was probably so intended in order that a foreign service officer
could reorient himself with the American way of life in a short time
through travel, observation, reading, and conversation, unburdened by
the mundane duties of his everyday job.4"1 The crucial factor to the
Ninth Circuit, however, was that despite the fact that "home leave'.'
was in the nature of a vacation, it was also a "compulsory job require-
ment."
Unlike other taxpayers, Stratton did not have a choice as to 'where
he could spend a substantial portion of the family treasury. He did
not have the option of investing his money or spending it on a new
car, a boat, a trip to another country abroad, or an expensive hobby.
Instead, he was mandatorily required to take a vacation in the United
408 Id. at 1031.
409 Id. at 1032.
410 Id. The Tax Court, 52 T.C. 378, had found no evidence that the taxpayer was
compelled to take his "home leave.' The review court believed such finding t6 be
clearly erroneous. Id.
411 ' The Department realizes direct, albeit intangible, benefits in terms of the effec-
tiveness of its employees by virtue of just such 'vacations.'" Id. at 1033. "
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States. It may not be a particularly onerous burden to many foreign
service officers, but it still is an unavoidable expense imposed by the
employer and by statute for reasons pertaining directly to the em-
ployee's trade or business (emphasis added) .412
The Stratton court therefore held that the travel expenses, including
food and lodging, attributable to the taxpayer while he was on "home
leave" were primarily related to his trade or business as a foreign serv-
ice officer. Just as it had earlier indicated in Disney that the expenses
of not all employer-required travel were deductible, the court of appeals
felt:
[C] onstrained to add, however, that implicit in our decision in this
instance is the fact that it was the Congress that has determined to
require the travel involved. In the context of a private employer's
requirement that certain executives travel on leave to various countries
in order to better perform their duties, such a requirement significantly
becomes more suspect as a device for tax avoidance than would a
similar requirement imposed on government employees by the Congress
of the United States.413
Stratton disallowed any deduction for the "home leave" expenses at-
tributable to the taxpayer's wife and children. They were not employed
by the State Department and there was no mandatory requirement either
by statute or regulation that they accompany the husband on "home
leave." 414 Disney was distinguished on the grounds that there an express
company policy requiring executives to take their wives with them on
extended business trips to enhance the company's image was present
and that the record manifested that the wife's public relations duties
served her husband's business purpose in making the trip.4"5
Disney was foreshadowed by Warwick v. United States,4 16 a district
court decision. Substantially similar facts were involved in the two
cases, including the fact that in Warwick lower echelon officers of the
corporate employer were required to take their wives with them on cer-
tain business trips abroad. However, since the taxpayer was a senior
412 d.
413 Id.
4 14 Id. at 1034.
415 Id. at 1034 n.13.
416 236 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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officer the decision was left to him as to whether to take his wife. Al-
though not expressly articulated by the district court, it appears that had
the taxpayer in Warwick occupied a less powerful executive position
with his employer as in Disney, "the necessity of taking his wife on the
trips would have been dictated by employer insistence amounting almost
to a condition of employment." 417
The husband's duties in Warwick were similar to the husband's in
Disney, i.e., to project his employer's corporate image of competency
and integrity and to have a very close, friendly relationship with Euro-
pean customers.418 His wife's duties were to assist her husband in es-
tablishing that relationship.1 She occasionally visited the customers?
manufacturing establishments and on such occasions made the appro-
priate remarks. Her more significant activities, however, entailed enter-
taining customers and their wives in her hotel room and making it pos-
sible and congenial for her husband to be entertained in the customer's
homes. 420 The district court found that all of the wife's time was de-
voted to assisting her husband on the foreign trips, to the exclusion of
vacationing or touring on her own behalf. 42' Both the taxpayer and
his employer were of the opinion that the wife, through her travel with
her husband, did contribute measurably to his success, and consequentlyhis .422his earnings.
The Warwick court's ultimate conclusion was that "[t]he only rea-
son [the wife] ... went was because of her husband's business, and it
was appropriate to the conduct of his business. She assisted him in his
business and assisted him in the production of his income." 423 Warwick
also noted that the trips of the wife before it "differed from those of
a wife '*ho accompanies an ordinary salesman while he calls on his
trade..." 424 Nevertheless, a comparison with the majority of traveling
wife decisions reveals that the only truly significant difference was the
element of employer compulsion. Thus, Warwick may also be regarded,
as an employer compulsion decision, tested by the husband's business
417 United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1969).
418Warwick v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 761, 764-65 (ED. Va. 1964).
419 Id. at 765.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id. at 766.
423 Id. at 767.
424 Id.
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purpose, although only the latter element was expressly relied upon in
the holding.
To be contrasted with the facts and holdings in Disney and Warwick
is the Tax Court opinion in William H. Johnson.42 This case is an ex-
treme example of its illiberal attitude as to wives' traveling expense.
There a division vice president of the taxpayer's employer asked him to
take his wife to a convention. The taxpayer testified that his failure
to do so would have jeopardized his career.42" His wife did some secre-
tarial work at the convention, visited the company booth, met other
wives for breakfast, and worked in the company's hospitality suite.427
The Tax Court acknowledged that the taxpayer's wife aided him
through social contacts with the wives of delegates at the convention,
but after repeating the talismanic phrase that being "helpful" is not
enough, a traveling wife's functions must be "necessary," the court
found against the taxpayer for lack of evidence that the wife's presence
was of a substantial benefit. The court was not informed of the "extent
of the secretarial work," "how much time she spent at the company
booth or what she did while there," or "whether she merely ate break-
fast with other wives or acted as a hostess." 4 8 The factor of employer
compulsion was ignored.
The Disney conclusion that the fact that the wife spent much of her
time attending to "wifely" duties did not necessarily require the con-
clusion that her presence did not have a bona fide business purpose,
stands in stark contrast to the Tax Court's rather frequent cavalier denial
of deductions for the cost of a wife's travel on the grounds that her
services, such as entertaining clients, were no more than her "wifely
duty." 42 Disney, of course, held that it was the element of company
policy, i.e., an employer requirement, that made her traveling expenses
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses while the cost
at home of her living expenses and implicitly of her performance of
wifely dudes, constituted nondeductible personal expenses.3 0 Similarly,
in Stratton the Ninth Circuit had held that the taxpayer's vacation trip
to the United States was an unavoidable expense imposed by his em-
425 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 964, 970-71 (1966).
426 Id. at 970.
427 Id.
428 Id. at 971.
429 See notes 384 through 386 supra.
-40 United States v. Disney, 413 F2d 783, 788 (9th Cir. 1969).
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ployer for reasons pertaining directly to his trade or business."' Thus,
it, is clear that expenditures which if incurred by an employee of his
own volition would be personal become deductible business expenditures
if mandated by the employer for his own business reasons."
The Commissioner argued on brief in Rudolph before the Supreme
Court that this rule could not be the law.
At first sight, it might seem that nothing is more related to the
'business' of being an employee than that which is, in the phrase
quoted by petitioner from Judge Brown's dissent, "indispensable" to
keeping the job. Reflection, however, reveals the deficiencies of that
"but for" reasoning. In what petitioner calls the "ways of modem
business" there are many things that it may be essential to do to keep
one's job: dress well, belong to the right club, live in an expensive
neighborhood, entertain generously, or go on hunting trips with the
boss. The extent to which the "corporation" sometimes impinges upon
and controls the private life of the "organization man" is, indeed,
emphasized in Judge Brown's dissenting opinion of the Thomas case
(see petition for certiorari). With but slight extension, therefore, the
implicit premise that whatever the corporation demands the employee
may deduct could readily be applied to substantially all personal and
living expenses. Plainly that cannot be the law. One cannot deduct
commuting expenses because his employer requires him to come to
work (and go home to sleep) to keep his job (Regs. § 1.162-2(d));
the cost of his expensive clothing because his employer requires him
to dress well; the cost of being active in community affairs because his
employer expects it of him; the cost of a trip to Bermuda because his
employer insists that he take his vacation away from the tribulations
of home life, the better to perform his work upon return; or the cost
of food or shelter because one must eat and sleep to work. So plain,
indeed, is the error in petitioner's but-for reasoning, that the problem
is not to prove it wrong but to suggest how the obviously necessary
limitation on "ordinary and necessary" business expenses is to be
drawn . 3
The fallacy in the Commissioner's examples is that the employer usually
does not require the employee to make any of the above expenditures.
Yet where they are imposed upon the employee for bona fide employer
'43i Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1971).
432 Cf. Willis B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801, 805 (1963) (Opper, J, concurring).
43 Note 340 supra.
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business purposes pertaining directly to the employee's trade or busi-
ness, and he does not have the option of not making the expenditures,
they are in fact deductible.
Customarily the employer does not require the employee to commute;
it is the latter's choice whether to live within walking distance of his
job. Nevertheless, where the employer requires the employee to move
his work location and the employee is unable to move his residence as
well for reasons other than personal choice, under the better reasoned
decisions such "commuting" expenses are deductible. 4
Similarly, the Service has ruled that the cost of clothing that is of a
type specifically required as a condition of employment and is not
adaptable to general usage to the extent that it would take the place of
ordinary clothing, is deductible.435 It may be noted that the convenience
of the employer echoes of the ruling are reflected in the case law as
well. 436 The Tax Court has extended the deduction to "highly stylized"
clothing, clearly expensive, which the taxpayer, a fashion coordinator,
was required to wear to meetings of style experts and buyers, but which
was in her opinion not suited for her personal wear.487 Also, in language
reminiscent of the early educational expense cases and rulings, the Serv-
ice has held that hairdressers may deduct the cost and maintenance of
their unforms which are required to be worn by terms of their employ-
ment, state law, or regulations. 431
As to the cost of being active in community affairs, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Noland v. Commissioner,43 9 in disallowing deductions for such
expenditures, specifically noted that the expenditures were not required
by the employer. Stratton440 illustrates that the cost of an employer
mandated vacation may be deductible to an employee. Similarly, where
an employee is charged for meals or lodging furnished by his employer
on premises for the latter's convenience, an amount equal to that charge
434 See text at notes 108 through 125 supra.
435 Mim. 6463, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 29.
436 See, e.g., Louis M. Roth, 17 T.C. 1450, 1455 (1952); 0. G. Russell, 21 P-H T9x
Ct. Mem. 298 (1952).
437 Betty Lusk Yeomans, 30 T.C. 757 (1958).
438 Special Ruling, 6 CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 1 6630.
439 Noland v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885
(1959).
440Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1971)-
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is excluded from the employee's gross income,441 albeit technically not
through a deduction.
Unlike Gotcher, in which the Fifth Circuit synthesized the various
trends permitting exclusion of employer mandated employee expenses
primarily benefiting the employer, Disney and Stratton do not draw
together the various areas in which employer compulsion forms a basis
for deduction of expenses incurred by an employee. Nevertheless, these
cases share elements in common, and recurring principles are involved
as in the exclusion area. For example, a common element in the areas
of moving and educational expenses has been the establishment of the
bona fides of employer compulsion through benefit to the employer.
This element recurs in Stratton where the Ninth Circuit held that the
taxpayer's employer received direct, albeit intangible, benefits in terms
of the taxpayer's effectiveness by virtue of his compulsory travel. Sim-
ilarly, Disney implied that the entertainment and social activities of the
taxpayer's wife on the travel in question helped build the employer's
good will. Certainly the company's management believed that the
company's special image would be enhanced if its representatives traveled
with their wives. Since the function of the employer benefit element in
the deduction area is merely to corroborate that the cause of the expen-
diture is an employer requirement, it would appear that an employer's
belief that the expense benefited it is sufficient; an actual -benefit to the
employer need not be shown. Indeed, the Court of Claims has ruled
that where "an employer to all intents and purposes directs an employee
to be present at a certain place and at a certain time, the conclusion
is compelled that the trip, at least from the employer's point of view,
primarily serves his purposes." 42
Another recurring element has been employer reimbursement. .-The
Service's entertainment expenses ruling443 that employer reimbursement
tends to establish thar an expense is incurred in the employee's business
is paralleled by the holding in Disney that the employer requirement or
policy was backed up by a policy of reimbursement. It has been argued,
however, that a policy of reimbursement should be given little, if any,
weight in the question of deductibility. This argument is based on the
theory that what the company considers ordinary and necessary for its
business should not control what is ordinary and necessary to its em-
441 Boyldn,v' Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958).
442 Peoples Life Ins. Co..v. United'States, 373-F.2d924, 929 (Ct: CI. 1967).
443 Rev. Rul. 57-502, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 118'. ------- -
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ployee's business.4 4 4 The answer to this is the unarticulated premise of
Disney: a reimbursed expense which has to pass the "critical scrutiny of
corporate officers concerned with the elimination of needless expense" 445
does benefit the employer and thus the employer compulsion is bona
fide. An employee purpose to advance his employer's interests consti-
tutes a business purpose as to the employee.446 This same premise no
doubt underlies the rule promulgated in the pre-1962 business expense
regulations447 and in the substantiation regulations44 8 under which an
employee is not required to report on his tax return reimbursements
for travel and other expenses that he incurred "solely for the benefit of
his employer" if he was required to make an adequate accounting to
his employer. The problem of the controlled employer is covered by
special rules applicable to reimbursements to employees who are holders
of 10 per cent or more of the stock of their employer, whether directly
or by attribution.449
Further evidence that reimbursement is merely a factor corroborat-
ing employer compulsion is manifested by the fact that the appellate
court in Stratton did not even bother to directly address the Govern-
ment's argument that the employer's failure to provide a per diem allow-
ance or reimbursement of the taxpayer's expenses suggested that the
former did not view the "home leave" as a business trip. Of course, to
the extent that the taxpayer's failure to seek or obtain reimbursement
for his traveling expenses evidences an acknowledgment by him of
the weakness of his position, i.e., an unwillingness to submit the expense
to the critical scrutiny of his employer, it tends to establish that the
expenses are not deductible. 450
Thus, the employer deduction trends share the common elements of
utilization of employer benefit or employer reimbursement to establish
444 Recent Case, Wife's Traveling Expenses, supra note 292, at 1437-38.
445Noland v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 108, 113 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885
(1959). But see James T. Thrower, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1707, 1716 (1962), aff'd,
330 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1964) (no authority exists for unique argument that approval
by employer of reimbursement yields "presumption of regularity"; however, on facts
employer scrutiny was pro forma).
446 See text at note 347 supra.
447 Treas Reg. § 1.162-17 (1958).
448 Id. S 1.274-5 (e) (2) (1) (2) (1962).
449 Id. § 1.274-5 (e) (5) (ii) (1962). See also Id. § 162-17 (d) (1) (iii)(1958).
450 See Walter M. Sheldon, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 256, 259 (1961), aff'd, 209 F.2d
98 (7th Cir. 1962); Price, supra note 321, at 86-87.
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that the employer compulsion is bona fide. The reason is not hard to
see. As noted by commentators:
By itself, however, the commanded appearance by an employee can
hardly change the cost of a trip for personal enjoyment into an or-
dinary and necessary business expense. If such reasoning were fol-
lowed, all an employer would have to do if he wanted to give his
employees a nontaxable bonus, would be to require them to attend
a city or resort area under the pretext that it is for a business con-
vention.4 11
One answer, advocated by the Service, is to impute any employer intent
to benefit the employee to the employee, so that the expense, although
compelled, is primarily incurred for his personal benefit and hence not
deductible.452 A similar theory was recently adopted by the Tax Court
in International Artists, Ltd.453 The business-personal dichotomy is ap-
plicable to a corporation in that if an expenditure is primarily made to
benefit an individual in control of the corporate affairs the expenditure
is personal and not deductible by the corporation and constitutes taxable
income to the benefited individual. Consequently, if the primary pur-
pose of the mandated expense is to benefit the employee, then it is not
deductible by him, at least to the extent that it is intended to benefit
him. Inherent, however, in such a subjective test is the difficulty of
showing employer or employee intent. Thus, objective criteria such as
employer business purpose or reimbursement requiring an accounting
to the employer constitute a more practical, and easier administered
451 See Note, Convention Trips, note 82 supra, at 571; 47 VA. L. Rav. 1097, 1103
(1961).
452 See text at note 347 supra.
453 54 T.C. 94, 104 (1970). International Artists also held that the primary purpose
criterion is applicable to claimed business expenses only if the secondary purpose is
relatively insignificant; otherwise, allocation is necessary. On the other hand, the
section 162 regulations provide that traveling expenses are deductible only if the trip
is primarily related to the taxpayer's trade or business; if not, the expenses are not
deductible even if the taxpayer engages in business activities at this destination. Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958). Many decisions apply this regulation without question;
others add that the taxpayer had not shown any basis for a partial allocation. Edgar A.
Basse, 10 T.C. 328 (1948). Most significantly, some decisions have made allocations
(particularly where automobile expenses were involved), albeit without discussion of
the regulation's all-or-nothing test. See, e.g., William L. Heuer, Jr., 32 T.C. 947 (1968),
aff'd, 283 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1960). It would appear that the Cohan rule (see text at
notes 222 through 244, supra) would require an allocation, 'even though the business
purpose of the travel was relatively insignificant.
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solution to the problem of insuring that the employer compulsion is not
a device to give the employee a tax free, i.e., deductible, bonus.
Disney required, in addition to the employer business purpose safe-
guard, that the compelled expense be rationally connected with the
employee's business purpose or activities. 454 Indeed, the employee busi-
ness purpose appears infinitely more important than employer business
purpose. The Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayer's conformance With
company policy (the analogue of employer compulsion for lower eche-
lon employees) adequately established that the wife's presence on the
trips had a bona fide business purpose tested by the husband's business
purpose in making the trip.455 His business purpose was in part to pro-
mote his employer's public image, to enhance the morale and enthusiasm
of company representatives, and to cultivate close and cordial relation-
ships between the company and its customers. The circuit court con-
cluded that to fulfill these duties it was necessary for the wife to ac-
company the taxpayer to the various luncheons, dinners, receptions,
press conferences and good will visits.4 56 Stratton also found that the
taxpayer's travel, conversation, and communication, resulting ih renewal
of his knowledge of American life, was directly related to his trade or
business of being a foreign service officer although primarily achieved
through personal activities such as vacation traveling.4rT
The Ninth Circuit has taken this requirement beyond the educational
and entertainment expense authorities if it demands a proximate rela-
tionship to the employee's activities or duties other than his duty to obey
his employer's command when the expense is mandated by the em-
ployer. In the latter areas, relationship with the taxpayer's other duties
is an alternative basis for deduction, not a prerequisite for deduction
in addition to employer compulsion.4 5 If Disney and Stratton are read
in this manner, the mistake made by the Hill progeny will be repeated.
Of course, where a commanded expense benefits the employer, it will
usually be intimately related to the employee's duties in addition to
following his employer's command. For example, the wife's travel in
Disney benefited the employer's image, but then the husband's duties
included promoting his employer's image. Furthermore, the Service has
454 United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1969).
455 Id.
4561d. at 787.
457Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030, 1033 n.9 (9th Cir. 1971).
4.8 See text at notes 177 and 283 supra.
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admitted that it is part of an employee's business to further the interests
of his employer. Therefore, an expense incurred in obeying an employer
command that benefits the employer meets the test of the employee's
business purpose. In short, it is the employer business purpose or benefit,
not the employee business purpose in the abstract, that is decisive. In
this light Disney and Stratton are completely consonant with the educa-
tional and entertainment expense trends. Furthermore, while the Gil-
more "origin of the expense" test would only appear to require that the
expenses be commanded by the employer,459 in which case the origin
of the expense w6uld be the employer compulsion which in turn would
be business in nature because essential to the continuance of the tax-
payer's employment, in actuality if the commanded performance bears
no relationship to the trade or business of the employer, it is more
likely that no compulsion actually existed or that the employee incurred
the expenses for reasons other than the employer's command. Thus,
these employer benefit and reimbursement safeguards are compatible
with the employer-compulsion-origin test because they insure that the
compulsion, which may be susceptible to abuse, is the origin of the
claimed expense.
Conclusion
The striking parallelisms in approach, theory, and even terminology
manifested in the decisions permitting exclusion of employer reimburse-
ment of commanded employee expenditures and allowing deducti6n
by employees of similar expenditures clearly establish the existence of
common principles supporting such exclusions and deductions, regardless
of the specific category of expenditure. This conclusion does not result
from inductive reasoning. Rather, it reflects the fact that a single
statutory gross income provision (section 61 and predecessors) with its
judicial glosses and a single Statutory deduction provision (section 162
and predecessors) should each yield consistent results when the factors
of employer compulsion and benefit are present, without considering
the classification of the expenditure reimbursed or deducted. On the
exclusion side, the central element is the primary benefit to the em-
ployer. If the employer is primarily benefited, the incidental economic
benefit received by the employee is not compensatory, and hence, not
49 See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
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taxable income.4 60 Lack of employee control, the concomitant of em-
ployer compulsion, may constitute a secondary basis for exclusion, but
the true significance of employer compulsion is that "[w]hen an em-
ployer to all intents and purposes directs an employee to be present at
a certain place and a certain time, the conclusion is compelled that the
trip, at least from the employer's point of view primarily serves his
purpose." 401 In any event, this limited role played by employer com-
pulsion or lack of employee control should not extend beyond the cause
of the expenditure." 2 Moreover, the fact that indirect benefits are en-
joyed by the employee's wife,463 or a wife's traveling expenses accom-
panying her husband, 64 should not preclude exclusion as long as the
employer is primarily benefited. The scope of such benefit should
encompass at a minimum the following: (1) benefits from activities
that directly improve the employee's ability to perform his assigned tasks
more effectively;465 (2) tangible and substantial economic benefits to
460 See text at notes 69 and 142 supra. See generally Ness & Vogel, note 42 supra, at
§ 835.
461 Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924, 929 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
462 See text at notes 70 and 214 supra.
463 Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1951 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 6031.
464 Disney v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1 (D. Calif. 1967), aft'd, 413 F.2d 783 (9th
Cir. 1969); Allen J. McDonell, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 126 (1967).
465 Benefit to the employer as a tax concept has not received extensive delineation
in tax cases. See text at notes 31 though 34 and 39, supra. On the other hand, the
concept has received considerable attention in the local law area of workmen's com-
pensation in a striking instance of parallel evolution: (1) the "bunkhouse" rule (see,
e.g, Pearson v. Taylor Fruit Farm, 18 Ohio App. 2d 193, 248 N.E.2d 231 (Ct. App.
1969)); Rosen v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 49 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
is the analogue of the convenience of the employer doctrine, in some jurisdictions
even using identical terminology, In re Kilcoyne, 352 Mass. 572, 227 N.E.2d 324 (1967);
(2) educational activities, Kenny v. Rockingham School District, 123 Vt. 404, 190 A.2d
702 (1963); E. R. Burget Co. v. Zupin, 226 Ind. 633, 82 N.E.2d 897 (1948); (3) enter-
tainment of employer's customers, Charles v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ariz. App. 202, 407
P.2d 391 (Ct. App. 1965); and (4) the "special errand" rule which encompasses trips
to and attendance at employer sponsored conventions, Cabin Crafts, Inc. v. Pelfrey,
119 Ga. App. 809, 168 S.E.2d 168 (1969); Lawrence v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ariz. 401,
281 P.2d 113 (1955); Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 18 Cal. Rptr.
540 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The California Supreme Court has recently held that class
attendance by an employee which was of direct benefit to the employer constituted a
"special mission" within the scope of employment. Dimmig v. Workmen's Comp'n
App. Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2686 (Cal. Sup. Ct., March 31, 1972). Criteria used to ascertain
direct benefit were: (1) employer encouragement, (2) greater percentage of employer
reimbursement for expenses of courses directly related to the employee's job, and (3)
the educational activity directly improved the employee's ability to perform his as-
signed tasks more effectively.
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the employer;466 and (3) benefits from a specific work assignment other
than the employee's usual job activities.4 67
The key to the deduction of these expenses is employer compulsion,
which establishes the element of necessity as well as provides the required
connection with the employee's business. Theoretically, employer bene-
fit could also satisfy the necessary and business related requirements
since it is appropriate to the employee's business that he further his
employer's business. But in practice benefit to the employer and direct
relationship with the employee's everyday activities appear to have been
utilized in most cases more as a means of testing the bona fides of the
employer compulsion 68 than as an independent test. Paradoxically, the
basis for deduction is the mirror-image of the exclusion, since the latter
turns more on benefit to the employer, with the secondary emphasis
placed on employer compulsion. Thus, in theory, reimbursement of a
given expenditure might not be excludible because the factor of benefit
to the employer was not sufficiently strong, but the expenditure itself
would be deductible by the employee because of bona fide, albeit mis-
directed, employer compulsion. On the other hand, where the expense
primarily benefits the employer, not only would reimbursement be
excludible but an unreimbursed expense would be deductible as well. 469
Yet, as a practical matter it is submitted that on the usual set of facts
the results will be the same whether exclusion or deduction is involved.
For this reason, the sole issue where reimbursed expenses are involved
466 The workmen's compensation authorities are in conflict in this area. For example
the Dihmzig court, id., distinguished activities that directly benefit the employer from
those that only indirectly benefit the employer, such as an employee vacation or health
plan which provides benefits not directly related to the employee's actual job function,
but only indirectly aid his ability to perform by keeping him healthy and, it is hoped,
happy. A company sponsored picnic would appear to fall on the indirect benefit side
of the line, and the leading commentator in this area has stated that a determinative
factor is whether the employer benefited tangibly, and not merely through better
morale and good will. LAsomN, WozrKlmN's COMPENSATiON LAW 22, 23 (1965). But
other courts have ruled that improved employer-employee relations fostered by such
company picnics (that extend beyond the tangible value of improved employee health
and morale common to all recreation) constituted such tangible benefits to the employer.
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery v. Industrial Comm'n, 36 IMI. 2d 410, 223 NE.2d 150
(1967) (and authorities cited therein); accord, Kohlmayer v. Keller, 24 Ohio St. 2d 10,
263 N.E.2d 231 (1970).
467 See Allen J. McDonell, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 126 (1967).
M0 8 See p. 36 & note 177 supra.
469 See text at notes 279 and 347 supra.
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is properly whether the reimbursement is excludible47° and deduction
should play a role only where the expense is neither paid directly by the
employer nor reimbursed.
The above principles point to the directions that exclusions and de-
ductions in this area should have taken. Instead of such uniform devel-
opment it is as if a morality play were being reinacted in each area.
The allegorical characters are Administrative Opposition to exclusion
and deduction, Judicial Opposition, Judicial Approval, and Non-Judicial
Resolution of the Conflict. The first act stars Administrative Opposition,
invariably played by the Service. The Tax Court and the other tri-
bunals have taken turns at being Judicial Opposition and Judicial Ap-
proval in the second act. In the third and final act, Congress attempts
to end the conflict arising in the second act by imposing a new rule,
albeit perhaps arbitrary, in each run of the play decreeing exclusion
or deduction in limited circumstances. The Service is substituted for
Congress in the educational expense area. This survey has not been
intended to be solely a scholastic study of what might or should have
been, for the quasi-Hegelian progression has yet to be resolved in one
principal area: travel expenses. In this field, especially as to conventions
and travel by wives, appellate courts have recently taken positions
favoring either exclusions or deductions depending on the forum. The
Tax Court has traditionally by and large favored deductibility of con-
vention expenses but has disallowed wives' traveling expenses. It has
hardly spoken to the issue of exclusion. It is to be hoped that either
the Tax Court or the Service will reassess their positions with respect
to such expenses in order that still another otherwise predestined final
act with a mechanical and nonconforming conclusion by Congress will
be avoided. As the Tax Court itself has recently held:
[I]n the area of the tax laws, Congress has already chosen to legislate
with a great deal of particularity; nevertheless, it should not be bur-
dened with the necessity of considering additional details of the law.
Congress can and should expect us to assume a responsible role in this
470 One -commentator has pointed out that if the principle that reimbursements for
expenses incurred by an employee for his employer's benefit and convenience do not
constitute gross income to the employee discloses a major flaw in the Service's require-
ment that an employee report all reimbursements as income if he is going to claim a
deduction for any unreimbursed expenses. Huffaker & Falb, supra note 297, at A-12.
It may be further noted that without the reporting requirement mth of section 274 be-
comes ineffectual.
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constitutional system of government of attempting to carry out the
general policies decided upon by the Congress.
Everybody deplores the complexity of the tax laws, but if we make
it necessary for Congress to write every rule in detail, then we con-
tribute toward that complexity. 471
471 International Trading Co., 57 T.C. 455, 464 (1971) (Simpson, J, concurring).
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